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PREFACE 
During 1974 and 1975, members of the Department of Anthropology 
and Sociology, and Social Work, at the University of Queensland, 
carried out a study to assess the social impact of one of Australia's 
greatest natural disasters, Queensland's Australia Day Floods of 
January 1974. One of many studies, this one was undertaken to assess 
the effects of the floods on householders and to evaluate the relief 
activities of formal organisations. This University of Queensland 
study (referred to here as The Flood Study) entailed a retrospective 
study of the evacuation of Normanton in far north Queensland; a study 
of organisations involved in relief and rehabilitation in Brisbane and 
Ipswich; and a longitudinal study of flood-affected households in 
Brisbane and Ipswich. 
This thesis develops aspects of the longitudinal study through 
secondary analysis of the data. (The beginnings of the research are 
outlined in Chapter 1). An underlying concern in this work is the 
appropriateness of the conceptual framework used in the Flood Study. 
Therefore, a critique of some aspects of the Flood Study and the 
research traditions upon which it was based is undertaken, in 
Chapter 2. It is argued that concepts employed, which were chosen 
from the major traditions of disaster research, required 
reformulation. A review of these major traditions leads to the 
adoption of the concept of "vulnerability", which refers to 
risk-bearing in relation to the natural environment, as a central 
analytical tool. The complex of structures and processes by which 
householders' vulnerability is constituted is illustrated in Chapter 3. 
Bureaucratic management of the environment, the privatisation of the 
environment through private home ownership, and a confidence in 
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technological mitigation and post-impact relief measures are 
recognised as significant elements in the constitution of patterns of 
vulnerability. These structures are shown (in Chapter 4) to have been 
relevant also to the development and acceptance of a particular public 
(and dominant) account of the catastrophic flooding in the Moreton 
Region. This account emphasised the disaster groupings of "helpers" 
and "victims" which were formed in relation to what was defined as an 
environmental threat. The public account and the public response are 
shown to have been predicated upon an uneven distribution of knowledge 
of the hazard (held mainly by experts in government departments) and 
an acceptance by householders, who were mainly private home owners, 
that dealing with the effects of vulnerability was essentially a 
private concern. 
In Chapter 5, recovery, though depending upon state organised 
financial assistance, is shown to be very much a private concern, 
achieved in large part by the private effort or household labour of 
those directly affected by the flooding. Chapter 6, providing a 
conclusion to the enquiry, emphasises that throughout the analysis, 
attention repeatedly returns to a paradox of acceptance by 
householders that management of the use of the environment is 
essentially a state responsibility, but that management of the 
unfavourable outcomes of using the environment (their vulnerability) 
is essentially a private responsibility. This is recognised as a core 
feature of the structuring of vulnerability, impact and recovery. 
Finally, elements of an emergent substantive theory and their 
practical implications are identified. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION (AND BACKGROUND TO THE MORETON REGION FLOOD STUDY) 
The Beginnings of the Research 
Among the many community reactions to the flood experience was a 
predictable interest in documenting and evaluating responses. 
Accordingly, particular agencies such as State Emergency Services, the 
Civil Defence Organisation, the Bureau of Meteorology and various 
other groups and organisations examined and reported on their own 
involvement. Media reports and contemplative articles in the press 
discussed the experience. No less predictable was the reaction of 
people in various university departments, who saw either the need or 
potential for research into various aspects of the situation. 
Responses came in particular from the Departments of Architecture, 
Geography, Psychology and Psychiatric Medicine, as well as from Social 
Work and Anthropology and Sociology, and from individual members of 
other departments at the University of Queensland. The University as 
a whole responded with discussion at many levels and through various 
channels, with organised seminars and public meetings. 
Similarities and differences in interest and approach were 
discovered and attempts were made to co-ordinate research efforts. 
After the initiation of the Flood Study, meetings were arranged in the 
Department of Social Work, which were attended not only by staff from 
that department and from the Department of Anthropology and Sociology, 
who continued as collaborators, but also by others from the 
Departments of Geography and Psychology. Attempts were also made to 
co-ordinate activities with research conducted by the Department of 
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Psychiatric Medicine. The final outcome of these discussions was 
that, apart from the congruence of interests between the Departments 
of Anthropology and Sociology and Social Work, there were significant 
differences in approach and in areas of interest, and it was accepted 
that an amalgamation of all interests into one co-ordinated project 
was not feasible. As a result a number of separate research projects 
were undertaken, with different aims and foci, but all drawing upon 
the same subjects - the flood-affected population. This fact had 
implications for the practical administration of research, 
particularly where questionnaire administration was concerned. Not 
only did it complicate the ethical issues associated with the use of 
the flood-affected population as the source of information, but the 
multiplicity of investigations added yet another dimension to the 
experiences of flood-affected people. Some flood-affected people were 
repeatedly the subjects of many different studies. 
The Departments of Social Work and Anthropology and Sociology 
embarked upon a longitudinal survey of flood victims and a survey of 
helping organisations. This resulted in the publication of a report 
to the Department of Social Security, the Queensland Flood Report, 
Australia Day, 1974 (Chamberlain et al., 1981). This publication can 
be regarded as the first stage of the research which has led to this 
thesis. The thesis is essentially a re-examination of the original 
data in the light of additional data. It entails a critique of 
theoretical approaches to the study of natural disasters and, more 
broadly, to natural hazards. (The terms "natural disaster" and 
"natural hazard" will be distinguished in later discussion.) The 
relationship between the first stage and the re-analysis of data, 
though apparently sequential, is best described as dialectic. The 
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beginnings of this thesis lie in concerns about the relevance and 
usefulness of the theoretical and methodological approach adopted for 
the Flood Study in providing new directions for the understanding of 
disasters. The re-examination arose because, in a fundamental way, 
there appeared to be a 'poor fit' between the data and the theoretical 
framework. Victims' experiences were clearly not uniform and were not 
simply determined by the physical characteristics of the flood. 
Moreover, although at different times (because of the progress of the 
flood and the gradual accessibility of resources), most flood-affected 
people focussed upon the same activities, they were not all 
experiencing 'phases' of the disaster at the same time. There was a 
good deal of variability in the times people spent on various tasks as 
responses to the flooding. An early scepticism in this regard led to 
a rejection, even in the early stages of the Flood Study, of the 
concepts "disaster phases" and "flood/disaster victims" - both central 
concepts in disaster research literature and in welfare discourse. 
The Flood Study, as it was conducted, had little capacity to reveal 
the underlying determinants of the situation; to explicate reasons for 
the "disaster". The unsociological nature of the project prompted 
further theorising and the inevitable return to the data. The 
research comprising the Flood Study and this thesis is properly viewed 
as an exercise in "grounded theory" in the sense outlined first by 
Glaser and Strauss (1967), that is, the discovery of theory from data 
systematically obtained from social research. 
The following account of the development of the research 
concentrates upon those aspects which are particularly relevant to 
the re-analysis of data, that is, most relevant to this thesis. A 
more detailed account of the Flood Study can be found in Chamberlain 
et al. (1981). 
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The Flood Study 
The first stage of this research had its beginnings in the period 
immediately after the floods, with the socially disruptive 
consequences of the floods becoming the subject of the study. The 
timing of the research affected its conduct in the following ways. 
Firstly, there was no pre-established plan for such a study and 
the researchers had comparatively little experience or knowledge of 
the field of disaster research specifically. As a result, the 
preparation of research instruments and the definition of research 
tasks were, to a large degree, developmental. 
The research plan was formulated at a time when the physical and 
social environment had not returned to "normal", and therefore 
research questions and hypotheses were heavily influenced by the 
everyday experiences of the research participants at that time. These 
included direct personal observation of the situations of relatives, 
friends, colleagues or acquaintances who were flood-affected; 
secondhand accounts by others affected by the disaster; media reports 
from a variety of sources; and other talk, both public and private, 
about "the disaster". This is not to suggest that the formulation of 
the research was unsystematic, or that research questions were 
developed solely in the light of such personal experience. A review 
of available literature contributed to the formulation of the research 
and alerted the researchers to common "disaster myths", but it 
presented no serious challenge to the "commonsense", everyday 
interpretations"of the disaster. The research was designed to 
document the disaster events more systematically, to point to 
shortcomings in the counter-disaster effort and finally to make 
6
recommendations for the further improvement of the counter-disaster 
effort. 
A second effect emerging at this early stage of research was the 
sense of urgency which permeated early research activity. It was felt 
at the time that if a successful study of the effects of the flood 
were to be carried out, a major part of the data collection would have 
to be done in the immediate post-impact period. The implicit 
assumptions here were that the disaster was a short-term, sudden event 
that could not have been observed either before or after this time and 
that the flood-affected person's account of his or her flood 
experience recorded soon after the flooding would be more accurate 
than any account recorded at a later stage. These assumptions were 
never seriously examined during the first stage, although the 
practical implications of undertaking a large-scale research project 
in a very short time led researchers to assume the validity of survey 
data recorded as much as seven months after the flood. This sense of 
urgency which had influenced the initial organisation and conduct of 
the research and these assiimptions upon which it was based can now be 
recognised as elements of the very social environment that was to be 
investigated. 
It was under these developmental conditions that the two surveys 
of flood-affected households came to be designed and conducted in 
Brisbane and nearby Ipswich. The first of these was carried out 
during the period May to August 1974 (between four and seven months 
after the flood) and the second in April and May 1975 (fourteen to 
fifteen months after the flood). A discussion of sampling procedures, 
questionnaire design and conduct of these surveys follows. 
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The Samples 
When the samples were being designed, little precise information 
was available about the flood-affected population in Brisbane. A 
flood map showing areas of inundation at various levels on the 
Brisbane Port Office gauge and a careful estimate of the 1974 flood 
line had been" prepared and published soon after the flood by the 
Queensland Surveyor-General. However, Windsor and Jindalee, suburbs 
which the research group wished to consider for inclusion in the 
sampling, were not shown on this map. Therefore an approach was made 
to the Brisbane City Council for information on the extent of flooding 
in these areas. Information was also available from the officers of 
the Queensland Disaster Welfare Committee (QDWC) on the number of 
applications for financial assistance which had been received by the 
Lord Mayor's Fund from various suburban areas in Brisbane. (The 
Queensland Disaster Welfare Committee was a central welfare 
co-ordinating committee of social workers and other welfare 
professionals which obtained funding from the Australian Department of 
Social Security to co-ordinate a working unit of social workers, some 
seconded from government departments and some employed under contract 
to the QDWC. Its purpose was to ensure effective service delivery and 
especially to ensure that disadvantaged groups and individuals with 
special needs were identified and serviced early.) At the time it was 
believed that the figures supplied by QDWC would be good indicators of 
the number of households affected by flood. This assumption may not 
have been altogether justified, since between 19 per cent and 
22 per cent of the households surveyed appear not to have applied for 
financial assistance from this fund. Nevertheless, these two sets of 
information (that is, the maps of flood-affected areas and the 
estimates of applications to the Lord Mayor's Fund) provided the basis 
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on which the sample was constructed. Initially it was hoped that the 
entire flood-affected region might be covered, but after examination, 
some areas were eliminated. Among them were South Brisbane and 
West End, because of the high proportion of industrial and commercial 
sites in these suburbs. Others eliminated were Ashgrove and St. 
John's Wood, since only a few homes in these areas were affected, and 
the cost of paying interviewers to travel to and return for callbacks 
in these areas was prohibitive. Within the selected suburbs, 
boundaries were drawn around the most densely populated affected 
areas, thus defining the locations in which the data would be 
collected. Care was taken to ensure that the sample was selected from 
both river-flooded and creek-flooded areas. Once the sample areas had 
been drawn, the number of households to be interviewed within each 
area was determined. The number for each area was in direct 
proportion to the estimated number of affected households in the area. 
All streets from an area were randomly ordered and each street was 
then canvassed for interviews. Interviews were conducted on one side 
of the street only, this side being determined by systematically 
assigning either the odd numbered or even numbered side for each 
street alternatively as streets appeared on the randomly ordered list. 
Interviewers were instructed to begin interviewing at the lowest 
numbered house on the designated side of the street and proceed to 
interview at every fourth house from that one. Interviews were 
conducted only at households where floodwaters had entered the 
property. This, then, was the operational definition of the "flood 
affected household". Interviews were conducted with an adult person 
from the household which, in most cases, meant a household manager. 
This term is used in place of the conventional sexist terms 
'head of household' and 'spouse'. 
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BRISBANE AREA SAMPLE 
n = 4 3 1 
'NINDiOR 
in] 
Figure 1.1: Brisbane sample areas, 
To sum up then, the sampling method adopted for Brisbane was basically 
a three-stage one, involving: 
1. Stratified sampling of flood-affected areas; 
2. Simple random sampling of streets within selected areas; 
3. Systematic sampling of households. 
For Ipswich, much the same sampling procedure was adopted, 
although there were minor variations because the field work did not 
commence until Brisbane data collection had been completed. The basis 
of the sampling procedure here was a flood map which showed 
25 demarcated flood-affected areas with total number of known 
flood-lost (i.e. totally destroyed) and flood-affected dwellings in 
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each area. This is the major difference between the Brisbane and 
Ipswich samples. The starting points in Ipswich were known, not 
estimated, numbers of flood-affected units. Again, some of the 
25 affected areas were eliminated on the basis of practical 
considerations. The inner city areas were not included and areas 
where the number of flood-affected households was comparatively small 
were also eliminated. All other areas were included in the sample. 
IPSWICH AREA SAMPLE 
n = 99 
uicmiROT 
Figure 1.2: Ipswich sample areas. 
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Table 1.1 lists the number of interviews conducted in each sample 
area in 1974 and 1975. 
TABLE 1.1 
INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED IN EACH SAMPLE AREA 
Number of 
Interviews 
1974 
Number of 
Interviews 
1975 
Brisbane 
Chelmer-Graceville 
Fairfield-Yeronga 
Jindalee 
Milton/Toowong'-'' 
Rocklea 
St. Lucia* 
Windsor 
Ipswich 
All Areas 
Goodna 
117 
90 
53 
19 
72 
10 
70 
75 
24 
65 
43 
25 
39 
39 
35 
16 
TOTALS 530 262 
"Interviews were not conducted in these areas in 1975 because 
the small numbers involved made interviewing in these areas 
uneconomical. 
The procedure for the selection of respondents for the follow-up 
study in 1975 was quite straightforward. A simple random sample, 
consisting of half the number of 1974 respondents, was selected for 
each area from the 1974 lists. In a very few cases respondents 
interviewed in 1974 indicated at that time that they did not wish to 
be interviewed again in 1975. Such respondents were not approached on 
the second occasion, their names being struck off the list of 
follow-up study respondents, to be replaced by further random 
selection from the 1974 lists. 
12
The Questionnaires 
Copies of the questionnaires or interview schedules together with 
copies of letters of introduction and interviewer instruction sheets 
are reproduced in Appendix A. The basic questionnaires for the 
Brisbane and Ipswich surveys covered a number of areas of interest. 
These can be grouped under four main headings: 
(i) Personal and social characteristics of affected 
individuals, e.g. age, socio-economic status, 
previous flood experience, family size and 
composition; 
(ii) Flood dimensions - peak height, speed of onset, 
duration of impact; 
(iii) Impact on the individual's immediate physical 
environment; 
(iv) The operation of other forces within the social 
environment, e.g. the response of other 
individuals, groups and organisations whose 
actions may have been directed either at 
controlling the physical agent or at supporting 
or assisting the affected individuals. 
The 1974 questionnaire was designed to document, record and, 
where applicable, measure these factors, so that their 
inter-relationships could be discerned at the analysis stage. The 
follow-up questionnaire was intended chiefly to assess recovery and 
the extent of adjustment to the flood hazard. Several questions were 
asked about financial assistance in 1975 in an attempt to confirm the 
reliability of the 1974 data. A large battery of questions, focusing 
on the flood-affected person's perception and knowledge, use and 
evaluation of helper organised activities, was also included. 
Finally, a major section of the follow-up schedule dealt with the 
association respondents had with different organisations and their 
involvement in local area activities. The aim was to document more 
extensively the potential networks of support available to 
flood-affected people and to identify those they had used in the 
process of recovery and rehabilitation. 
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The Analysis of Data 
Frequency distributions and extensive cross-tabulation were 
carried out on these data to explore the relationships between 
variables in the groups outlined above. The following diagram shows 
the main inter-relationships between variables which were examined in 
the Flood Study. 
Individual demographic variables 
(family structure, number in 
household, age, sex, income 
level, etc. of principal house-
hold manager) 
Previous flood experience 
Type of warning 
-> Expectation of flooding 
or perception of the 
flood hazard 
Perception of the threat 
Preparations made 
Evacuation variables 
(method and time of 
evacuation; satisfaction 
with evacuation) 
Within this second group of variables the following relationships 
were also considered: 
Expectation of flooding or 
perception of the hazard 
Perception of threat 
Perception of threat 
Preparations made 
Perception of threat 
Preparations made 
Evacuation variables 
-> Preparations made 
-> Evacuation variables 
Finally, the effects of all these variables on a set of variables 
which were labelled "impact" variables and upon reported recovery were 
assessed. 
However, this thesis is concerned not only with developing a 
better understanding of what happened during, and in the afteirmath of. 
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the 1974 Moreton Region floods but also with the issue of whether 
conventional sociological studies of disasters have posed useful 
questions. More particularly, it addresses the issue of whether more 
relevant questions than those posed by the Flood Study could be asked 
about the Moreton Region floods of 1974, and a re-analysis of the data 
does suggest "other useful lines of enquiry. 
This re-examination of theory and data has been motivated by a 
general concern about theory, method and ethics in sociological 
research. Such concern implies an examination of the models of 
society which have informed natural disasters research as well as an 
awareness of the ways in which the research programme itself is 
related to the social environment which it purports to investigate. 
It implies also a questioning of the responsibility for conducting 
disaster research after impact and of the utility of knowledge so 
gained. 
Theory, Method and Ethics 
The approach to theory and method taken here has been motivated 
by what can be described broadly as the interpretive tradition in 
sociology - by Winch's (1958) account of a philosophy of action, the 
phenomenological tradition (Schutz, 1964; Berger and Luckman, 1967), 
by some of the insights of ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967; Schutz, 
1972; Cicourel, 1964) and particularly by Habermas's extension of the 
hermeneutic tradition embodied in his suggestion that the structure of 
critical social theory should reflect that of the psychoanalytic 
encounter. According to Habermas (1979), the task of the 
psychoanalyst involves, first, interpretation - interpreting the 
meaning of what the patient thinks and feels. Next the psychoanalyst 
must develop an explanation of what is happening to the patient. This 
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will involve reference to forces which are not independently 
controlled by the patient and the language of explanation here is like 
the language of the natural sciences. It recognises that there are 
circumstances in which human social life is shaped by forces of which 
the social actors are unconscious. Then, a third element in the 
psychoanalytic encounter involves emancipation - actively transforming 
what is happening to the individual into what the individual makes 
happen; transforming, if you will, the locus of control. Habermas, in 
recognising the essential reflexivity of human action, argues that 
critical social theory should also have this structure, that it too 
should involve interpretation, explanation and emancipation. This 
statement has been influential because it is concerned not only with 
the inter-relationships of theory and method as conventionally 
conceived but also with the ethical dimension of sociological work -
the question of the "uses" of sociology and the liberating potential 
of sociological knowledge. 
This critical tradition stands as an alternative to the 
positivism and functionalism which dominated American and Australian 
sociology in the 1950s and 1960s - what some refer to as 
'Establishment Sociology'. In the positivist tradition, theory 
(logical explanation) and method (the rationale for the acceptance or 
rejection of hypotheses) were seen as distinct specialties and 
separate from everyday matters - independent of the social world of 
investigation and the scientist's own social location. Positivism as 
a methodological tradition, in denying the essential reflexivity of 
human action, denies also that social life, the social world, is 
actively constituted by and through the actions of its members. 
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In contrast, the interpretive tradition asserts the significance 
of the internal logic of social life and the significance of 
subjective knowledge. In this respect, the interpretive tradition not 
only challenges positivism but also structural-functionalism of which 
"systems theory" (which, it will be illustrated, has informed much of 
the sociological analysis of disasters) is an elaborate outcrop. 
Indeed, the recognition of the significance of subjective knowledge in 
the interpretive tradition makes the nomological dimension of the 
whole gamut of structuralist theory problematic, in part because of 
the cultural difficulty, in a world dominated by science and 
technology, of sustaining a genuinely structural as opposed to a 
causal explanation of social phenomena. A genuinely structural 
explanation is based not upon the simple assumption of underlying 
causes of human social action but upon the assumption that social 
structures which condition or shape social action are both the medium 
and the outcome of social actions. A structural explanation entails a 
focus upon the way in which people as social actors (members of social 
groups) make things happen or allow them to happen. 
At the same time, many writers, including Robert Merton in his 
formulation of the notion of "middle-range theory" (Merton, 1957), 
have acknowledged the difficulty of applying the methodology of 
positivism - of testing "grand theory" using positivistic methods. 
Merton's response remains within the positivist tradition in its 
acceptance of the validity of a unidirectional sequence of hypothesis 
formulation, observation, testing and conclusion as procedures for the 
construction of theory. It is "grand theory" rather than the 
positivist method which Merton casts aside. He fails to acknowledge 
that the difficulty of applying large-scale grand theory lies in its 
overly deterministic, law-like character, because of the links which 
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grand theory has had with positivism as a methodological tradition. 
Thus, his middle-range theory inherits, but disguises, the problems of 
applying positivist methodology to the social world. It continues to 
use the language of the hypothetico-deductive method, searching for 
and proposing causes. Theory and method remain separate activities; 
and the possibility of the researcher being neutral is assumed to be 
real. There is no doubt, in Merton's account, that description can be 
free from interpretation and that value-freedom is possible. 
Furthermore, the question of who makes use of sociological knowledge 
is not part of the formulation of the notion of "middle-range theory". 
In accordance with this (North American) tradition of 
functionalism and middle-range theory, systems models of society have 
been conventionally employed in disaster research, and researchers 
have clung to the methodological tradition of positivism. Such models 
have assumed that (at least for the purpose of analysis) a societal 
cognitive and value consensus exists with regard to any disaster and 
that the actual physical impact of a hazard is the prime cause of a 
natural disaster. Thus physical characteristics of the "disaster 
agent" (flood, cyclone, tornado) and the dimensions of impact (number 
of people killed or injured, number of buildings affected, costs of 
damage) form the basis of generalisation and comparison (see Barton, 
1969:42-45 for a typology of disasters based on these factors). Such 
studies have not taken sufficient account of the internal logic of 
particular social structures which have been affected by natural 
hazards. These studies have failed to acknowledge the interdependence 
of theory and data. 
The Brisbane Flood Study can be included in this critique, for 
implicit in the lines of enquiry was a "model" of a smoothly 
functioning society suddenly disrupted by the floods, an event which 
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provoked a more or less unified response from a variety of 
agencies, whose goal was to restore society to its "normal" pattern. 
Although factors such as socio-economic status and strength of 
personal social networks were seen as likely to affect the level and 
speed of individual recovery, the level of flooding and the amount of 
property damage were viewed as the most important factors affecting 
recovery. Socio-economic status and strength of personal support 
networks were treated in the analysis as personal attributes of 
"victims" and not as structural features of the society. "Recovery" 
was seen as a restorative process, essentially collective and 
necessarily directed by those with the institutional power to control 
resources. Indeed, the major rationale for the project was to gather 
data which would assist in making future policy decisions about the 
"distribution" of welfare in disasters. Moreover, there was no 
expectation that the knowledge produced by the study would necessarily 
be shared by those most directly affected by the hazard - the 
"victims" - to be used if necessary by them to improve the quality of 
their lives. In other words, a critical, emancipatory dimension was 
absent from the Flood Study, just as it has been from most disaster 
research. 
In contrast to this conventional approach to disaster research, 
this thesis, in taking its direction from the interpretive tradition 
and from critical theory, attempts to follow an alternative strategy 
for the reinterpretation of data. In this task, the work of Glaser 
and Strauss (1967) has provided a most useful prescription at the 
practical level, and this thesis, as previously stated, should be 
regarded as an exercise in grounded theory as formulated by Glaser and 
Strauss. Their formulation, like Merton's "middle-range theory", can 
be regarded principally as a response to the difficulty in using grand 
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theory in social research. Unlike Merton, Glaser and Strauss have 
utilised the insights of the interpretive, phenomenological tradition. 
They reject the imposition of the external logic of 
hypothetico-deductive language and recognise not only that meaning 
systems and the internal logic of social arrangements must be taken 
into account in devising explanations of the social world (cf. 
Cicourel, 1964; Douglas, 1970; Baldamus, 1976; Phillips, 1971; 
Habermas, 1968; Giddens, 1982, 1984) but also that systematic social 
research really involves "tripping back and forth from data to 
theory", a process of "progressive double fitting". Here there is a 
continuous adjustment of concepts and data, theory and method (Glaser, 
1981). Like Baldamus (1972, 1976) who describes this latter activity 
as one "sui generis" of sociological work, Glaser and Strauss (1967) 
see no other way of doing sociological analysis. It is in the 
recognition that this j^ the nature of sociological work and the basis 
of sociological knowledge that the possibility for a critical and 
humanistic (emancipatory) knowledge of social structure and human 
agency lies. 
Accordingly, the analytical strategy adopted in this thesis, 
which is based upon a re-analysis of survey data from the Flood Study, 
takes account of additional information gathered during the Flood 
Study by less formalised methods. Knowledge gained in the actual 
conduct of the research at that time has also contributed to a 
critical re-analysis. It is a strategy which concentrates not upon 
personal stress (which was emphasised in the Flood Study) but upon 
social categories and upon relevant social practices. It is also 
based upon the belief that a major goal of sociological analysis is to 
discover the underlying mechanisms by which commonsense knowledge is 
produced and not simply to re-affirm it by reproducing it in 
'scientific' terminology. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF DISASTERS: THEORETICAL AND 
METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 
In this chapter, the development of the conceptual framework 
informing the re-examination of the Flood Study data will be examined 
and the questions which have directed this analysis and 
re-interpretation will be stated. Two separate research traditions 
provide the background to the present analysis. The first, 'disaster 
research' and the second, 'natural hazards research' can be 
distinguished, not only by their differing approaches but also by 
their respective attention to different stages in the development of 
natural disaster or hazardous events. Disaster research has, for the 
most part, focussed upon the way societies function at times of actual 
threat and impact of natural hazards and during the immediate 
post-impact period. Natural hazards research, in contrast, has been 
concerned with all situations where there is at least the potential 
for the impact of a natural hazard, whether or not an impact has 
occurred. A review of the differences and links between the two 
traditions provides a useful starting point for a discussion of 
concepts. 
Disaster Research 
Despite some calls to concentrate to some extent upon the study 
of the response to disasters, in terms of structural characteristics 
of whole societies and cultures (Quarantelli and Taylor, 1978; 
Westgate and O'Keefe, 1975; Clausen et al., 1978), the field of 
disaster research is dominated by studies of the functioning of local 
communities (for exsimple, suburbs, towns, cities or even regions) and 
formal organisations operating during impact. This emphasis on the 
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study of community and organisational functioning has come about 
because there is the belief that effective response to the impact of 
disaster is largely a matter of appropriate preparations and efficient 
response by informally organised groups and formal organisations 
developed specifically to deal with problems arising from extreme 
environmental-conditions (Quarantelli, 1972). This research has been 
heavily influenced by systems theory. Organisational personnel and 
counter-disaster planners think of organisations and communities as 
'systems', with sociological studies analysing the behaviour of human 
beings largely in terms of the extent to which behaviour is 
incorporated, or can be incorporated, within designed systems of 
communication and control (Quarantelli and Dynes, 1977). In these 
views, 'systems' are seen to be collections of inter-related parts 
with specific purposes or functions, usually understood to operate 
within specific boundaries. The general assiomption that social 
systems tend towards some equilibrium and not that parts should 
function to maintain the whole, typically underlies these approaches. 
With the influence of cybernetics, these systems are regarded as 
input-output systems and effectiveness of response has usually been 
evaluated in terms of the efficiency of organisational performance: 
in terms of the extent to which 'inputs' match 'outputs', supply 
matches demand and in terms of the accuracy and speed of 
communication. Judgements about recovery are generally made in terms 
of the rapidity with which the whole social system functions normally 
again. 
Implicit in this approach is the assumption that the disaster 
agent or the environmental hazard is external to the social system. 
In many studies (for example, Killian, 1954; Fritz, 1961; Barton, 
1969) the disaster has been regarded quite explicitly as an event 
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isolated in time and opposite to normal social processes: a sudden, 
external interruption. 
Now, while this view recognises that the nature and effects of 
the impact of a natural hazard are shaped by social forces, it 
employs a consensus model of society, based upon the assumptions that 
goals and values of the whole society or system can be specified and 
that there is a general acceptance amongst members of the society of 
these goals and values. The relationship between individuals and 
social structure is non-problematic in this account; normally 
individuals occupy social positions and perform social roles and so 
contribute to the efficient (smooth) functioning of the social system. 
Disaster disrupts this 'normal' and efficient functioning by 
preventing individuals from fulfilling their normal roles. The 
experience of disaster is regarded as a collective one with variations 
conceptualised in terms of the single dimension of role performance. 
A consensus model of disaster society further assumes that a cognitive 
consensus exists with regard to the threat from the environment; that 
there is only one account of events. 
One notable response to this tradition of disaster research has 
come from the Sozialwissen schaftliches Institut fur Katastrophen und 
Unfallforschung (Social Science Institute for Disaster and Accident 
Research) in West Germany. In a paper published some years ago 
(Clausen et al., 1978) the concept of disaster is examined in terms of 
the distribution of knowledge in class-based society. Disasters, they 
argue, are the result of the deliberate, uneven distribution of 
knowledge which occurs in class societies. Those in power (the 
dominant class) bring their point of view to bear upon others, and the 
distribution of knowledge (about hazards) is at least inhibited, if 
not deliberately distributed unevenly, via established social 
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processes. Hence, appropriate disaster action is not easily performed 
by many since they do not have sufficient knowledge of their 
circumstances. Clausen et al. (1978) reject a consensus model of 
societies in disaster and criticise previous approaches to the 
sociology of disaster because in these, disasters were construed as 
sudden breaks in or disturbances to the continuity of normal events. 
These types of analyses, Clausen et al. (1978) assert, lead to a 
defensive and politically conservative approach to the problem of 
disaster - an approach which emphasised the return to 
'normality'; the reinstatement of society as it was. What they 
propose instead is a phenomenological Marxian analysis of disaster, 
wherein the emergence of differential definitions of disasters based 
upon class divisions can be studied. Because they see the evolution 
of disasters as being propelled and characterised by social 
antagonisms, the theory of historical and dialectical materialism is 
seen to be relevant to the understanding of disaster events and this 
implies, for them, that the analysis of disasters should begin with an 
analysis of the mode of production of the society in question. 
However, Clausen et al. (1978) fail to clarify sufficiently the 
application of this perspective on disasters and, more importantly, 
their conception of 'class' is not altogether clear. Thus, some 
important questions are left hanging in the balance. 
Their assertion that class analysis can be used to explain the 
evolutionary processes of disasters is accompanied by other more 
contentious claims. The first is that knowledge (including 
disaster-relevant knowledge) is distributed (or withheld) on the basis 
of class divisions in society. By this they mean that members of the 
dominant class by virtue of their power in the economic order, are 
able to construct definitions of the real world and utilise these as 
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instruments of domination. Clausen et al. (1978) see this knowledge 
possessed by the dominant class as being imposed as ideology upon the 
less powerful. They assert that: 
disaster action is not easily performed by many because 
previous social processes have, in regard to individuals, 
classes or groups, destroyed or inhibited knowledge or 
deliberately distributed it unevenly (Clausen et al., 
1978:64). 
This suggests useful lines of enquiry. However, their contention that 
the 'knowledge' of the dominant class in capitalist society is imposed 
as ideology upon the less powerful (my emphasis) suggests an overly 
simplistic conception of the link between knowledge and power in any 
society. 
Then, as an outcome of this line of thinking, the authors suggest 
that it might be quite appropriate and realistic in disaster to speak 
of "an antagonistic disaster society with disaster beneficiaries and 
disaster victims" (Clausen et al., 1978). This division, they argue, 
parallels the differentiated distribution of knowledge amongst class 
groupings. Again, this idea (not fully developed in their paper) 
suggests an all too simple division of an (antagonistic) disaster 
society. Consideration of empirical evidence from around the world 
would lead one to reject the contention put by Clausen et al. (1978) 
that loss, in disaster, is determined by class position. Indeed, such 
contentions have caused some authors to reject out of hand the value 
of any type of class analysis of disaster situations (see comments by 
Wettenhall in Murray, 1979). 
These problems in Clausen et al.'s (1978) paper and the lack of 
clarity about their conception of 'class', undermine the value of 
their work. They have suggested that conflict (rather than consensus) 
is the organising principle in disaster societies; that a class 
analysis provides a key to understanding who suffers loss in disasters 
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in modern capitalist societies; and that knowledge is a critical 
component of power which affects the allocation of resources in such 
societies. These suggestions can, however, be utilised to formulate a 
more satisfactory alternative to traditional disaster research. 
First, however, a review of the alternative tradition of natural 
hazards research is necessary. 
Natural Hazards Research 
Developments in the field of natural hazards research offer a 
different approach. Here, an ecological perspective is firmly 
established. The relationships between humans and their environment 
are central and, importantly, this perspective recognises that 
environmental hazards have a dual cause - human activity and nature. 
The interaction of humans and nature is, in natural hazards research, 
conceptualised broadly in terms of inter-system adjustments between 
two separate systems - the human use system and the natural events 
system (Kates, 1970). More specifically, a conceptual framework of 
'adjustment-perception' - referring to the rational adjustments which 
people make to their perceived environment - is applied to investigate 
the adaptive behaviour of individual users of hazardous environments 
(Hewitt and Burton, 1971). This approach combines an ecological 
framework with a behavioural model of 'bounded rationality' (Kates, 
1970). 
According to this model, adaptive behaviour in hazardous regions 
results from accurate perception and adequate knowledge of the hazard 
and effective decision-making whereby individuals evaluate possible 
strategies for adjustment to the environment in terms of their costs 
and feasibility. On this basis, it is posited, they arrive at a 
satisfactory minimum or optimal level of adjustment. Analyses based 
upon this model (for example, Burchill et al. , 1979) have focussed 
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heavily on the processes of searching for and adopting or rejecting 
particular adjustments. The study of these processes entails a 
description of decision-makers' (individual householders, 
organisational personnel, community leaders, legislators) perceptions 
of the hazard and their possible adjustments. 
Such analyses have generally treated adjustments as if they can 
be made on an individual and/or small-scale community level and have 
failed to examine some of the external limits placed upon adjustment 
by, for example, legislation, local government practices, labour 
markets, land and housing markets, the distribution of other 
commodities and the processes of communication or information 
distribution. Similarly, differences in class position and power have 
not seriously been examined for the effects they may have on the 
individual adjustment process. The adjustment-perception paradigm is 
based, like most disaster research, upon a consensus model of the 
social world. The social world is assumed to be a stable, cohesive 
system. The economic, political and social structural determinants of 
behaviour have not been explicitly dealt with by the 
adjustment-perception approach though their importance has been 
recognised (White and Haas, 1975; Burton et al., 1978). 
Westgate and O'Keefe (1975), two British geographers, were among 
the first to deal explicitly with the broader social, economic and 
political dimensions of hazard vulnerability or human exposure to 
hazards. They do so by challenging the notion that disasters are 
external to the social system and recommend quite strongly that 
disasters be regarded as part of the normal functioning of the social 
system: 
It is essential to view disaster as an extreme within a 
series of non-extreme events, an extension of every-day 
life, where the latter is as important to an understanding 
of disaster as the disaster manifestation itself (Westgate 
and O'Keefe, 1975:57). 
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Westgate and O'Keefe (1975) assert that disaster events occur at the 
interface between the natural environment and the human group; between 
an extreme physical and natural phenomenon and a vulnerable human 
group. Disaster events are manifestations of this interaction. This 
approach, then, places their work firmly in an ecological framework. 
However, they emphasise that vulnerability should not simply be seen 
as the level of 'unpreparedness' of a community for the impact of a 
hazard but as a broader concept which entails a recognition that 
individuals and societies are exposed to a wide range of problems and 
that their capacities to deal with these problems vary widely. The 
authors define 'vulnerability' as 'the incapacity of a community to 
deal with unfavourable elements (the hazardousness) of a physical 
environment, an environment which provides economic resources for 
their community or wider society'. Westgate and O'Keefe's (1975) 
discussion, by reference to the differences in risks borne by people 
in Third World countries in comparison to those in the First World, 
implies that in a general sense, the benefits and risks of living in a 
particular environment or location are not evenly distributed amongst 
different groups in any society. However, they do not deal explicitly 
with the possible bases of this inequality. 
There have been more recent developments in natural hazards 
research also, which have responded to omissions in the traditional 
approach and have indicated some change in direction. Marston (1984), 
adopting a political economy perspective, outlines some advantages of 
this perspective in comparison with the established 
adjustment-perception approach: 
The key difference between the traditional approach and the 
political economy approach is that what is implicit in the 
former is theoretically and empirically explicit in the 
latter. Whereas the traditional approach suggests that 
social variables are important, political economy 
28
specifically attempts to define and analyse those social 
variables, such as economic system and governmental 
organization, which influence vulnerability (Marston, 
1984:9). 
However, although the political economy approach offers a dimension of 
social structural analysis not incorporated in previous research 
and does provide an adequate framework for the analysis of structural 
constraints upon human adjustment to hazards, its application to the 
analysis of natural hazards has involved the abandonment (albeit 
temporarily) of the focus on individual (household) practices present 
in the adjustment-perception model. As a consequence, the approach, 
from a political economy perspective, does not adequately deal with 
the question of human agency at the micro-level of the household. The 
capacity of households, as social actors, to act independently of 
particular social structures is, on the whole, not fleshed out. 
Questions about how people oppose structural constraints are still not 
adequately dealt with; nor are questions about how people reproduce 
structures (including constraints) through their actions. In 
particular, although the political economy perspective of natural 
hazards recognises that government laws and practices (political 
forces) and economic forces such as the profit motive and market 
competition are strongly related and that they influence people's 
behaviour, important questions such as how, in practice, private home 
ownership and concepts of individualism, or ideas about private, 
individual responsibility, operate in the context of wider political 
and economic forces to affect disaster vulnerability are largely left 
unanswered. Applications of a political economy approach to the study 
of natural hazards have offered a critical perspective not apparent in 
either the earlier, adjustment-perception tradition of natural hazards 
research or disaster research. However, as a response to the 
adjustment-perception paradigm, they have echoed a long-standing 
29
debate in sociological theory concerning the relationships between 
human agents and social structures. 
New Directions 
In practice, it may be difficult to devise a method of analysis 
which deals adequately with both structure and hviman agency but an 
analytical model which explicitly acknowledges both dimensions of the 
social world should produce a fuller account of the interplay of 
social practices and social structure. Such a model, foreshadowed in 
this thesis, emerges from the omissions of past research and responds 
to four sets of questions thrown up by the Flood Study. The following 
questions were left unanswered by the conventional analysis employed 
in the Flood Study. 
Who (which people, in which positions) understood the nature of 
the hazard, its potential for damage and expected frequency? This 
set of questions centred around the question of who decides how the 
flood plain can be or will be used. For most residents of the flood 
plain, their use of it was 'taken for granted' and not questioned. 
Why were there so few town planning restrictions on residential 
occupation of the flood plain? The recognition that the catastrophe 
which emerged was not an inevitable outcome of riverine flooding but 
that particular uses of the flood plain had contributed to the 
potential for catastrophe raised questions about which particular 
practices had increased this potential and how. 
How were the benefits and costs (for individuals as well as for 
'the community') of residential use of the flood plain assessed? 
Since the outcome of river and creek flooding in the areas concerned 
was predictable, why was the event which was both publicly and 
privately acknowledged to be a disaster 'allowed' to occur? 
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What were the processes by which a dominant, public account of 
the flood and its aftermath was sustained? The apparent discrepancy 
between public accounts of the flooding and recovery and private 
experience drew attention to the possibility that several accounts of 
what was happening, not one, might be possible. 
Now these concerns link directly with those expressed by Clausen 
et al. (1978), Westgate and O'Keefe (1975) and Marston (1984), and 
with the debate over the extent to which structural arrangements 
determine what social actors do and how social actors may act 
independently or in opposition to social structures. In recognition 
of these important connections between theoretical and practical 
concerns, the analytical model proposed here utilises the insights of 
these recent analyses and proceeds firstly, to attempt to clarify the 
concept of 'class', a method of class analysis and the dimensions of 
the structure-agency connection. This is done in order to understand 
the ways in which the natural environment is incorporated in and by 
social structures and processes. This will help in understanding how 
vulnerability to a hazardous environment is socially produced. The 
approach taken in clarifying these concepts is somewhat eclectic but 
it begins with the following assxamptions: 
(1) that the production of goods and services and the reproduction of 
society and of individuals (biologically) are central activities 
in all human societies; 
(2) the way that the production of goods and services is organised 
significantly determines the system of distribution of resources 
in society; 
(3) that when some (or all) of the forces of production are privately 
owned, conflicts of interest are implicit in the process and the 
organisation of production and hence of distribution; 
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(4) that the processes and organisation of production and 
reproduction do not simply determine cultural and political 
practices but that the latter can have important influences upon 
the former. 
A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Disaster 
One of the major difficulties with class analyses results from a 
confusion between 'class' as a mode of social organisation which may 
or may not generate 'classes' or class groups and 'class' as class 
position or a description of where an individual is situated in 
relation to this mode of organisation. This confusion of a generative 
concept on the one hand, with a categorical one on the other, gives 
rise to problems such as those in Clausen et al.'s (1978) analysis and 
to much discussion and debate within the discipline of sociology 
(Connell, 1983a, 1983b; Cutler et al., 1977; Habermas, 1979; Giddens, 
1981, 1984; Wright, 1976, 1980; Kelley and McAllister, 1983a, 1983b). 
In capitalist societies (i.e. societies organised around the 
private ownership of the means of production), classes in Marxian 
terms are groupings formed around the opposing interests of capital 
(owners of the means of production) and labour (non-owners of the 
means of production) or in Weberian terms around different market 
capacities. In both of these schemas, 'class' is theorised first and 
foremost as a generative and relational concept concerned primarily 
with understanding the forces producing social groupings (the 
organisation of production or the relations of production for Marx and 
the organisation of the market - production and exchange - for Weber). 
They do not set out to delineate the categories or discrete groups of 
people produced, as is done by stratification researchers (Runciman, 
1974; Parkin, 1972; Lenski, 1966; Encel, 1970). In the Marxian 
scheme, in the last analysis there are only two class groupings 
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(forces representing opposing interests) - the capitalist class and 
the proletariat. In Weberian terms there are only four main class 
groupings (representing different market capacities) - the propertied 
class, the intelligentsia (a managerial class), the traditional petty 
bourgeoisie and the working class. However, neither of these analyses 
necessarily implies that in any society at any particular point in 
history only two (from Marx) or four (from Weber) class positions or 
locations exist. Rather, the implication is that there are really 
only two or four positions from which transactions in the sphere of 
production (or in the market place) can take place. Thus, a 
generative theory of class leads one to question how, in capitalist 
societies, various groupings in society (business persons and trade 
unionists, blacks arid whites, men and women, 'helpers' and 'victims') 
are connected to the class system. 
Applying such a concept to the analysis of disaster, then, 
involves looking for ways in which disaster groupings ('helpers' and 
'victims', for example) are connected, through ideas and social 
practices, to positions in the class structure. It does not 
necessarily involve, as Clausen et al.'s (1978) analysis seems to 
suggest, looking for ways in which the bourgeoisie, as a category, win 
and the proletariat, as a category, lose in disasters. A class 
analysis of natural disaster involves asking questions about how 
natural disaster is connected to the maintenance (or destruction) of 
an antagonistic system of private property (the class structure). How 
and why classes emerge - or do not - as categories of actors in 
disaster, are matters for empirical investigation. Even when class 
groups do not emerge, the fact that in capitalist societies 
antagonistic relations between capital and labour are built into the 
system of production, forces one to ask why they do not form. 
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Hence, in a class analysis of disaster, attention will be 
focussed upon: 
(1) how vulnerability to natural disaster (or the risk of injury to 
persons and damage to property) and people's ability to withstand 
its effects, is constituted through the incorporation of the 
natural environment into the capitalist system of social 
organisation; 
(2) how groupings which form in the disaster (such as 'victims' and 
'helpers') are connected to the class structure; 
(3) how vulnerability - the negative aspect of incorporation of the 
natural environment into the system of social organisation - is 
'managed' through cultural, political and economic practices 
which can contain potential class conflict; and 
(4) how patterns of recovery from disaster are related to particular 
forms of vulnerability constituted in a capitalist system of 
social organisation. 
It should be noted at this point that, in accordance with the 
basic assumptions outlined above (Page 31), political and cultural 
practices are not seen necessarily to have their essence in the 
economy. Also, the production of knowledge as a cultural practice is 
not seen as necessarily ideologically oppressive. Practices within 
each sphere - the economic, political and cultural - are seen as being 
constrained and facilitated by practices within the other spheres of 
social action. The economic sphere is seen to be basic only in the 
sense that life in any form cannot proceed without the act of 
production and in this sense, disruption of or challenges to the 
system of production are seen as more fundamental than, for example, 
challenges to the political system or the dominant culture (unless 
these lead to or arise from challenges to the system of production 
which, of course, they may). 
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Connections amongst the economic, political and cultural 
dimensions of social organisation occur at the level of everyday 
social processes. Everyday practices, both formal and informal, are 
carried out because they 'make sense'. They are the logical 
connections made by social actors at all levels. There may be several 
possible (and possibly conflicting) interpretations of everyday 
practices. The question arises as to how it is that 
one interpretation of a disaster and not other possible 
interpretations provides a basis for action that 'makes sense' (i.e. 
works sufficiently well as a basis for action for most people). These 
are essentially empirical questions but they require a brief 
theoretical consideration of knowledge and power, as processes, and 
their connection to social structures. 
Knowledge, Power and Social Structures 
Knowledge and power are inextricably bound together and both are 
inherent in all social relations and social relationships. 
Michel Foucault (1969, 1975, 1980) has recognised this in developing 
the concept 'power-knowledge'. For Foucault, everyday knowledge is 
generated within specific regimes of power and at the same time it 
comes to be a resource for power. For Foucault, power is a complex 
strategic relation in a given society (Foucault, 1980) and any 
particular strategy is constituted on the basis of particular 
knowledge - not because of its capacity to establish a reign of 
ideological mystification but because certain 'knowledges of men 
[sic]' have the capacity to define certain fields of empirical truth, 
and thus to establish what Foucault calls a 'regime of truth': 
There can be no possible exercise of power except through 
the production of truth ... we must speak the truth; we are 
constrained or condemned to confess or to discover the 
truth. Power never ceases its interrogation, its 
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inquisition, its registration of truth; it 
institutionalises, professionalises and rewards its pursuit 
(Foucault, 1980:93-94). 
The value of this line of thinking lies in three key ideas - that 
power is a strategy inherent in all social relations, that power is 
inextricably bound up with knowledge and that power has both coercive 
(constraining) characteristics and productive (facilitative) 
characteristics. According to Foucault's view, then, a major task for 
sociological investigation is to specify the practices which 
constitute power (and knowledge), and further, to identify both the 
positive, productive or facilitative aspects of a particular strategic 
relation and its negative, coercive or constraining characteristics. 
On this conception of power-knowledge, the structural aspects of 
power are a matter 'for investigation in each particular instance. 
According to Foucault, the social-historical connections between 
one situation and another occur through discourse (the communication 
of ideas), practice and effects (especially, for Foucault, unintended 
effects). His account does not suggest that various strategies of 
power are always constituted in terms of discrete discourses and 
practices and outside the effects of other strategies of power. 
However, Foucault's account does emphasise the importance of deriving 
a relevant conceptual framework (for example, class analysis) from 
observation of what is happening in the real world and it does assert 
that the link between human agency and (enduring) social structure 
occurs because social actors repeatedly use social structures 
(language, educational institutions, welfare agencies, the family, 
work) in order to conduct their lives. In doing so, they remake or 
reconstitute these structures. Further, although Foucault's account 
does not deny 'class' as the most important strategic relation in 
capitalist societies, it allows the possibility that other ideas and 
actions, which do not necessarily have their essence in class 
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structures (for example, gender, bureaucracy) may be implicated in 
effects or outcomes observed. 
This conceptualisation of the structure-agency dynamic informs 
this analysis of disaster including the application of a generative 
conceptualisation of class to the analysis. It is used to explore the 
economic, cultural and political dimensions of disaster. The 
analysis, as a class analysis, focuses specifically on the issues of 
vulnerability and social organisation in disaster outlined above on 
Page 34 and, in giving cognisance to the relevance of Foucaultian 
concepts for analysing the structure-agency dynamic, the analysis is 
organised around two types of question about each of these focal 
issues - "What did people know about their situation at the time and 
how did they talk about what they knew?" and "What did people do on 
the basis of their knowledge?" 
Thus, the earlier questions, formulated within a conceptual 
framework of class analysis, are transformed in the following ways: 
The first question about vulnerability, on Page 34, now becomes -
(la) Was the potential for catastrophe understood (and talked about) 
as an outcome of the particular way(s) the natural environment 
had been incorporated into the (capitalist) system of social 
organisation? 
(lb) What did people do to establish the particular relationship 
between the natural environment and the system of social 
organisation or what specific social practices constituted the 
potential for catastrophe and were these class practices? 
Question 2 about the formation of social groups in disaster is now 
transformed into -
(2a) Were the disaster groupings, that is, those which formed at the 
time of impact, understood and talked about as class groupings? 
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(2b) What did people do to form these groupings and in what ways did 
their actions connect these groupings to the class structure? 
The third question about the management of vulnerability now leads 
to -
(3a) What and whose ideas and talk about the catastrophe became 
dominant and did these ideas contain the inherent potential for 
opposition? 
(3b) What and whose actions contained the potential for opposition to 
the (class) system of social organisation through which 
vulnerabilities were created? 
And the final question about patterns of recovery now becomes -
(4a) How was recovery understood and talked about? Was recovery 
understood in terms of the restoration of private property and 
the pre-flood society-environment relationship? 
(4b) What actions did people take to achieve recovery and how were 
these actions formulated from the particular positions of 
vulnerability, constituted via the (capitalist) system of social 
organisation? 
These, then, are the questions around which the research 
evidence, presented in the chapters which follow, is organised and for 
which an attempt has been made to formulate answers. Chapter 3 is 
directly concerned with the first set of questions about the 
constitution of patterns of vulnerability whilst Chapter 4 deals with 
both the second and third sets of questions about the emergence of a 
dominant account of the disaster and of disaster groupings and the 
effects of these for the containment of the potential for opposition 
to the system. Chapter 5 attends to the questions about the processes 
of recovery and underlying patterns of vulnerability. The conclusions 
to these chapters return specifically to these questions. 
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In addition to answering these questions directly, this line of 
enquiry has the potential to answer other questions which were left, 
unanswerable, by conventional analysis, those questions about the 
distribution of knowledge about the hazard, questions about 
flood-plain management, occupation of the flood-plain and the 
assessment of risk and the question of possible competing definitions 
of what was really going on. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE VULNERABILITY OF FLOOD-PLAIN RESIDENTS 
Introduction 
Questions about the vulnerability of flood-plain residents are 
dealt with in this chapter; questions about how the potential for 
catastrophe was understood and talked about and questions about what 
aspects of social-economic and political organisation created a 
potential for catastrophe. Investigating the nature of vulnerability 
in the Moreton Region was an important and fundamental step in the 
development of this thesis. 'Vulnerability' is a key concept, for the 
nature of vulnerability, or more particularly, the bases of different 
forms of vulnerability in a p"articular setting must first be 
comprehended before their effects and management can be understood. 
As it is used here, 'vulnerability', as a conceptual tool, focuses 
attention upon the links between the social-economic and political 
organisation of the human use of the natural environment, and the 
social-economic and political organisation of extreme conditions of 
the natural environment. 
The Concept of Vulnerability 
Following Westgate and O'Keefe (1975), whose definition of 
'vulnerability' has been discussed in Chapter 2, the term 
'vulnerability' refers here to people's incapacity to deal with 
unfavourable elements of a natural physical environment, an 
environment which provides them with essential needs and economic 
resources such as residential land. The incapacity of people to deal 
with extreme, unfavourable conditions in the natural environment in 
which they live may arise from different sources. For example, the 
extreme adversity of the natural environment may become overwhelming. 
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People may not have the social or economic resources to bear the 
personal and/or financial costs of living in the hazardous 
environment, or those at risk may suffer because they do not have the 
political clout to command useful resources for dealing with the 
environment. As it has been theorised in this analysis, vulnerability 
is seen to be a social experience (i.e. one shared by individuals) 
conditioned by specific patterns of economic, social and political 
organisation; a relationship between people (or units such as families 
or households) and their environment which can only be understood by 
reference to the social context or formation within which it is 
situated. From this perspective, vulnerability is analysed in terms 
of three major dimensions - the social-environmental, the 
social-economic and<the political: 
(1) The social-environmental refers to the social definition of the 
flood hazard, including the levels of perception, knowledge and 
experience of it. It encompasses the likelihood or predicted 
frequency of flooding, the density of population in the area 
likely to be affected by flooding and the likely depth and 
duration of flooding which describe the physical dimensions or 
hazardousness of an environment for its users. Hazard perception 
can be distinguished from hazard knowledge insofar as the former 
entails an awareness of what the impact of the hazard would mean 
in terms of recognition of warning, the making of preparations 
both prior to and at the time of impact, and re-adjustment after 
impact. The latter entails, quite simply, the possession of 
information about the existence of the hazard and its likely 
dimensions. 
(2) The social-economic refers to those factors such as labour market 
position, household organisation, age and gender, which structure 
(provide or limit) access to particular, relevant resources. 
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(3) The political dimension entails the policies and practices of the 
state (here regarded as the formal institutions of the 
legislative, executive and administrative wings of government, 
the judiciary, police and armed forces and all organisations 
coming under their direct control). Protective legislation such 
as land use control and insurance and State counter-disaster 
plans, which determine official response in the areas of 
reconstruction and rehabilitation are examples of what comprises 
the political dimension of vulnerability. 
Establishing the manner in which any particular form of 
vulnerability is constituted requires at least an investigation of 
these three dimensions. Here they are considered in turn, in a 
general sense, although it is argued that these dimensions operate 
together to constitute particular (and varying) forms of 
vulnerability. 
The Social-Environmental Dimension 
The frequency of major river flooding in the Brisbane River basin 
shown for the period 1841-1974 is illustrated in Figure 3.1. It can 
be seen that four floods in excess of the 1974 level have occurred 
over a period of one hundred and thirty-three years. Two of these 
occurred in the 1840s and two in 1893, when the previous great flood 
disaster hit the city of Brisbane. The chances of floods in the 
future can be calculated by reference to the frequency with which 
these floods have occurred in the past. However, although reliable 
probability estimates of flood risk can be made, prediction of 
flooding in the relatively short term is not possible because, 
although the path of an extreme weather pattern such as a cyclone can 
be tracked, its course or duration and its potential for producing 
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Figure 3.1: Major floods in the Brisbane River Basin 1841-1974. 
rain depressions cannot be predicted. Thus, flooding in the Moreton 
region is regarded as a 'sudden onset' phenomenon and the inability to 
predict flooding in the short term was a major factor in producing the 
interpretation of flooding in the Moreton region as a sudden, 
unexpected and uncontrollable event. The known estimates of risk, 
though discussed publicly in the aftermath of the floods, never became 
a significant element in the management of vulnerability because they 
were previously not widely known and were not incorporated in the 
public and dominant definition of what was happening at the time of 
the floods. What was happening was defined, and subsequently dealt 
with, as a sudden, unexpected event. 
It should also be noted that three different types of flooding 
can occur in the Moreton Region. Direct river flooding, flash 
flooding in creeks and backwater flooding differ not only in the 
frequency with which they are expected but also in the speed of onset, 
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duration and locality. In the case of river flooding, which is a low 
frequency event, the peak usually occurs within two or three days of 
the river first reaching flood level. Also, in the Brisbane 
metropolitan area, there is a flood gradient or slope of flood waters. 
This has the effect of complicating the interpretation of flood 
warning messages, since a rise of particular dimensions at one point 
in the river, for example at the Port Office - where the principal 
flood measurements are taken - can indicate a greater or lesser rise 
at other points in the metropolitan area. Areas in Brisbane 
particularly subject to river flooding are Jindalee, Chelmer and 
Graceville, Fairfield and Yeronga, Toowong and Milton. 
Secondly, flash flooding in creeks occurs more frequently and 
usually occurs in a number of creeks simultaneously, though under 
certain weather conditions the flooding may be quite localised. Most 
creeks in the Brisbane metropolitan area and in the Ipswich area 
respond very rapidly to excessive rainfall, and some have flooded 
frequently. A notable example is the Enoggera Creek/Breakfast Creek 
system, which affects the Windsor area. To some people whose homes or 
places of employment were in certain parts of Windsor, the experience 
of the great flood of January 1974 was by no means new, but the level 
of flooding experienced then was excessive. 
The third type of flooding, backwater flooding, occurs when 
backwaters from river flooding raise the level of the tributaries to 
the point where they overflow their banks. Some areas are susceptible 
to 'double flooding'. That is, they may be flooded first as a result 
of heavy run-off from heavy rainfall in the catchment area of their 
own particular tributary, and subsequently by backwaters from the 
river. For example, the waters of the Brisbane River in flood may 
back up into the Bremer River. The Bremer would then back up into its 
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tributaries, thus adding to the flooding in the low-lying areas along 
the banks of tributaries. 
Therefore, when flooding occurs in the cities of Brisbane and 
Ipswich, the potential for damage is considerable. There has been 
some recognition among technical experts (and to some extent by the 
general public) that human activity has increased the flood risk in 
the city of Brisbane, notably by the construction of more and more 
buildings on the flood plains. However, neither the Brisbane City 
Council nor the Ipswich City Council had imposed town planning 
regulations to prevent the erection, or to require the removal of, 
dwellings in high-risk areas of the flood plain. There have been, 
instead, attempts on the part of the authorities (mainly the State 
government) to reduce the likelihood of flooding through major 
construction works aimed at controlling river levels. These are 
consistent with an Australia-wide tendency to depend upon large-scale 
technological adjustments as one of the major forms of adjustment to 
flood hazards. This widespread tendency serves to indicate the 
strength of the pervasive belief in the efficacy of human control over 
nature and the propensity for calculated risk-taking. In the Moreton 
region, Somerset Dam was the most important of these major 
construction works, although some minor flood mitigation work was 
completed along Enoggera and Breakfast Creeks after the 1974 floods. 
A very full and clear account of the operation of Somerset Dam is 
contained in a paper by Cossins (1974). It becomes clear that the 
dam, which is located about 8 kilometres from the junction of the 
Brisbane River and one of its major tributaries, the Stanley River 
(Figure 3.2), achieves flood mitigation by withholding the flow of the 
Stanley as far as is practicable from entering the middle reaches of 
the Brisbane River when the water level there and further downstream 
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is at peak heights. For floods up to a certain magnitude in the 
Stanley River, Somerset Dam can absorb the whole peak flow, but when 
there are excessively heavy falls of rain upstream from the dam (such 
as occurred in 1893, long before the dam was constructed), it can 
provide only partial control of the flood waters. It must also be 
remembered that the Somerset Dam can only affect the flow of water 
\ / 
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ki lometres 
Source: Institution of Engineers, Australia, Queensland Division, 
Proceedings of Symposium, January 197A Floods, Muruton 
Region, August 1974, p.169. 
Figure 3.2: Brisbane River Catchment. 
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from the Stanley River into the Brisbane River, and that flooding in 
the Brisbane River is the outcome of rainfall over the whole catchment 
area. In 1974, the heaviest falls occurred in the lower parts of the 
Brisbane River catchment area and in the catchment of the Bremer 
River, thus greatly increasing the flow of water in the Brisbane River 
and its tributaries well downstresim from the dam and quite outside the 
influence of the dam. Figure 3.1 shows the estimated heights that 
floods would have reached without the mitigating effect of the dam and 
the variability in the extent to which it has served as a control is 
apparent. Cossins's (1974) account illustrated that expert opinion 
clearly recognised the limitations of the dam. Among the general 
public, however, if any thought at all was given to the matter before 
January 1974, there'appears to have been the illusion that Somerset 
Dam had a far greater capacity than it actually had to prevent major 
river flooding. 
The majority of people living in the flood plain had given little 
thought to the possibility of their homes being flooded. The 1974 
post-flood survey revealed this very clearly. Only 6 per cent of 
respondents said that they knew flooding was likely to be a problem in 
their area when they moved there. Only 12 per cent said they had 
thought of the possibility of flooding and many of these had dismissed 
it as unlikely or unbelievable. Seventy-six per cent said they had 
never thought of the possibility of a flood - a fact which reflects 
not only the infrequency of river flooding but also the limited 
distribution and consequent low level of knowledge about the hazard 
amongst householders living on the flood plain. 
There existed (and indeed continues to exist) a sharp contrast 
between the levels of knowledge and awareness of the hazard among 
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technical experts on the one hand and occupants of the flood plain on 
the other hand. There have been few pressures on professional groups, 
specialist bodies or local government authorities, to release 
information. The flood problem in the Moreton Region has not, on the 
whole, been a political issue in the narrow sense of the word. Its 
'management' has occurred almost wholly within government 
bureaucracies and the issue has rarely entered the public political 
arena. Local governments, though willing and able to give information 
on request, had not prior to 1974 publicised flood risks in threatened 
areas. This lack of emphasis, in the end, comes unwittingly to serve 
the interests of urban property owners and developers who would want 
to maximise their gains on or at least maintain the value of 
investments in land and housing. However, this limited distribution 
of knowledge of the hazard contributes to environmental vulnerability. 
This is not to suggest a conspiracy by property owning interests 
against those living in flood-prone areas; they were, to some extent, 
one and the same group, a fact which is illustrated and discussed 
later in this chapter (see Figure 3.9). According to the 1974 Flood 
Study data, some 89.3 per cent of houses included in the 1974 Flood 
Study were owner-occupied. Moreover, apart from the more recently 
developed areas such as Jindalee, flood-prone areas were not 
subdivided by large-scale developers who might be regarded as 
beneficiaries in commercial land sales. The extent of private 
ownership is emphasised here, however, in recognition of the 
double-edged nature of the relationship between humans and the natural 
environment when land is commodified. To reduce vulnerability by 
distributing information about the hazard, so as to increase knowledge 
and awareness, would directly threaten property values in flood-prone 
areas (at least in the short-term). In a highly privatised urban 
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economy, most property owners would be unwilling, and many unable, to 
financially tolerate a drop in property values. To attempt to reduce 
vulnerability by circulating information or publicising the risk, 
without further government intervention to protect the market (for 
example through insurance schemes), would not have been consistent 
with the short-term economic interests of property-owning flood 
affected people. 
To summarise then, knowledge of the hazard was not widespread, 
and detailed knowledge of its dimensions was limited to experts, 
mainly those employed in local or State government departments. 
Management of the hazard was highly bureaucratised (and hence removed, 
for the most part, from the political arena) and few demands had been 
placed upon experts by flood-plain residents (mainly owner-occupiers), 
to provide and circulate information about the hazard. 
With resulting low levels of knowledge amongst most flood-plain 
residents, a poor perception of the hazard and its dimensions would 
consequently be expected as a common characteristic. Any differences 
in the social-environmental dimension of vulnerability, then, would be 
more likely to be a function of differences in the hazard 
dimensions in particular areas - differences such as magnitude (peak 
height), speed of onset, duration and importantly frequency - factors 
which differ for different types of flooding. 
The Social-Economic Dimension 
The social-economic dimension of vulnerability refers quite 
specifically to people's access to relevant resources to allow them to 
adjust to or recover from a hazard. In discussing this dimension, the 
focus is upon the patterns of social and economic organisation which 
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affect individuals' access to resources (goods and services) relevant 
for adjustment or recovery. The production and exchange (access to) 
goods and services occur both within the formal economy, where goods 
and services are acquired by payment in the market and outside the 
formal economy where production as well as distribution takes place 
within the household and informal networks - centred for instance 
around the extended fcimily, residential area, church or groups of 
friends. Here, an attempt is made to take these informal modes of 
production and exchange as well as the formal mode into account in 
assessing different forms of vulnerability. 
Very little specific data are available from the Flood Study on 
patterns of social and economic organisation in Brisbane and Ipswich 
and so these are examined here in terms of available data on 
occupations, education and income groupings, household structure and 
home ownership of flood-affected persons. An attempt is also made to 
take age and, later, gender into account as structural factors which 
might produce variations in forms of vulnerability. 
Although it is evident that there was little variation in levels 
of knowledge of the hazard amongst flood-plain residents, it would 
appear that there were notable variations in their socio-economic 
characteristics. Figures 3.3 to 3.9 present mapped distributions of 
relevant socio-economic characteristics for the Brisbane and Ipswich 
areas overlaid with estimates of the 1974 flood lines. 
These figures are constructed on the basis of computer maps in 
McDonald, G.T. et al. (1976) and the Flood Map of Brisbane and 
Suburbs, prepared by the Queensland Surveyor-General's Department 
(pre-1974). 
50
66 
67 
68 
/l--, 
62 
68" 
ALBERT 
V1 
...... 
POPULATION DENSITY 
CodeIndex to Statistical Areas 
I. 
2. 
City 
North City 
35. 
36. 
Kenmore 
St. Lucia 13 - 1000 
3. South City 37. Toowong 
5. Ascot 40. Balmoral 
6. 
7. 
Fernberg 
Ithaca 
4l. 
42. 
East Brisbane 
Morningside 1000 - 2000 
8. Meeandah 44. Archerfield 
9. 
10. 
Newmarket 
Normanby 
45. 
46. 
Camp Hill 
Carina 
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2000 - 4000 
II. 
14. 
15. 
Windsor 
Ashgrove 
Aspley 
47. 
48. 
49. 
Chatsworth 
Cooper's Plains 
Ekibin 
..............~ .
. ..
..................
...................
.................... 
. .
. .
..................... 
4000 - 6000 
16. Bald Hills 50. Fruitgrove 
17. 
18. 
Banyo 
Chermside 
5l. 
52. 
Greenslopes 
Holland Park 
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.................. 
6000 - 23,423 
19. Enoggera 53. Moorooka 
20. Geebung 54. Mount Gravatt 
2l. Hendra 55. Murarrie 
22. 
23. 
Kalinga 
Kedron 
56. 
57. 
Tarragindi 
Wynnum West 
24. 
25. 
Mitchelton 
Nundah 
58. 
6l. 
Yeronga 
Boondall Definition 
26. 
27. 
30. 
3l. 
32. 
Stafford 
The Gap 
Corinda 
Darra 
Graceville 
62. 
63. 
64. 
66. 
67. 
Nudgee 
Sandgate 
Wynnum 
Western 
South Western 
'Population density' refers to 
number of persons per square 
kilometre. 
(McDonald et aI, 1976: 86) 
the 
33. Inala 68. South Eastern 
34. Indooroopilly 69. Eastern 
Figure 3.3: Population density. 
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CodeIndex to Statistical Areas 
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45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
5L 
52. 
53. 
Kenmore 
St. Lucia 
Toowong 
Balmoral 
East Brisbane 
Morningside 
Archerfield 
Camp Hill 
Carina 
Chatsworth 
Cooper's Plains 
Ekibin 
Fruitgrove 
Greenslopes 
Holland Park 
Moorooka 
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0.17 - 20.00 per cent lower 
blue collar 
workers. 
20.00 - 30.00 per cent lower 
blue collar 
workers. 
30.00 - 40.00 per cent lower 
blue collar 
workers. 
40.00 - 50.00 peL cent lower 
blue collar 
workers. 
50.00 - 74.29 per cent lower 
blue collar 
workers. 
20. Geebung 54. Mount Gravatt 
2L Hendra 55. Murarrie 
22. Kalinga 56. Tarragindi 
23. 
24. 
Kedron 
Mitchelton 
57. 
58. 
Wynnum West 
Yeronga Definition 
25. 
26. 
27. 
30. 
3L 
32. 
33. 
34. 
Nundah 
Stafford 
The Gap 
Corinda 
Darra 
Graceville 
Inala 
Indooroopilly 
6L 
62. 
63. 
64. 
66. 
67. 
68. 
69. 
Boondall 
Nudgee 
Sandgate 
Wynnum 
Western 
South Western 
South Eastern 
Eastern 
means 
of 
'Male lower blue collar worker' 
males engaged in Australian Bureau 
Statistics Census Occupation Codes 
505, 515-530, 560-631, 642-656, 668­
672,687-688, 711-736, 743-758, 
820-821, 830. 
(McDonald et aI, 1976: 12) 
Figure 3.4: Male lower blue collar workers. 
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65 YEARS AND OVER AGE GROUP 
Indes to Statistical Areas Code 
I. City 35. Kenmore 
2. North City 36. St. Lucia 0.00 - 5.00 percent over 
3. South City 37. Toowong 65 years. 
5. Ascot 40. Balmoral 
6. Fernberg 41. East Brisbane .................. 
...... ..... .... -
5.00 - 10.00 per cent over 
7. Ithaca 42. Morningside 65 years. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Meeandah 
Newmarket 
Normanby 
44. 
45. 
46. 
Archerfield 
Camp Hill 
Carina 
·· .. I··' ..t· .. " ..
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10.00 - 15.00 per cent 
65 years. 
over 
II. 
14. 
15. 
Windsor 
Ashgrove. 
Aspley 
47. 
48. 
49. 
Chatsworth 
Cooper's Plains 
Ekibin 
.................. 
................... 
.................. 
................... 
. .
...................
.................. 
.................. 
15.00 - 20.00 per cent 
65 years. 
over 
16. 
17. 
18. 
Bald Hills 
Banyo 
Chermside 
50. 
51. 
52. 
Fruitgrove 
Greenslopes 
Holland Park 
'.'"1 ••••""0' ••' 
::::::::::::::::::
' .•n,u .. ."".,. 
limiilll!liHii! 20.00 - 51.19 per cent 
65 years. 
over 
19. Enoggera 53. Moorooka 
20. Geebung 54. Mount Gravatt 
21. Hendra 55. Murarrie 
22. Kalinga 56. Tarragindi 
23. Kedron 57. Wynnum West 
24. Mitchelton 58. Yeronga Definition 
25. Nundah 61. Boondall 
26. Stafford 62. Nudgee '65 years and over age group' means all 
27. The Gap 63. Sandgate persons aged 65 years and over. 
30. Corinda 64. Wynnum (McDonald et aI, 1976: 48) 
31. Darra 66. Western 
32. Graceville 67. South Western 
33. Inala 68. South Eastern 
34. Indooroopilly 69. Eastern 
Figure 3.5: 65 years and over age group. 
53
67 
68 
68 
ALBERT 
\C...,.:< 
VI 
-i:'­
UNIVERSITY GRADUATES 
Index to Statistical Areas Code 
I. City 35. Kenmore 
2. North City 36. St. Lucia 0.00 - 1.00 per cent 
3. South City 37. Toowong university 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Ascot 
Fernberg 
Ithaca 
40. 
4l. 
42. 
Balmoral 
East Brisbane 
Morningside 
::::::::::::::::::
................... 
:::::::::::::::::: 
.................. 
:::::::::::::::::: 
1.00 
graduates. 
- 2.00 per cent 
university 
8. Meeandah 44. Archerfield 
'" '" 
graduates. 
9. Newmarket 45. Camp Hill '" 
'" 
'" 
2.00 - 5.00 per cent 
10. Normanby 46. Carina '" university 
II. Windsor 47. Chatsworth ... t~,,,,,· •• tl'!I" ,..... '.'" ...'... ,. graduates. 
14. 
15. 
Ashgrove 
Aspley 
48. 
49. 
Cooper's Plains 
Ekibin mmmmmm 
5.00 - 10.00 per cent 
university 
16. 
17. 
18. 
Bald Hills 
Banyo 
Chermside 
50. 
5l. 
52. 
Fruitgrove 
Greenslopes 
Holland Park 
••••• ,1 .
...................
...................
...................
...................
........................
...................
.................... 
10.00 
graduates. 
- 20.00 per cent 
university 
19. 
20. 
2l. 
Enoggera 
Geebung 
Hendra 
53. 
54. 
55. 
Moorooka 
Mount Gravatt 
Murarrie 
:::::::::::::::::: 
."' tt ,
:::::::::::::::::: 
UHHHiiU!!HH 20.00 
'graduates. 
- 42~89 per cent 
university 
22. Kalinga 56. Tarragindi graduates. 
23. Kedron 57. Wynnum West 
24. Mitchelton 58. Yeronga 
25. Nundah 6l. Boondall Definition 
26. Stafford 62. Nudgee 
27. The Gap 63. Sandgate 'University graduates' means people 
30. Corinda 64. Wynnum over the age of 22 years who have 
3l. Darra 66. Western obtained Bachelor or Higher 
32. Graceville 67. South Western University Degrees. 
33. Inala 68. South Eastern (McDonald et aI, 1976: 36) 
34. Indooroopilly 69. Eastern 
Figure 3.6: University graduates. 
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0.00 - 5.00 per cent upper 
white collar 
workers . 
5.00 - 10.00 per cent upper 
white collar 
workers. 
10.00 - 20.00 per cent upper 
white collar 
workers. 
20.00 - 30.00 per cent upper 
white collar 
workers. 
30.00 - 40.00 per cent upper 
white collar 
workers. 
40.00 - 55:48.per cent upper 
white collar 
workers. 
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..................
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...................
....................
......................
....................
.....................
................... 
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'Upper white collar workers' means male 
workers engaged in Census Occupation 
Codes 001-026, 035-050, 060-068, 075-118 
and 150. These include 'professional, 
technical and related workers' with the 
exception of nurses, clergy and draftsmen 
/technicians and 'administrative, 
executive and managerial workers'. 
(McDonald et aI, 1976: 10) 
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UPPER WHITE COLLAR WORKERS 
Kenmore 
St. Lucia 
Toowong 
Balmoral 
East Brisbane 
Morningside 
Archerfield 
Camp Hill 
Carina 
Chatsworth 
Cooper's Plains 
Ekibin 
Fruitgrove 
Greenslopes 
Holland Park 
Moorooka 
Mount Gravatt 
Murarrie 
Tarragindi 
Wynnum West 
Yeronga 
Boondall 
Nudgee 
Sandgate 
Wynnum 
Western 
South Western 
South Eastern 
Eastern 
35. 
36. 
37. 
40. 
4l. 
42. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
5l. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
6l. 
62. 
63. 
64. 
66. 
67. 
68. 
69. 
City 
North City 
South City 
Ascot 
Fernberg 
Ithaca 
Meeandah 
Newmarket 
Normanby 
Windsor 
Ashgrove 
Aspley 
Bald Hills 
Banyo 
Chermside 
Enoggera 
Geebung 
Hendra 
Kalinga 
Kedron 
Mithchelton 
Nundah 
Stafford 
The Gap 
Corinda 
Darra 
Graceville 
Inala 
Indooroopilly 
Index to Statistical Areas 
I. 
2. 
3. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
II. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
2l. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
30. 
3l. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
Figure 3.7: Upper white collar workers. 
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SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS 
Index to Statistical Areas Code 
I. 
2. 
3. 
City 
North City 
South City 
35. 
36. 
37. 
Kenmore 
St. Lucia 
Toowong 
......•.•..... -...
.................. 
. . 
.................. 
................. 
..................
.....•••.......•.. 
Lowest S.E.S. areas. 
5. Ascot 40. Balmoral 
6. Fernberg 4l. East Brisbane 
7. Ithaca 42. Morningside 
.... 
8. Meeandah 44. Arcgerfield 
9. Newmarket 45. Camo Hill 
10. Normanby 46. Carina j~8.8~llt ..~ ••• e.~. 
II. Windsor 47. Chatsworth m1mjl11111mi 
14. Ashgrove 48. Cooper's Plains 
15. Aspley 49. Ekibin 
. . 
16. 
17. 
Bald Hills 
Banyo 
50. 
5l. 
Fruitgrove 
Greenslopes 
• 0 ~ . 
• ••• u ••••••••••••
..................
..................
..................
.............".... 
..................... 
18. Chermside 52. Holland Park 
19. 
20. 
2l. 
Enoggera 
Geebung 
Hendra 
53. 
54. 
55. 
Moorooka 
Mount Gravatt 
Murarrie 
iHiiHUiii:inn
:1:1:::1:1:::::1::
:::::::::::::::u•
.................. 
Highest S:~.S. areas. 
22. Kalinga 56. Tarragindi 
23. Kedron 57. Wynnum West 
24. Mitchelton 58. Yeronga 
25. Nundah 6l. Boondall Definition 
26. 
27. 
30. 
Stafford 
The Gap 
Corinda 
62. 
63. 
64. 
Nudgee 
Sandgate 
Wynnum 
'Socio-economic status' is one of five 
dimensions extracted by factor analysis 
3l. Darra 66. Western of twenty-two social, economic and 
32. Graceville 67. South Western demographic variables. High positive 
33. Inala 68. South Eastern loadings on the SES dimension are 
34. Indooroopilly 69. Eastern professional and technical workers, 
administrative and managerial workers 
and those over 15 years with tertiary 
education. High negative loadings are 
craftsmen and those employed in transport 
and communication industries. 
(McDonald et aI, 1976: 108,116) 
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OWNER OCCUPIED HOUSES 
CodeIndex to Statistical Areas 
I. City 35. Kenmore 
............... 0.00 - 50.00 per cent owner
 
..... - .....•...••36. St. Lucia .. - .2. North City occupied houses •37. Toowong3. South City 
40. Balmoral5. Ascot 50.00 - 70.00 per cent owner 
6. Fernberg 4l. East Brisbane ~~~~n\\~j\~jm occupied houses.Morningside7. Ithaca 42. 
•••• I .....·~·.f·~UI 
••• '1""4 ·.e~.·"·ArcherfieldNeeandah 44.8. H::::i::::;::i::: 70.00 - 80.00 per cent ownerCamp Hill :::::::::;;;::::::9. Newmarket 45. •• u.·•• '·'·efl.ll •• • occupied houses .46. Carina10. Normanby 
...................

..................
47. Chatsworth ,. .II. Windsor ..................

................... 80.00 - 90.00 per cent owner
 
.. .Cooper's Plains ...................
 
......... u .
14. Ashgrove 48. occupied houses . 
15. Aspley 49. Ekibin 
Fruitgrove :1:1:::l:n:: I:11116. Bald Hills 50. ~~:~~::I:'I:i:::UI 90.00 - 100 per cent owner5l. Greenslopes Hania: hHil1 
...............u.
17. Banyo occupied houses . 
52. Holland Park18. Chermside 
53. Moorooka19. Enoggera 
Mount Gravatt20. Geebung 54. 
Nurarrie2l. Hendra 55. 
Tarragindi22. Kalinga 56. 
57. Wynnum West23. Kedron 
58. Yeronga24. Mitchelton Definition61. Boondall25. Nundah 
62. Nudgee26. Stafford 'Owner occupied houses' means privately63. Sandgate27. The Gap occupied houses either owned or beingWynnum30. Corinda 64. purchased,through mortgage or install­66. Western31. Darra ment payments, by their occupants.South Western32. Graceville 67. (NcDonald et aI, 1976:98)68. South Eastern33. Inala 
69. Eastern34. Indooroopilly 
Figure 3.9: Owner occupied houses. 
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On the basis of the information contained in these maps, a number 
of clear-cut general observations can be made. To begin with, 
although some low-lying areas are parklands, most of the 1974 flood 
plain was, and still is, occupied. Figure 3.3 indicates that some 
flood-prone areas were densely populated, with Figure 3.4 indicating 
that a substantial proportion of flood-plain occupants were low income 
earners. An area of particular interest, with a high concentration of 
male blue-collar workers, is the suburb of Rocklea, which is 
perennially prone to local flash flooding and backwater flooding from 
the Brisbane River. 
Additional information from the Atlas of Population and Housing 
published by NATMAP (1979) on the basis of 1976 census data indicates 
that people living in other flood prone areas, notable Windsor, 
Buranda/Stones Corner, Hill End, Toowong, Rosalie and Fairfield, 
tended to have incomes of less than $5,000 per year (1976). In most 
of these areas, this concentration of low incomes possibly coincides 
with the concentration of old-age pensioners since, as Figure 3.5 
indicates, there is a concentration of persons 65 years of age and 
over in these areas. It should also be noted that comparative 
immobility, the relative absence of private transport and small 
household size (factors which might be considered to increase 
vulnerability in emergency situations) have been shown to be 
characteristics of areas with high concentrations of persons 65 years 
and over (McDonald et al., 1976). 
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 indicate levels of education and income, with 
Figure 3.8 showing how widely the socio-economic characteristics of 
those in flood-prone areas differ. Figure 3.8 shows concentrations of 
high socio-economic status groups - mainly reflecting high proportions 
in these areas with high levels of education and high proportions in 
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professional, technical, administrative and managerial occupations -
and concentrations of low socio-economic status groups in other 
areas - mainly reflecting high proportions of transport and 
communications workers and craftsmen. The existence of such 
differences suggests there will be differences in the social-economic 
dimension of vulnerability. There will be differences in responses to 
the hazard and in access to relevant resources available to enable 
adjustment. There will also be variations in the dependence upon 
household resources and occupational skills, implying there will be 
differences in patterns of adjustment and recovery. That is to say, 
it would not be expected, on the basis of these differences, that the 
experience of impact and the ^processes of recovery would be uniform 
experiences for all flood-prone residents. 
Lastly, Figure 3.9 presents some interesting and important 
information. It indicates the prevalence of home-ownership in 
flood-prone areas. Although home ownership is clearly more common in 
some areas (e.g. the western suburbs) than in others (e.g. the inner 
city northern suburbs affected by creek and backwater flooding), home 
ownership can be recognised as a characteristic common to many 
flood-plain residents. Even in flood-prone areas where home ownership 
is least common (excluding the city), more than 50 per cent of houses 
are owner-occupied and, in most areas, more than 70 per cent is more 
typical. Therefore, notwithstanding other social and economic 
differences and the fact that vast differences existed in the market 
value of owner-occupied houses, it was very likely that most 
flood-plain residents would recognise that most others, like 
themselves, had had their 'own homes' damaged by flooding. 
Social-economic vulnerability is clearly a complex matter, 
encompassing, as it does, a tension between the commonly shared social 
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characteristic of home ownership and, at the same time, vast 
differences in social and economic circumstances amongst residents of 
the flood plain. 
The Political Dimension of Vulnerability 
The mere existence of counter disaster plans at the formal 
organisational level can be considered a factor of some import in 
determining the forms of vulnerability of a population. Where formal 
organisations have resources, people and advanced plans to deal with 
emergency situations, this position constitutes some protection for 
those affected by such emergencies. The effectiveness of 
counter-disaster plans can, however, be assessed finally only by 
reference to their usefulness in the event of impact. Nonetheless, 
the suitability of any such pre-existing plans for a particular 
emergency can be assessed by reference to other known aspects of 
vulnerability in threatened areas. The most suitable plans will 
function in such a way as to directly reduce these other dimensions of 
vulnerability - the social-environmental and the social-economic. One 
would then expect effective counter disaster plans to: 
(1) reduce the severity of the hazard; 
(2) educate and inform both those at risk and organisations who 
accept responsibility for those at risk. In the event of an 
emergency the appropriate individual and contingent 
plans could then be undertaken prior to and during the emergency; 
(3) incorporate a welfare component so that the social-economic 
dimension of vulnerability can be reduced by appropriate measures 
undertaken prior to as well as during an emergency. 
Before 1974, the political situation, in relation to disasters, 
in the Brisbane/Ipswich region was an interesting one. Some counter 
disaster plans did exist but it appears that they were non-specific, 
fragmentary, formulated for emergencies other than floods and/or were 
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poorly circulated even amongst those organisations and personnel 
implicated in them. They could better be described as sets of 
procedures to be adopted by individual government departments. The 
commitment of each of the three levels of government was broadly 
similar. In the event of an emergency, personnel, financial and 
material resources were to be supplied by or through government 
departments such as the Defence Department (Federal), Department of 
Social Security (Federal), Police Department (State), Department of 
Health (State), Department of Transport (State), etc. But programmes 
for the mobilisation and utilisation of these resources had not been 
developed and, in the absence of any pre-existing comprehensive 
counter-disaster plan, the complexities of a tri-level political 
structure (local, state, federal) created obstacles in these areas. 
This lack of pre-planning elicited the following response from the 
Executive Officer of the Queensland Disaster Welfare Committee (QDWC), 
Ms Anne Quinnel: 
I hope ... that no welfare personnel in Australia ever again 
have to begin planning a disaster recovery programme during 
the impact phase of a natural disaster. 
This statement is, in itself, almost sufficient comment on the 
institutional unpreparedness for the flood which hit the 
Brisbane/Ipswich region in January 1974, but the situation can be 
reviewed in more detail by considering each level of government in 
turn. 
1. The Federal Government 
In the Australian context it is the State governments rather 
than the Federal government which hold the administrative 
responsibility for mitigating the effects of natural disasters (see 
Butler and Doessal, 1979). However, since 1939, the Federal 
government has allocated funds to affected State governments for 
natural disaster relief. By 1960, a definite policy of allocation of 
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such funds had emerged. The Australian government would match State 
government expenditure on the relief of personal distress and hardship 
and the restoration of public (not private) assets with a specific 
purpose grant. In particular circumstances, exceptions to this 
general policy have occurred so that more generous and/or suitable 
allocations could be made. The Tasmanian bush fires relief of 1967 
was, prior to 1974, the most notable example of this. In that case, 
funds were made available to individuals for the restoration of 
private assets. 
Whilst the Australian government provides these funds for 
natural disaster relief and while the business of administration is 
typically left to the State governments, the terms for the 
distribution of Australian government assistance are usually agreed 
to jointly between these two levels of government. Apart from 
financial assistance the Australian government has typically also made 
available other material resources (for example equipment), extended 
welfare services and seconded personnel through such departments as 
Defence, Transport, Social Security and Health. 
The expectation prior to, and at the time of, the 1973/74 
floods in Queensland was that the Australian government would provide 
financial support, material resources and personnel. But there was, 
at that time, no co-ordinated national counter-disaster plan and the 
implementation and exact structuring of these disaster relief measures 
depended to a very large extent upon the initiatives of the incumbent 
Prime Minister and his ministerial colleagues and, more generally, on 
the policies of the government of the day. 
Some stress should be given to the fact that the 
mobilisation of Federal relief measures was not in any way conditional 
upon the implementation of hazard reduction programmes in the States. 
Thus, the Australian government policy, whilst having the potential to 
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alleviate personal costs in the event of impact, did nothing to reduce 
the environmental vulnerability of the population at risk. It 
amounted mainly to an assurance of state intervention to mitigate the 
effects of social-economic vulnerability - to compensate people for 
those material losses or damages for which they, themselves had 
insufficient means to replace or repair. Such a policy does not 
encourage preventive 'resistance' to the hazard but rather dependency 
on repair and rehabilitation after impact - a pattern which, it will 
be argued, contributes to the maintenance of existing forms of 
vulnerability. 
2. The Queensland Government 
The Queensland government apparently had pre-arranged 
counter-disaster plans from 1971 when the State Disaster Committee was 
formed. This Committee, established under the then Co-ordinator-
General, Charles Barton, as chairperson, had allegedly evolved the 
following operational plan: 
Stage 1: Rescue, provision of temporary accommodation and other 
immediate welfare needs; 
Stage 2: Reconstruction to include physical and financial resources, 
the latter being handled by public servants selected for 
their experience in planning and administering fund 
allocation; 
Stage 3: Provision for the formation of a Committee for House Repair 
and Construction; 
Stage 4: Implementation of 'social work' activities to deal with 
2 
needs arising from post-flood emotional stress. 
2 
A document outlining this plan was provided to Ms Heather 
Mugglestone who was conducting the organisational component of the 
original flood study. The exact source is not known to the present 
author. 
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Having noted this, it should be said, however, that there 
was no evidence at the time of the January 1974 emergency that such a 
plan was ever adopted. As in the case of the Federal government, the 
expectation prior to the 1974 floods was that the existing 
infrastructure of State government could be re-oriented and extended 
to meet the needs of the population in an emergency. Certainly, after 
the flooding of 1974, the State Departments of Health, Community 
Services and Transport, the Premier's Department, and the Treasury did 
respond in this manner. However, when any of the operations outlined 
in the State Disaster Committee plan occurred, they apparently did so 
as a result of ad-hoc decisions by those involved at the time of the 
emergency rather than as part of an overall plan. 
The Civil Defence Organization (officially, though loosely, 
controlled by the Queensland Police Department) and the Police 
Department emergency operations room (described in Chapter 4) were the 
main areas of State government involvement in the early stages of the 
emergency. On the whole, the State government was seen publicly to be 
relatively inactive at this point and it became patently clear that 
the Civil Defence Organization was unprepared for a flood of the 
magnitude of the 1974 flood. This lack of preparedness is to some 
extent understandable in terms of the history of the organization. 
Civil Defence Organizations were set up in Australia in the 1950s in 
response to either real or imagined threats of enemy attack. They saw 
their functions as primarily related to civil defence in the event of 
military attack with a clear focus upon preparation for protecting a 
population from nuclear fallout. Thus, in January 1974 the Civil 
Defence Organization in Brisbane and Ipswich found itself without 
information on the dimensions of the flood hazard and having no boats 
at its disposal. 
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The consequences of not having an established, comprehensive 
and workable plan or of having one without any legislative base became 
clear as the flood hit. In 1974, delays occurred, dissatisfactions 
were expressed, conflicts emerged and vulnerable groups were left 
exposed to risk for unnecessarily lengthy periods of time. Also, the 
amount and terms of aid were heavily dependent upon decisions made by 
the governments in power. 
3. Local Government 
As controllers of water supply and related services in the 
respective urban areas, the Brisbane and Ipswich City Councils are 
clearly involved, at the preventive level, in the process of 
counter-disaster planning, at least in relation to flooding. The 
Brisbane City Council (BCC) also carries responsibility for the 
maintenance of Somerset Dam, the operation of which directly affects 
water levels in the Brisbane River. Additionally, the Works 
Departments of both councils play a continuing role in flood 
mitigation planning and implementation and in flood prediction and 
warning. In the event of a flood emergency, these departments have a 
key role in the translation of Bureau of Meteorology flood warnings so 
that areas and streets likely to be affected can be identified. 
Over and above these responsibilities, the Brisbane City 
Council in 1973 had appointed its first 'Social Planning Officer'. 
Linked to this position was responsibility for community welfare in 
disaster/emergency situations. Thus, in the 1974 flood emergency, the 
Brisbane City Council was in a position to become involved in welfare 
relief through the Brisbane City Council Social Planning Officer, 
Mr David Ament, who played a key role in initiating response from the 
social work profession by calling for volunteers in the Brisbane area. 
The Brisbane City Council had, within its normal operational 
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structure, functions which could be extended in times of flood 
emergency and it was therefore capable of providing (and did in the 
event) assistance and relief in a variety of ways. The Brisbane City 
Council contingency measures for welfare assistance were, however, 
formulated independently of the State and Federal governments and 
events immediately following the 1974 floods illustrated the potential 
for rivalry among political parties and/or different levels of 
government. 
Although political measures had the potential to reduce 
social-economic vulnerability, there were no plans directed at 
reducing environmental vulnerability, other than large-scale 
technological mitigation schemes which had been incorporated in water 
resource management in the region. The complexity of government in 
Australia and the potential for political party rivalry increased 
political vulnerability by complicating the process of relief planning 
and the implementation of relief measures, despite the existence, 
prior to the 1974 floods, of an operational plan for rescue and 
reconstruction in the event of disaster. 
Conclusion 
Attention has been focussed in this chapter upon the sources or 
bases of people's incapacity to deal with extreme states of the 
natural environment in which they lived. This incapacity or 
vulnerability has been conceptualised as having at least three major 
dimensions - the social-environmental, the social-economic and the 
political. Each dimension has been treated in turn, although it has 
been emphasised that, in reality, anyone's vulnerability results from 
an interaction of these dimensions. 
The question has been posed as to whether the potential for 
catastrophe was known (and talked about) as an outcome of particular 
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social practices in relation to the environment, practices constituted 
within a class system. 
This examination of evidence about the hazard and its 
incorporation has illustrated that although the potential for damage 
and injury from flooding is a real and ever-present hazard, awareness 
and knowledge of even the environmental aspects of the hazard were 
limited. The hazard has been managed by government bureaucracies and, 
as a consequence, few had known even that extreme flooding was likely 
to be a problem, much less thought about how the potential for 
personal injury and property damage might have arisen. Prior 
knowledge of the hazardous environment which people occupied was 
absent, except among technical experts and bureaucrats. For the 
occupants of the flood-plain, awareness and knowledge of the natural 
environment were to emerge during the floods. Among technical 
experts, the situation was quite different. They did know the nature 
of the physical environment, and the potential for catastrophe had 
been stated in terms of the frequency and geographical extent of the 
hazard. This had been treated as a low-risk factor (in view of its 
infrequency) to be reduced further by large-scale technological 
mitigation schemes. The relationship of the social group and the 
natural environment was conceptualised by technical experts in terms 
of possibilities for technical dominance and there is little evidence 
to suggest that the character of this societal-environment 
relationship was ever critically examined nor that either the 
specifics of the social-economic dimension of risk or vulnerability, 
or government policies and plans for emergency relief were 
specifically referred to by these experts. Societal structure and 
particular social, economic and political practices were taken for 
granted and not examined in the assessment of risk or the potential 
for catastrophe. 
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So, whilst the occupants of the flood plain, for the most part, 
had no conception of their vulnerability, those with expert knowledge 
of the environment conceptualised the risk without reference to social 
practices and thus solely in terms of the likelihood of the occurrence 
of particular extremes of the natural environment; that is, in terms 
of the estimated frequency, extent, height and duration of flooding 
and broad estimates of the number (and possibly value) of buildings 
constructed in the flood plain. 
Another indication of the way in which the natural environment 
and the social world were separated is the clear bureaucratic 
separation of environmental management and the formulation of 
emergency and relief policy. Consideration of the political dimension 
of vulnerability in this chapter revealed little evidence that 
specific hazards of the region had been taken into account in the 
formulation of protective emergency and relief policies and 
programmes. Indeed, it was revealed that the Civil Defence 
Organization was unprepared for a flood. 
These points reveal also the answer to a second question related 
to that posed above, namely, what specific social practices 
constituted the potential for catastrophe and were these practices 
class-practices? The bureaucratic and specialised (separated) 
management of the environment and of emergency relief services are 
seen as key practices which conditioned the nature of vulnerability. 
The major effect of these was the unequal distribution of knowledge 
about the hazard. Other key practices identified were the operation 
of a system of land use regulations which did not restrict or impose 
prescriptive guidelines upon construction in large areas of the 
flood-plain; and the existence of government precedents for the 
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allocation of Federal funds in proportion to State government 
expenditure on personal relief and restoration of private assets which 
were not conditional upon hazard reduction programmes. These factors 
were coupled with a neglect on the part of commercial lending 
authorities to require insurance cover against flood damage for 
borrowers in the flood-plain and a high rate of private home 
ownership. 
Now, whilst it is difficult on the basis of the empirical 
evidence gathered here, to link any of these practices directly to the 
class system, as class-practices, they can be seen as typical ones in 
a capitalist economy characterised by low levels of government 
intervention but with state provision and management of necessary 
infrastructure. 
What this analysis of vulnerability suggests is not that one (or 
some) class(es) is/are vulnerable to the hazard (i.e. are losers and 
that other classes are beneficiaries) but that for some, their 
position in the class structure means that their share of the ordinary 
benefits of a capitalist economy (wealth, property, income) could 
offset the costs of exposure to risk which they experience in common 
with others in this hazardous environment. Others, who fail to 
benefit, or who benefit less, from the ordinary operations of the 
economy will be less able to bear the special costs of residing in the 
flood-plain. 
The significance of widespread home ownership in this nexus 
cannot be overlooked. Even though the value of homes, as assets, 
varied greatly, private home ownership was an important common 
characteristic of those at risk, cutting across class divisions, and 
was thus an important element in the private acceptance of risk. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE EMERGENCY PERIOD: THE MANAGEMENT OF VULNERABILITY 
Attention is now directed at how people responded to their 
vulnerability during what shall be referred to as the "emergency 
period". This is the period of the time between when the first threat 
of flooding became apparent and the time when most of the 
flood-affected population had returned to their usual occupations. 
Setting this emergency period aside for special analysis is not in any 
way intended to suggest that it is, in reality, separate from what 
went before or what followed. Indeed, what is being asserted here is 
that events prior to, during and after the emergency period are 
inextricably linked "in an historical way, so that each should be seen 
as an outcome of former periods and a fore-runner of later periods. 
In this respect, this analysis differs from other disaster studies 
which conceptualise disasters as sudden breaks from, or interruptions 
to, a pre-emergency state. In other words, the starting point for 
this analysis of the time of the emergency is the recognition that 
what happened during the emergency was conditioned by the nature of 
the ongoing social-environmental, social-economic and political 
vulnerability of people in the flood-plain as it has been outlined in 
Chapter 3. 
Also, it differs from conventional studies in that the 
progression from pre-emergency through emergency to post-emergency 
phases is not seen to be simply determined by an underlying sequence 
of events in the physical environment. This progression is viewed 
instead as the outcome of various social, economic and political 
forces which operate within - and upon - the physical environment. 
Furthermore, the 'management' of vulnerability before, during and 
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after the emergency period at both the individual (private) and 
collective (public) levels is seen to be political, in the broad sense 
of the word. That is to say, the 'management' of vulnerability is an 
outcome of strategies of power. A dynamic interplay of ideas and 
actions between the public and private spheres constitutes relations 
of power through which an emergency is constituted and at the same 
time, managed. This process will be examined here in reference to the 
1974 floods through the documentation of interactions in two main 
areas: the way people interpreted the threat, which stems from the 
social-environmental aspect of vulnerability, and their responses to 
impact, which are indicative of the patterns of social-economic and 
political vulnerability. 
It will be argued that, at the time of the 1974 floods, the 
management of vulnerability at both private and public levels occurred 
via strategies of power based upon specialised knowledge 
('power-knowledge' in Foucault's terminology) of the environmental 
dimension of the hazard. The uneven distribution of knowledge of the 
hazard was the basis upon which a dominant public account of the 
threat and response emerged from the state via the mass media and 
other agencies. This dominant account, in which there were 
two principal actors, 'victims' and 'helpers', confronting the 
extremes of the natural environment, obscured variations in forms of 
vulnerability but, at the same time, enabled their management. 
The Public Interpretation of the Threat 
From mid-December 1973 to 24 January 1974, much of Queensland was 
subjected to unsettled weather patterns including extensive cyclonic 
depressions which produced very heavy falls of rain and resultant 
flooding in most rivers in the northern part of the state. Heavy 
summer rain and flooding (the 'Wet') in the tropical north were not 
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unusual, but few people in the south-eastern corner of Queensland 
would have given any serious thought to the possibility that they 
might share the experience of their fellow Queenslanders in the north. 
In the south-east, the actual period of threat (the time when the 
threat became apparent to the time of impact) was quite brief. On 
24 January, the region came under the influence of a severe cyclonic 
depression bringing heavy falls of rain, and by the next day the 
catchment areas of the upper Brisbane and Bremer Rivers and Lockyer 
Creek were saturated. This was accompanied by significant run-off in 
all three catchment areas. On Saturday, 26 January at 7.00 a.m. the 
Australian Bureau of Meteorology issued the following warning: 
Heavy rainfalls up to 127 mm at Moore were recorded in the 
18 hours to 3 a.m. in the Upper Brisbane River, Lockyer 
Creek and Bremer River. Moderate to major flooding is 
expected today in these streams and increasing minor 
flooding is [expected] in the Brisbane River Middle Reaches. 
Moderate flooding is expected to increase in Ipswich today. 
A height of 14 feet is expected at the Brisbane Port Office 
gauge on the high tide at 12 noon today. This is similar to 
the flood peak of 1931. Moderate flooding will be 
experienced (Department of Science, Bureau of Meteorology, 
1974:51). 
This and other warnings were the first public statements about 
the threat and they were issued to an audience whose knowledge of the 
flood hazard was absent or minimal. Couched apparently in everyday 
language (certainly familiar to the population), the terms used were, 
in fact, technical ones. They had quite specific meanings; "minor 
flooding", "moderate flooding" and "major flooding" are defined quite 
specifically in the following ways: 
- minor flooding causes inconvenience such as closing of 
minor roads and submergence of low level bridges and makes 
the removal of river pumps necessary. The effect may be 
felt in the reach of the river in question in the vicinity 
of the gauge or at some distance upstream or downstream. 
The texts of major early warnings are included in Appendix B. 
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- moderate flooding causes inundation of low lying areas 
requiring the removal of stock and evacuation of houses. 
Main traffic bridges may be covered. 
- major flooding causes inundation of large areas isolating 
towns and cities. Major disruption occurs to road and 
rail communications and evacuation of many houses is 
required (Department of Science, Bureau of Meteorology, 
1974). 
Data from the flood study (discussed in the next section) illustrate 
the difficulty most flood-affected people had in interpreting the 
warnings they received, and the effectiveness of the warning process 
was a matter of considerable concern in discussions about the 
performance of the Bureau of Meteorology after the flooding. These 
specific definitions and the locational reference points used in 
warnings were not known to the majority of the public in receipt of 
warnings. This problem of communicating effective messages of warning 
to a public unfamiliar with the threat, and uninformed in the language 
of meteorologists was recognised with a good deal of insight and a 
degree of anger by Mr G. Cossins at the Institute of Engineers, 
Australia, Queensland Division Symposium (August 1974) on the January 
1974 Floods. He said: 
Weather forecasts will not become more informative and 
reassuring to the public unless the public first accepts the 
responsibility for understanding the full implications 
contained in weather forecasts, including what can go wrong 
as well as what can go right. In turn the public must have 
some means of gaining this necessary understanding 
(Institute of Engineers, Australia, Queensland Division, 
1974:34). 
The implications of this problem of communicating effective 
warnings are taken up in the section which follows. What is more 
important at this point is to recognise that, irrespective of whether 
or not these messages were effective, in the sense that they enabled 
recipients to accurately assess their situation and take appropriate 
actions, these warnings had other effects. They were, as public 
statements, the first stage in the production of public knowledge 
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about the threat. Importantly, weather warnings describe only the 
synoptic dimensions of the threat and the expected flood heights at 
specific locations. They refer only to the short-term, they provide 
no interpretive information (apart from road reports in some 
instances) and contain no 'action' component - therefore there are no 
instructions offered to people about what to do. Thus, very early in 
the emergency period, the environmental dimension of the threat is 
emphasised along with its suddenness and immunity to human (at least 
individual) intervention. 
Private Interpretations of the Threat 
The 1974 flood study data on Brisbane and Ipswich indicate that 
most people had had^no previous experience of flooding in their 
present location, and in the absence of prior knowledge of the hazard, 
they continued to assiime that general warnings did not apply to them, 
at least until events demonstrated otherwise. As they became acutely 
aware of the dimensions of the threat and the speed with which flood 
waters were encroaching, they took the most effective actions they 
could. Most however, though resourceful, were not able to effectively 
protect their property against the flood. 
What appears to have happened in most cases is that people in 
threatened areas began to express concern as they and their neighbours 
watched water levels rising beyond those to which they were accustomed 
(Table 4.1). Over half (57 per cent) of respondents interviewed in 
1974 reported that rising water levels or a warning from a neighbour 
or friend was their first indication of flooding. Yet rising water 
levels were being interpreted by different people in different ways, 
for there was considerable variation in the point at which people 
began to think their home might be flooded (Table 4.2). Many reported 
thinking that their home would be flooded before water had entered 
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TABLE 4.1 
RESPONDENTS' FIRST INDICATION OF THE FLOOD 
n % 
Warned by a recognisable official 39 7.3 
Neighbour or friend warned §0 11.3 
Stranger warned 9 1.7 
Radio or television warning heard 65 12.3 
Watched water rising 243 45.8 
Other warning 76 14.3 
Didn't think house would be flooded 27 5.1 
No answer 11 2.1 
TABLE 4.2 
HEIGHT OF WATER WHEN RESPONDENT FIRST THOUGHT HOUSE MIGHT BE FLOODED 
n 
Had not entered property 
Had entered grounds only 
Under house - no living space affected 
Had entered downstairs rooms (high set 
house) 
Had reached main floor level 
Respondent didn't think house would be 
flooded 
No answer/don't know 
their property, but there were those who apparently had not begun to 
think in these terms even when flood waters had reached the main floor 
of their home. 
There is no evidence to suggest that having received an official 
warning made any difference to the efforts made by potential victims 
144 
117 
114 
80 
25 
27 
23 
27.2 
22.1 
21.5 
15.1 
4.7 
5.1 
4.3 
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to protect their property. In most cases, an official warning came as 
one of several indicators of the threat. Those who received some 
official warning and those who did not had very similar reactions 
(Table 4.3). 
TABLE 4.3 
OFFICIAL WARNING AND PRE-EVACUATION PREPARATIONS (BRISBANE ONLY) 
Received 
Official 
Warning 
Not applicable 
Yes 
No 
n 
% of 
% of 
n 
<• % of 
% of 
n 
% of 
% of 
total 
row 
-r 
total 
row 
total 
row 
Preparations 
Not 
applicable 
6 
1.3 
46 
5 
1.2 
4.7 
37 
8.6 
11.9 
made before 
Yes 
3 
0.6 
23 
69 
16.0 
50.0 
216 
50.0 
69.4 
leaving? 
No 
4 
0.9 
30 
33 
7.6 
13.4 
58 
13.4 
18.6 
TABLE 4.4 
FURNITURE AND/OR POSSESSIONS REMOVED FROM HOUSE 
(Number of Responses = 681) 
n 
(Responses) 
Furniture and/or electrical 
appliances 
Floor coverings and/or curtains 
Kitchenware and/or food 
Personal papers and valuables 
Clothing, linen, bedding 
Items of sentimental value 
Other 
Everything 
No answer/does not apply 
133 
14 
13 
64 
140 
15 
6 
41 
255 
25.1 
2.6 
2.5 
12.1 
26.4 
2.8 
1.1 
7.1 
48.1 
76
The majority of people who left their homes, did take action to 
protect their possessions. Most stacked belongings above the level 
they expected the flood waters would reach and took with them items of 
clothing, some bedding and linen, and small items of furniture (see 
Table 4.4). 
Although the actions taken by flood-affected people to protect 
their property must be viewed as appropriate adaptive behaviour under 
the circumstances, it should be noted that evacuees listed amongst 
their major losses such things as soft furnishings, bedding, objects 
of sentimental value, tools, personal papers, business records - all 
items which are portable and very likely to have been saved if an 
accurate assessment of the threat could have been made. 
Therefore, this widespread inability to interpret warnings 
resulted in ineffective adaptive behaviour by flood-affected people. 
This was no doubt a function of the gross lack of prior knowledge of 
2 
how a flood would affect the area. This, then, opened the way for 
the widespread acceptance of a public definition of the situation 
which stated that the region was suffering from stress produced by 
uncontrollable and somewhat haphazard forces in the environment; 
flood-affected people were seen to be victims of these forces. 
The Public Response to the Emergency 
Three spheres of public action directed at managing the effects 
of flooding have been selected for discussion because of the 
centrality and breadth of their influence in producing this public 
definition of the situation. These central institutional areas are: 
(1) the Police Department and related emergency service 
organisations such as civil defence; 
2 
An investigation carried out in 1979 by Irish and Falconer 
(1979) in an area flooded in 1974 and again in 1979 illustrates the 
importance of familiarity with the hazard for effective warning. 
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(2) the mass media; and 
(3) welfare services. 
Counter-disaster actions in each of these areas in critical ways 
contributed to the public definition of the event as a 'collective 
stress' situation, as well as to the social production of public 
images of two main social groups involved in this definition -
'victims' on the one hand and 'helpers' on the other. 
The Police Department 
In response to warnings issued by the Bureau of Meteorology, the 
Police Department mobilised its emergency operations room. The 
function of this unit was to receive, monitor and disseminate reports 
on the flood situation. The operations room comprised senior police 
officers and liaison personnel for the Civil Defence Organization, the 
army, press and the Brisbane City Council (BCC). Within the 
operations room were detailed maps of flood prone and inundated areas 
together with maps indicating police locations, road conditions, 
transport and fuel availability and manpower resources. In the field, 
police were also involved in rescue and evacuation and it was the 
Police Department which assumed overall responsibility for the 
co-ordination of emergency services. 
All of this was seen to be a normal extension of police functions 
and the necessity for a centralised, established authority (to oversee 
post-threat community action) went largely unquestioned. The benefits 
of a centralised authority are clear. The research literature on 
organisational effectiveness in disasters suggests that this is an 
effective way to achieve a necessary degree of co-ordination amongst a 
wide variety of organisations. It also enables standardisation of 
communications with the public through the provision of a centralised 
communications centre; and control of organisational activity and 
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converging masses (through the acceptance of the authority) might be 
maintained. 
Although some researchers (Barton, 1969; Weller, 1972) have 
pointed to the way in which new authority relations develop in 
disaster situations, the less obvious, though no less significant, 
questions of the negative and long-term effects of established, formal 
authority relations have not been the subject of enquiry. Such 
effects are sociologically interesting because of the implications 
that they have for the development of the 'disaster' and the 
structuring of power relations in the long-term. The presence and 
involvement of an established authority, such as the police force, has 
the effect of reinforcing the- legitimacy of the public definition of 
the situation received largely via the mass media. It comes to be 
seen as the 'official' view. Additionally, police efforts are seen 
as part of the concerted attempt to bring the disaster agent (the 
floods) under control and both publicly (especially through the media) 
and privately, the activities of a wide range of helpers were viewed 
as being, organisationally, associated with the police and Civil 
Defence. The following excerpts from the Courier-Mail and Sunday Mail 
illustrate the way in which helper activities of a wide variety were 
3 
viewed, collectively in public communications: 
In yesterday's flooding the biggest ever emergency 
evacuation in Brisbane was mounted with police, civil 
defence authorities, the Army and Air Force combining to 
rescue more than 500 flood-bound residents. 
It was Brisbane's Dunkirk. 
Hundreds of small craft worked the flooded suburban streets 
carrying householders to high ground and safety. 
RAAF Iroquois helicopters flew mercy missions in the 
metropolitan area. 
They winched people from tree-tops near Bundamba and roof-
tops at Inala and Blackstone (Sunday Mail, 27 January 1974). 
3 
See News-sheets Numbers 1 to 6 in Appendix C for copies of the 
full text of these news articles. 
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Hundreds of exhausted emergency personnel - including 
police, the military and volunteers - worked throughout 
yesterday combatting the floods which have affected 
one-third of the city and claimed four lives (Courier-Mail, 
28 January 1974). 
The following cartoon illustrates this same aspect of public 
communication. In it, the good deeds of the three nondescript 
'helpers' are associated visually with the directives and actions of 
Civil Defence and the RAAF (represented by the helicopter). Yet, as 
will be seen, these organisations played a relatively small role in 
helping flood-affected people; it was people known through informal 
ties (especially relatives and friends) who played the helper role. 
'Of course we didn't have wireless or helJcoptors or motor boats In 1893, but people haven't 
changed!" 
(Cour i e r -Ma i l , 30 January 1974.) 
In this way, these public agencies were seen to be in control of 
much private 'helper' activity. As a result, private 'helpers' gained 
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a status which allowed them access to a wider range of resources and 
public recognition for their actions. At the same time, through the 
mass media, the value of these official agencies was reaffirmed and 
their counter-disaster efforts endorsed. 
The Mass Media 
Intertwined with these forces were the operations of the mass 
media. They functioned as public interpreters of the causes and the 
4 
course of the disaster and they utilised limited official accounts as 
the basis for the public definition of the emergency. The front page 
of the Sunday Mail of 27 January "Great Flood Kills 3, Damage in 
Millions" typifies the ways in which official accounts (Bureau of 
Meteorology warnings and predictions and Police reports) included in 
the front-page article, were expanded to produce newspaper reports in 
the usual, dramatic style. The media effectively produced a 
definition of the disaster which was not only consistent with official 
accounts, but which also met the media's usual criteria of what is 
newsworthy - criteria such as drama, human interest, the exotic, 
proximity, and 'importance' (Mayer, 1979). 
Although it is difficult to assess the effects of media discourse 
on either public or private actions, the capacity of the mass media to 
set the agenda for public discussion is widely accepted. In the 
unfamiliar physical and social settings which occur following the 
impact of a natural hazard, the views and sentiments expressed in the 
media become part of the public account of the disaster. 
4 
This formulation of the media's role is derived from 
Windschuttle (1981:96). 
See News-sheet Number 1 in Appendix C. 
For a summary discussion of the range of literature which 
supports this notion, see Mayer (1977), pp.132-157. 
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The main elements of this public account are evident in 
newspaper, radio and television coverage of the flooding. With 
respect to the processes of interpretation and definition of the 
disaster, radio and television could perhaps be considered to be of 
greater significance than newspapers. But an analysis of these is 
beyond the scope of the present research which can, at most, include a 
review of newspaper coverage - sufficient only to indicate some of the 
main elements of media treatment and to underline the significance of 
analysing media operations in disaster studies. 
In the case of the Moreton region floods, newspapers reported the 
causes of the disaster chiefly in meteorological terms. For example, 
on 27 January, the Brisbane Sunday Mail carried the following article: 
MiiiiiniiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiMiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii 
THE downpour that caused Brisbane's 
massive floods yesterday resulted from the 
linking up of the monsoonol trough and the 
former Cyclone Wanda just north of the 
city. 
The 314 mm fall gave Cyclone Wancfa joined up 
Brisbane its wettest day with the monsoonol 
for 87 years, just 151 mm trough over Brisbane eorly 
short of the record fall on on Friday night. 
January 2 1 , 1887. ,,-r, , . .. 
The combinotion is 
Brisbane W e a t h e r s ' i " affecting Brisbane's 
Bureou said the trough weother, but we don't ex-
thot had previously been Pect ram anything like 
Friday night's ogoin," a 
imillimi I l l l l l i l l l l l l l l l Weather Bureau forecas-
ter said. 
South of Brisbane yes-
terday, the trough caused 
further heavy falls in the 
Gold Coast hinterland, 
with Springbrook record-
ing more than 100 mm in 
three hours. 
IllilliiilililllilllilllllllllllJlll 
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Each day, similar articles focused upon meteorological 
developments, which were regarded as the primary causes of the 
disaster. These reports were well-validated by physical evidence and 
their validation, it would seem, enhanced the credibility of other 
reports less well supported by evidence. Some reports did suggest 
other causes of specific or additional flood problems; articles 
critical of the Brisbane City Council and State Government land use 
zoning methods suggested poor planning, implying that zoning was 
another 'cause' of the disaster. On another occasion, the opinion of 
a flood-affected engineer was reported and he publicly blamed the 
Brisbane City Council for a backwater-flooding problem in the 
Fairfield area. Other reports suggested that careless decision-making 
on the part of the Brisbane City Council had allowed works to proceed 
in spite of the fact that they may have aggravated the flood problem. 
The Windsor area, which was affected by Breakfast Creek, was one area 
referred to in this regard. But reports such as these remained for 
the most part unrelated to each other and none seriously challenged 
the planning principles guiding the use of the natural environment. 
Although several articles stated quite clearly the opinion that in 
specific areas, buildings should not have been constructed, these 
opinions were stated only when a specific scapegoat was apparent (for 
example, the Hooker Development Company in the suburb of Jindalee). 
There was no apparent public suggestion that these errors might have 
been part of a particular economic relationship, a relationship in 
which land is seen as a marketable commodity, location is a factor of 
urban wealth and in the final analysis, the costs of protecting a 
population from the one in 100 year flood are calculated as being too 
great in comparison with the benefits to the local economy. It was 
never seriously suggested that some general principles of planning 
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rather than the actions of individual developers should have been 
critically examined. Apparently, the newspapers and the public were 
satisfied when scapegoats had been found. 
Furthermore, in public discussion of the causes of the disaster, 
reassurances were repeatedly offered that, with the proposed 
construction of Wivenhoe Dam, the flood problem in Brisbane would be 
minimised. Many people were led to believe that Wivenhoe Dam (in 
addition to Somerset Dam) could prevent the recurrence of floods of 
the magnitude of the 1974 flood. However, technical descriptions of 
the combined operations of these two dams suggest that flood 
mitigation is, in reality, not as simple a matter as media accounts 
would suggest (Cossins, 1974)-. 
The public discussion of the causes of the disaster thus 
reinforced the view that the flood was a sudden, unpredictable, mostly 
unavoidable event, the causes of which were uncontrollable events 
which occurred in the physical environment. The social, economic 
and/or political uses of the flood-plain were not publicly discussed 
as relevant causes. In other words, the problem was not discussed 
publicly in terms of the obvious fact that if buildings had not been 
constructed on what was very clearly a flood plain, the disaster would 
not have occurred. 
The public interpretation of the course of the disaster was 
consistent with this view. In the public arena of the mass media, 
flood experiences were aggregated and at times exaggerated. 
Unfamiliar experiences were categorised and interpreted by the mass 
media, probably more so by the broadcasting media than by newspapers. 
It is instructive to review the content of some of the newspaper 
reports of the time, paying particular attention to the language used, 
the way that disaster myths were utilised and the methods by which the 
appropriate disaster roles which emerged were constructed. 
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Courier-Mail 28.1.1974 City's Flood Fighters are Weary. 
It was Brisbane's Dunkirk. 
Courier-Mail 28.1.1974 Ipswich last night was reeling 
under the impact of the worst 
flood to strike the city since the 
1893 disaster ... At least 300 
houses in six suburbs have been 
abandoned, and have been badly 
inundated or destroyed by the 
relentless muddy torrents. 
Courier-Mail 29.1.1974 Watery Invasion of Jindalee. 
Courier-Mail 29.1.1974 The Brisbane River's massive 
floodwave early today began its 
surge through the city's 
already-ravaged areas and 
authorities warned that the 
disaster level would not fall 
until late this afternoon ... . 
- The raging Brisbane River 
« continued to rip the heart out of 
the near crippled city, tearing 
vessels from their moorings and 
washing into more than a dozen 
suburbs causing disruption to 
essential services. 
Courier-Mail 30.1.1974 Flood-savaged Brisbane was an 
incredible sight from the air 
yesterday. (Author's emphasis.) 
These passages illustrate the use of images of invasion, combat, 
resistance and defeat. (Appendix C contains full copies of the 
articles from which these excerpts have been drawn.) Such images 
connote the impact of external forces and suggest, firstly, that the 
situation is an aberrant one, an abnormal event, and secondly that the 
forces which caused it are alien. The use of such language reproduced 
the already well-established view of the hazard as being external to 
the society; an extreme condition of the natural environment. In 
addition, prominent, if brief, coverage of dramas, such as when some 
Jindalee residents armed themselves because of fears of looting in 
flood damaged areas, lent support to persistent disaster myths which 
function to unite a community against the external threat of which 
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these additional (if imagined) threats are seen to be a part. As 
well, the public denouncement of such unacceptable behaviour in media 
reports projected expectations of altruism and philanthropy from those 
not directly affected (non-'victims'). As well as having practical 
outcomes, such reports emphasised the significance of the evolving 
images of the 'victim' and 'helper'. 
'Victims' and 'Helpers' 
As these images of 'victim' and 'helper' emerged in public 
discourse, the expectations attached to these social roles became 
apparent. The expectations of powerlessness (defined in public 
discourse as helplessness) on the part of victims and the converse of 
a degree of control on the part of helpers, were particularly 
apparent. 
Flood-affected people were continuously referred to as 'victims', 
a term synonymous with terms such as 'casualty', 'sufferer', 'martyr', 
'fatality', 'patient', 'invalid' and 'target'. Stories appeared of 
people waking in the middle of the night and stepping into water 
inches deep, or of others falling asleep watching television and 
waking to find themselves floating around the living room. There were 
also reports of people having to leave their homes without having time 
to make any preparations to save their possessions because of lack of 
assistance. Though such stories did not depict typical examples of 
what was happening, they did serve to construct a public image of 
victims as bewildered, dependent, resourceless people, without 
possessions or home and in desperate need of help from others. 
On the other hand, the 'helpers' were portrayed publicly as 
capable, sensible, resourceful and well-organised people, unhindered 
by emotional distress, but showing compassion for the 'victim'. The 
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cartoon reproduced on Page 74 also illustrates the projection of these 
public images. 
The construction of these social roles produced both positive and 
negative effects. On the positive side, they offered a starting 
point for social interaction in an unfamiliar social and physical 
environment. They enabled those who assumed the victim role to gain 
resources for evacuation and rehabilitation, these being delivered, 
both informally and formally, by 'helpers'. A power strategy based 
upon the 'technology' (after Foucault, 1980), or specialised 
knowledge, of welfare (helping) was reproduced in the media. 
Active-passive, helpful-helpless, capable-incapable dichotomies were 
implicit in 'helper'-'victim*-^  relations and through the association of 
•i 
'helpers' with the state (a process discussed below), the formal 
structures of bureaucratic (state) control were reproduced. The 
legitimate 'victims' were expected to obtain resources through the 
state where their real needs could be assessed through declarations of 
damage, financial assets and income. 
The Welfare Response 
The significance of the welfare response lies in the fact that 
through their advocacy role, social work professionals attempted to 
establish the rights of victims and to intervene to ensure adequate 
compensation. However, whilst a great many hours were spent and a 
heavy professional commitment was in force, welfare workers (both at 
the professional and volunteer levels) accepted, reinforced and 
reproduced the popular image of the 'victim' as helpless and 
resourceless. It was in this sphere that relations of power based 
upon the 'technology' or specialised knowledge of helping were 
constituted. 
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In The Queensland Flood Report (Chamberlain et al., 1981) it was 
reported that social workers at relief centres saw the following as 
important needs or problems of flood-affected people: 
anxieties and frustrations associated with financial losses 
caused by the flood and their implications for ongoing 
commitments; 
reactive depression arising from delays experienced in 
respect of applications for financial relief; 
chronic depression, especially amongst the elderly; 
marital tensions, whether pre-dating, caused, or exacerbated 
by the disaster impact, and the after-effects in a 
disruptive social environment; 
physiological and neurological reactions, including high 
blood pressure, development of nervous tics, irritability, 
fatigue and decreased ability to cope with normal social 
relationships and environments, let alone additional stress; 
pre-flood psychoses and alcoholism aggravated by the flood 
aftermath environment; and 
family withdrawal from neighbours, particularly where the 
amount of flood relief grants differed (Chamberlain et al., 
1981:125). 
These early perceptions of the needs of flood-affected people are 
consistent with expectations of behaviour under stressful conditions 
and were based largely upon the practical experience of those social 
workers who operated out of relief centres. These people, the Flood 
Study data suggest, were likely to encounter high proportions of 
seriously affected people. Social workers' perceptions of the needs 
of flood-affected people were not, in these early stages, based upon 
reports of previous research or from data collected on this flood, as 
both sorts of information took some time to acquire and the social 
workers did not have this time available. The resultant image of 
over-stressed and (therefore) disabled victims, which was projected 
publicly onto all victims was consistent with the image of 'victims' 
'Relief centre' was defined for the flood study as "any physical 
location (premises) used as a basis of service delivery of a range of 
relief activities - whether material, financial or counselling 
oriented" (Chamberlain et al., 1981:115). 
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generated elsewhere in the public arena but not entirely consistent 
with survey data about the needs and resourcefulness of the majority 
of flood-affected householders. 
The survey data suggested that public sources of help may have 
been underutilised, not because flood affected people were unable to 
function well enough under stress, but because they were able to turn 
to private sources they were able to summon assistance from people 
within their own social network. Moreover, almost half the 1974 Flood 
Study sample reported that they did not seek assistance from emergency 
relief centres. Some went to the centres for food and grocery items 
soon after evacuation and about one-tenth received clothes (Table 4.5) 
but as few as 3 per cent of respondents said they had returned to a 
relief centre for as'sistance with problems they experienced while in 
temporary accommodation. 
TABLE 4.5 
PURPOSE OF CONTACT WITH RELIEF CENTRE(S) 
(Number of Responses = 554) 
n „ 
(Responses) 
Bedding and blankets 
Food and groceries 
Clothing 
Social welfare assistance/fund applications 
Accommodation 
Assistance or equipment for clean-up 
Other 
No contact with relief centre 
No answer/don't know 
However, the help that flood-affected people acknowledged 
immediately after the floods from the Salvation Army, members of 
18 
24 
63 
104 
29 
18 
29 
258 
11 
3.4 
4,5 
11.9 
19.6 
5.5 
3.4 
5.5 
48.7 
2.1 
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church organisations, service clubs and 'strangers' (not from relief 
centres) was probably perceived as part of relief-centre activity. 
1974 Flood Study respondents were not at all clear about the 
affiliations of 'strangers' who came to help and many had only 
contacted a relief centre for application for financial assistance. 
However, high levels of satisfaction with services received at relief 
centres were recorded. The data in Table 4.6 illustrate this overall 
satisfaction. The patterns of response illustrated in Table 4.6 and 
Table 4.5 (where it is shown that the most common reason for contact 
with a relief centre was to obtain applications for financial 
assistance) suggest that other helping activity may have been 
perceived as being connected with or organised from relief centres 
which were operated xinder the auspices of the State Government or the 
Brisbane City Council. 
TABLE 4.6 
REPORTED SATISFACTION WITH SERVICES RECEIVED AT RELIEF CENTRES 
(BRISBANE ONLY) 
n % 
N.A. 
Satisfied 
Non-committal 
Dissatisfied 
No contact with relief centre 
Although much help was given outside the auspices of the relief 
centres and the centres were in reality heavily dependent upon 
volunteer labour (Table 4.7), they were perceived as foci for 
assistance. Thus, private, independent effort was apparently 
perceived as part of an overall public response. No distinction was 
11 
210 
S 
4. 
201 
2.6 
48.7 
1.1 
0.9 
46.6 
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TABLE 4.7 
FREQUENCY WITH WHICH TYPES OF RELIEF CENTRE WORKERS 
MENTIONED BY ORGANISATIONAL STUDY RESPONDENTS 
% 
(n = 80) 
Church people 44 
University of Queensland staff 9 
Social workers 7 
Housewives 7 
Meals on Wheels workers 6 
Civil Defence workers 3 
City Council staff 3 
Tradesmen 3 
QDWC workers "^  1 
Teachers 1 
Others (could not specify) 14 
No answer 2 
Source: Chamberlain et al. (1981). 
made between the help given by relief centre workers and the help 
given by other volunteers. 
For most people the most likely reason for contact with a relief 
centre was to obtain application forms for financial assistance. This 
fact is significant because, were it not for the financial assistance 
provided to flood affected households by the State Government and by 
public contribution, few could have recovered economically. State 
Government grants were proportionate to damage incurred and were 
limited by the application of a means test which was imposed by the 
State Government. The State Government saw its responsibility solely 
as enabling flood-affected people to be sufficiently sheltered, 
clothed and fed to allow them to resume their usual occupations as 
quickly as possible: 
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the Government cannot be expected to refurnish homes, but 
only to ensure that people at least have the essentials 
(Statement by the Premier of Queensland, Mr Bjelke-Petersen, 
Courier-Mail, January 30th, 1974). 
This view was quite common and consistent with policies and 
precedents. Flood-affected people, along with the Premier, saw 
government financial assistance as a form of relief, not compensation. 
In relation to the financial costs borne by flood-affected people 
themselves, the extent of governmental assistance was considerable. 
Doessel and Butler (1979) have estimated that 46 per cent of the total 
costs of damage to residential properties was covered by the 
Government whilst private insurance and public philanthropy together 
covered only about 25 per cent. 
Government assistance was clearly a necessary resource enabling 
people to manage the effects of vulnerability. But the process of 
government assistance produced other effects. Firstly, application 
for financial assistance not only confirmed the 'victim' status of the 
flood-affected applicant but it also officially defined the 'victim'. 
Secondly, the constitution of government assistance as relief, not 
compensation, reproduced the public definition of the disaster as the 
result of forces external to the society. Unlike insurance where 
financial aid is provided in proportion to the damage incurred 
(compensation) and which presupposes knowledge of the risk and the 
involvement of the claimant in establishing in advance the extent of 
their financial liability, government assistance was proportionate 
also to the financial means of the individual household to effect its 
own recovery. Prior knowledge of the risk of preventive actions were 
not at all relevant. Clearly, none of the federal, state or local 
levels of government accepted responsibility or blame for damages 
because these were not seen to be calculable in advance. Thirdly, 
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g 
because local relief centres were used to distribute and collect 
application forms for financial assistance, the organisation of 
financial assistance was conjoined with the mobilisation and 
organisation of welfare workers (both professional and volunteer). 
This constituted, then, evidence of a large-scale response, and the 
counter-disaster effort of the state was generally seen to be 
effective overall. There is no suggestion here that individual 
flood-affected households were all satisfied with their lot. 
However, dissatisfaction about the 'unfairness' of financial aid 
remained fragmented and was often directed at other flood-affected 
households rather than at the principles and processes of allocation. 
In summary then, the public response to impact involved the 
'conversion', by association, of much private helping activity into 
public action. This had the effect of separating the publicly defined 
'helper' and 'victim' roles by associating 'help' with the public 
sphere. 'Pro-victim' welfare activity reinforced the helper/victim 
dichotomy with social workers, even as advocates, failing to challenge 
the powerlessness inherent in the victim role. 
The Private Response 
Private responses to the threat, though mostly independent of 
actions in the public sphere, were nonetheless constituted in 
important ways by the government response and the effects of the 
public and private responses were mutually reinforcing. 
What is most obvious about private responses to the flooding is 
the independence of the actions taken by flood-affected people, 
something which contrasts sharply with their dependency upon public 
g 
Centres for the processing of applications for financial 
assistance were not always in the same premises used for other relief 
activities but were located close by at central points within the 
suburbs. 
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knowledge for interpretation of the threat. The Flood Study data 
illustrate that, in taking actions in response to the flooding, very 
few flood-affected people 'conformed' to the publicly constructed 
image of the flood 'victim'. The data show, for instance, that the 
most salient response to the threat of flooding was to evacuate and 
that in this regard, most people decided independently, without 
direction, to leave their homes. Many left on foot, carrying 
possessions with them. Others left in boats, cars or trucks, mostly 
on their own (see Table 4.8). They went mainly to the homes of 
neighbours, friends or relatives living close by. If friends or 
relatives did not live close by, the evacuees were most likely to go 
to relatives living further away (see Figure 4.9). Some 70 per cent 
of respondents reported going immediately to relatives, friends or 
neighbours. They arranged their own post-evacuation accommodation and 
took into account factors such as their compatibility with their 
prospective hosts and their proximity to their own home (see 
Table 4.10). Only 9.8 per cent of respondents went to a relief centre 
for immediate post-evacuation accommodation (Table 4.9) and only 
6.6 per cent said that they were directed by emergency personnel to 
their immediate post-evacuation accommodation (Table 4.10). 
TABLE 4.8 
METHOD OF EVACUATION 
n % 
On foot by own initiative 178 33.6 
Swam out on own 13 2.4 
By car, truck or boat - own or arranged 
by respondent/householder 243 45.8 
On foot or by vehicle, with assistance 
from emergency personnel 59 11.1 
Other 3 0.6 
No answer/does not apply 65 12.2 
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TABLE 4.9 
IMMEDIATE POST-EVACUATION ACCOMMODATION 
n % 
Relief centre 
Relatives' home 
Home of friends or neighbours 
Private accommodation with strangers 
Rented accommodation 
Other 
No answer/does not apply 
52 
185 
191 
22 
4 
17 
59 
9.8 
34.9 
36.0 
4.1 
0.7 
3.2 
11.1 
TABLE 4.10 
REASONS FO^ GOING TO POST-EVACUATION ACCOMMODATION 
n % 
Closest unaffected house 
Close to area 
First offer/invitation from: 
neighbours 
friends 
relatives 
strangers 
Attractiveness of going to: 
neighbours 
friends 
relatives 
Directed to accommodation by emergency 
personnel 
Only place to go 
Other 
No answer/does not apply 
19 
71 
53 
54 
85 
40 
13 
57 
30 
35 
53 
16 
71 
3.6 
13.4 
10.0 
10.2 
16.0 
7.5 
2.4 
10.7 
24.5 
6.6 
10.0 
3.0 
13.4 
Also, a comparatively small proportion (11 per cent) of evacuees 
surveyed in 1974 acknowledged any other assistance, during evacuation, 
from emergency personnel, that is, people they recognised as acting in 
some official capacity. On the whole, emergency personnel appear. 
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from householders' reports, to have played a small role in evacuation 
and provision of shelter. At the same time, over half (59 per cent) 
acknowledged the presence in their area of Civil Defence personnel, 
police and/or members of other voluntary organisations at the time of 
their evacuation and very few respondents proffered criticisms or 
suggestions for the improvement of the performance of these emergency 
organisations (see Table 4.11). This uncritical appraisal of this 
public effort and the general pattern of satisfaction with evacuation 
procedures (Table 4.12) suggest that flood-affected people may have 
TABLE 4.11 
SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN EMERGENCY OPERATIONS 
(Column Percentages) 
(Nximber of Responses = 530) 
Police 
% 
(of Res-
pondents) 
Civil 
Defence 
% 
(of Res-
pondents) 
Army 
% 
(of Res-
pondents) 
N.A. 
No suggestions, D.K. 
Satisfied 
Better preparations/earlier 
involvement 
Improve overall organization 
and co-ordination 
More manpower/equipment 
Improve methods of: 
(i) warning 
(ii) evacuation 
(iii) clean-up 
Should be better informed 
Need for identification 
Other 
15 
64 
3 
13 
64 
2 
15 
17 
71 
4 
4 
4 
5 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
8 
5 
2 
0 
0 
2 
1 
0 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
« 
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TABLE 4.12 
SATISFACTION/DISSATISFACTION WITH EVACUATION 
n % 
N.A. 
Satisfied with evacuation 
Dissatisfied: 
insufficient warning 
lack of organisation 
lack of assistance 
instructions to evacuate too late 
instructed not to evacuate 
other 
Satisfied with some reservations 
Not at home at time of evacuation 
26 
325 
42 
30 
50 
11 
2 
23 
9 
12 
4.9 
61.3 
7.9 
5.7 
9.4 
2.1 
0.3 
4.3 
1.7 
2.3 
derived considerable^emotional support from the presence of 'help' in 
their area, even though this help played very little part in their 
actions because assistance was, at this time, mostly obtained directly 
by flood-affected people from relatives and friends. 
When people returned to their homes to begin the task of cleaning 
up (generally within about five days of the flood peak), assistance 
from the Salvation Army, members of church organizations, service 
clubs and 'strangers' was considerable. Still, flood-affected people 
were highly dependent upon private sources of help (relatives and 
friends particularly) and it was these people who proved most helpful 
(Tables 4.13 and 4.14). 
These data suggest that flood-affected people actively utilized 
private sources as opposed to public sources of help and independently 
applied themselves to preparations for evacuation. In contrast to 
their dependency upon public knowledge for their interpretation of the 
event, these flood-affected people were for the most part very 
independent in their actions; a reality not reflected in the 'popular 
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TABLE 4.13 
PEOPLE WHO HELPED DURING CLEAN-UP (BRISBANE ONLY) 
(Number of Responses = 666) 
Friends 
Neighbours 
Relatives other than household members 
Organizations 
Strangers 
Help offered but not needed 
No answer/does not apply 
n 
(Responses) 
219 
83 
212 
137 
85 
1 
66 
% 
(of Res-
pondents) 
50.8 
19.3 
49.2 
31.8 
19.7 
0.2 
15.3 
TABLE 4.14 
PEOPLE FOUND MOST HELPFUL DURING CLEAN-UP (BRISBANE ONLY) 
(Niimber of Responses = 462) 
Household members only 
Friends 
Neighbours 
Relatives other than household members 
Organizations 
Strangers 
All helpful 
No answer/No help required 
n 
(Responses) 
8 
95 
34 
119 
35 
19 
57 
95 
% 
(of Res-
pondents) 
1.9 
22.0 
7.9 
27.6 
8.1 
4.4 
13.2 
22.0 
image' of victims as helpless and resourceless. One might have 
expected some challenge to the popular image on this basis except that 
flood 'victims' were keenly aware that, in spite of their 
resourcefulness and independence, they were dependent upon the state 
not only for knowledge but also for financial assistance. 
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Most flood-affected households were in need of some financial aid 
for recovery and rehabilitation. There were two main sources of such 
aid - public appeals such as the Brisbane Lord Mayor's Fund and the 
Ipswich Disaster Relief Fund and two State Government funds. 
Reconstruction and Personal Hardship and Distress. Seventy-four per 
cent of respondents in the 1975 survey had received some assistance 
from the public appeals with 45 per cent receiving State 
Reconstruction grants and 51 per cent receiving Personal Hardship and 
Distress grants. The reported amounts of money received from each of 
these sources varied between $300 and $1,000 from the public appeals, 
9 
between $1,000 and $5,000 from the State Government Reconstruction 
Fund and $300-$l,000 in the form of personal relief from the State 
Government. Some 38.2 per cent of 1975 respondents also indicated 
that they had received amounts (usually less than $500) from voluntary 
organisations. These figures clearly suggest that the main sources of 
financial assistance were direct government grants or grants from 
public appeals administered by (local) government. These data are 
consistent with those compiled by Butler and Doessel (1979) and 
discussed above in connection with the public welfare response. Many 
flood-affected people were dependent upon this government assistance 
(some very much so) to effect housing recovery. 
Thus, it has been shown how both the knowledge necessary to 
interpret the extraordinary situation and the supplementary finance 
necessary to facilitate recovery were delivered by the state. 
Conclusion 
The examination of the nature of vulnerability undertaken in 
Chapter 3 led to the conclusion that bureaucratic management of the 
9 
Several reported grants in this category were between $5,000 and 
$10,000 and one over $10,000 was also reported. 
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environment and bureaucratic specialisation leading to separation of 
the management of the natural environment and the management of the 
effects of extreme states of that environment for the human group 
using it were key practices in the constitution of vulnerability. So 
too were the calculation of risk in broad terms by technical experts 
and the absence of awareness and knowledge of the hazard among people 
living in the flood-plain, most of whom were private home owners or 
buyers. These practices were seen to be consistent with a world-view 
in which the natural environment and the social world were separated 
and people's vulnerability to the flood hazard was conceptualised only 
in terms of an environmental dimension, in terms of the likelihood of 
extreme environmental events causing damage or injury to estimated 
numbers of properties and people. 
Now, an investigation of the emergency which arose in the Moreton 
region in January 1974, has demonstrated how these key ideas and 
practices carried over into the management of the effects of the 
patterns of vulnerability produced within this framework. It has been 
shown how, because of their lack of knowledge of the hazard and its 
dimensions, directly affected householders were generally unable to 
interpret environmental warning signs. Their lack of previous 
knowledge and experience meant that they were, in many cases, unable 
to make sufficient and appropriate preparation. However, 
meteorological accounts, delivered and utilised by the mass media, 
supplied for flood-affected people and others a definition of the 
situation. These meteorological accounts, in part because of their 
official nature, became the foundation for a dominant and public 
account upon which flood-affected people were dependent. This public 
account, entailing as it did, a separation of the natural environment 
from the social world, was acceptable. The extreme force of the 
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natural environment was perceived as an attack upon a more or less 
helpless social group, causing disruption to a smoothly running 
society. The prior bureaucratisation of knowledge about and 
management of the environment led to a ready acceptance of this 
dominant account. It 'made sense' in the absence of prior knowledge 
of the hazardous natural environment. Discussion of other causes of 
the catastrophe was never sustained. Publicly, attention was never 
focussed upon social-economic or political processes entailed in 
vulnerability to the hazard. 
This public account, communicated mainly through the mass media, 
was reflected and reinforced in other public talk, where those 
affected by flooding were referred to as 'flood-victims', a term 
implying that their common assailant was the natural environment - the 
flood. 'Victims' and 'helpers' were seen to be the key social actors 
in this setting. 
These groupings of 'victims' and 'helpers' which formed during 
the emergency can also be seen to have been constituted by 
bureaucratic control during the emergency and the consequent uneven 
distribution of knowledge (including, in this case, welfare knowledge 
which is essentially about access to resources). 
Welfare administrators recognised social and economic differences 
among 'victims', a contrast to the homogeneous public image of 
victims. This recognition was indicated clearly by means tests upon 
application for financial assistance and in the stated terms of 
reference of welfare bodies such as the Queensland Disaster Welfare 
Committee (QDWC). However, recognition of aspects of the 
social-economic dimension of vulnerability was not linked conceptually 
with other dimensions as a basis for action. Highly vulnerable groups 
were seen and treated as flood-victims with 'special needs', not as 
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groups who had experienced greater risk. In spite of the recognition 
of these 'special needs' which enabled a response to them, separating 
them from the effects of other dimensions of vulnerability reinforced 
the popular (and public) image of flood affected people as victims of 
the natural environment. 
'Helpers-' were also seen, in popular imagery, as a homogeneous 
group which came to be associated with the activities of the state. 
The ways in which private helping activity and the provision of 
personnel and resources by the state (local. State and Federal 
Governments) were conglomerated in public talk have also been 
discussed. The effect was that, even where flood affected people most 
valued the help and support they obtained privately, they acknowledged 
a large-scale state response to their needs. A crucial factor in this 
acknowledgement was the need of flood-affected people, mostly private 
home owners or buyers, for state financial assistance for the 
restoration of their private assets. The dependence of private 
property owners upon state financial assistance was clearly an 
important nexus in the processes which contained the potential for 
opposition to the system of social organisation. 
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CHAPTER 5 
VULNERABILITY AND RECOVERY 
Introduction 
Bureaucratic management of the natural environment and the 
consequent uneven distribution of knowledge of the hazard, the 
separation of the management of the natural environment and the 
management of emergency and welfare programmes and the consequent 
emphasis upon the environmental dimension of the hazard with relative 
obscurity of its social-economic and political dimensions have been 
identified as key processes in the constitution of vulnerability and 
in its management. So, too, have the emergence, in the aftermath of 
the flooding, of a dominant (and relevant) account of the 
(environmental) causes and course of the emergency and the formulation 
of social roles of 'victim' and 'helper' in the context of this 
dominant account. The essential structure of this complex set of 
relationships is seen to have been reproduced in the dependence of 
private home owners upon state financial assistance for the 
restoration of private assets. At the same time, there has been a 
presentation of evidence of variations in patterns of vulnerability 
and of independent and resourceful behaviour on the part of 
flood-affected people in the emergency. 
Now this chapter focuses upon the outcomes of this complex set of 
practices. It is primarily concerned with tJiat period of time after 
the flooding had abated, when human activity was focussed mainly upon 
rehabilitation and recovery and not upon immediate protection as it 
had been in the preceding days. Care mtxst be taken not to obscure the 
links between this period and the events and circumstances which 
preceded it. Thus, the thrust of the analysis is to investigate the 
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processes of recovery in the post-emergency period; the outcomes of 
vulnerability and its management. 
The post-emergency period probably began, for most people, around 
the end of January 1974. By Thursday, January 31st, the worst was 
evidently over. For the first time in days the river height at the 
Brisbane Post Office was below 3 metres and the immediate threat of 
further flooding had gone. Attention was beginning to turn away from 
the flood itself and focus on repercussions, particularly the 
financial costs of recovery. Government departments, both at the 
federal and state level, had mobilized resources. By the 
1st February, cleaning up was well underway and, publicly, the crisis 
period was seen to be over. By the end of the second week in February 
1974, many of the relief centres had closed, most shops and businesses 
had resiimed operation and many flood-affected people had returned to 
their jobs. About 4,500 cheques had been paid by the Brisbane Lord 
Mayor's Disaster Relief Fund and over 1,700 claims for assistance from 
State Government relief funds had been handled at the Ipswich Court 
House. A Federal-State co-ordinating committee was established to 
deal with questions of financial compensation for flood-damage to 
houses and it was announced that the Federal and State Governments 
would set up a scheme for providing financial assistance for small 
businesses affected by the flood. 
Although some of the organisational activities aimed at 
alleviating flood problems were to carry on for some considerable time 
(some for more than a year), by the middle of February 1974, the 
general pattern of life in Brisbane and Ipswich had begun, once more 
to resemble the typical. This was despite the fact that some people 
were still badly affected. 
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Only 14 per cent of those interviewed in the follow-up survey in 
1975 reported that their homes had been restored to their pre-flood 
condition within a month of the flooding. Thirty per cent of primary 
wage earners (that is, a male wage earner, with or without a spouse, 
or a female wage earner, without a spouse) in the follow-up survey did 
not return to their usual occupations until more than three weeks 
after the flooding. For married women employees, the proportions were 
higher. In 40 per cent of households it was reported that married 
women did not resume their normal occupation until more than 
three weeks after the flood, with a considerable number not answering 
the question, probably because they saw cleaning-up, repair and 
restoration activities as part of the normal work of housewives. 
Thirty-six per cent of follow-up respondents said they were still in 
temporary accommodation two weeks after the flood, and nearly half of 
these (17 per cent of all respondents) did not return to their homes 
until more than a month after the flood. 
Clearly, in spite of the apparent end of the emergency, many 
people remained acutely affected by the impact of the floods and the 
processes of recovery were to go on for some time. 
Vulnerability, Impact and Recovery 
The strategy adopted here to understand the processes of recovery 
is to compare the situations and experiences of those who indicated 
satisfactory recovery and those who appeared not to have achieved 
recovery some 14 months after the flood. No attempt is made at this 
stage to define 'recovery' precisely. Broadly speaking, it is 
regarded as a set of social practices which are directed towards the 
resumption of acceptable patterns and standards of living (the 
perceptions of which may vary). An effort is made to discover what 
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'recovery' is and how it is produced by examining the patterns of 
response to questions which either include a direct reference to 
'recovery' or measure the extent and speed of return to usual 
activities and standards of living. 
Initially, the focus of inquiry into 'recovery' was broad and 
many factors were considered for their possible influence on the 
processes and outcomes of recovery. Two main sets of variables need 
to be considered: those which measure vulnerability and those which 
measure impact (the immediate consequences of the flooding). 
Overall, vulnerability to a hazard for any individual, household 
or community is a product of people's position in relation to the 
natural environment, their access to social and economic resources 
which are useful in their interaction with the natural (hazardous) 
environment and their capacity to command and benefit from public 
resources useful for adaptation or response to the natural (hazardous) 
environment. 
As it has been conceptualised here, vulnerability has three main 
dimensions and these have been measured in terms of the following 
variables. 
{f} The environmental dimension has been measured in terms of: 
• Peak height of flood water in respondent's home. This 
measures the severity of the hazard. 
(ii) The social-economic dimension in terms of: 
• Age of household head and of spouse (where this applies). 
• Occupation of household head and of spouse (where this 
applies). 
• Household structure. 
• Home ownership (rental or owner occupation). 
• Combined income of household head and spouse. 
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(iii) And the political dimension by: 
• Receipt of an official warning. 
• Evacuation assistance. 
• Financial and other emergency relief: for example, food, 
clothing, household items and other short-term provisions. 
'Impact' refers to the negative or harmful effects which we 
expect to occur when resources or strategies for minimising the 
harmful effects of environmental usage are either insufficient, 
inappropriate or unable to be utilised. These have been measured in 
terms of the following variables: 
• damage to residence (a five-item scale) (see Appendix D). 
• reported emotional strain experienced by household members. 
• length of time in temporary accommodation. 
• length of time taken off from the normal occupation by the 
primary wage earner and spouse (where this applies). 
The extent of recovery has, in turn, been measured by three main 
items, one a self-report item on whether or not the respondents felt 
they had recovered from the flood at the time of the follow-up study 
and also by two items measuring the extent of home restoration or 
material recovery - one a report on the condition of the respondent's 
home at the time of the follow-up study relative to its pre-flood 
condition and the second a report on the speed of home restoration. 
In general, it was expected that high levels of vulnerability 
would be associated with high levels of impact and low levels of 
recovery. Preventive or interventive management strategies to reduce 
vulnerability and/or its effects would thus be expected to show 
effects in reducing injury to persons and damage to property and 
increasing the level of recovery. It has already been suggested, 
however, that prevention and intervention are complex matters which 
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reflect the complexity of vulnerability. The three dimensions of 
vulnerability - the social-environmental, social-economic and 
political - are not separate but interact with one another and this 
produces a variety of outcomes. Furthermore, where there is a good 
deal of variation in patterns of vulnerability, as was the case in 
Brisbane and Ipswich, devising an effective overall strategy of 
intervention with equitable effects could be problematic and the 
differential effects of relief may further increase the complexity of 
recovery processes. 
An analysis of the emergency period revealed that the management 
of vulnerability involved intervention (vis-a-vis preventive) 
strategies based upon a public definition of the flood as an 
uncontrollable accident. Differences in vulnerability were obscured 
as the public documentation of the causes and course of the 'disaster' 
emphasised the commonality of victims' experiences and the public 
definition of a 'victim' and a 'helper' role provided a social 
structure for mobilising and distributing resources. 
It has been argued (in Chapter 4) that the effectiveness of 
formal intervention strategies was, however, highly dependent upon 
individual (private) effort by flood-affected householders and those 
people who came privately to assist them. The extent of individual 
effort will again be the focus of interest in analysing the processes 
of recovery. The extent to which gender divisions, which usually 
structured (i.e. segregated) the workforce, produced a domestic labour 
force for recovery is another relevant concern. The analysis begins, 
however, with an interrogation of the data from the 1975 follow-up 
survey, in an effort to discern which, if any, of the aspects of 
vulnerability outlined above, were associated with recovery (or 
conversely, with non-recovery). 
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The Analysis of Recovery 
It will be recalled that 262 households - a stratified random 
sample of households surveyed in 1974 from seven areas were 
re-surveyed in April-May 1975. Numbers of households surveyed in each 
area for 1974 and 1975 have been preseiited in Table 1.1 (Page 12). 
At the time of the follow-up survey, 23 per cent of respondents 
said that they felt they had not recovered from the 1974 flood. The 
first step in the analysis of the follow-up data was, then, to discern 
a profile of differences between the circumstances and experiences of 
those in this group and those who felt that they had recovered. Items 
from the interview schedule indicating vulnerability and impact were 
considered for their usefulness in distinguishing between these 
two groups of people. What are presented here are the results of a 
systematic two-way contingency analysis. This unsophisticated 
analytical approach has been adopted because of the nature of the 
available data and because of the difficulty in interpreting the 
results of more sophisticated techniques when some assumptions of 
these techniques are necessarily violated. 
The nature of the flood study data is such that only a limited 
number of techniques for statistical analysis can legitimately and 
usefully be applied. The most sophisticated level of measurement of 
any variable is a limited ordinal scale (7 to 10 categories) with most 
variables being measured discretely in nominal categories. The 
dependent variable of most interest, 'self-reported recovery', is 
classified in a dichotomous way ('recovered' versus 'non-recovered'). 
Thus, in all cases, one is dealing with discrete not continuous 
measures. 
This has led to limitations in statistical analyses. Highly 
skewed distributions on independent variables of interest and an 
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unbalanced distribution of the major dependent variable, 
'self-reported recovery', suggest 'non-normality', which is a problem 
for multivariate analyses. Relatively small sample size (n = 262) in 
relation to the number of independent variables has further 
constrained and complicated the use of some multivariate regression 
techniques since some solutions to the problem of skewness are only 
appropriate if sample size is large in relation to the number of 
variables in the analysis. These conditions of small sample size and 
unbalanced distributions also prevent the use of categorical 
regression techniques which cannot tolerate the small cell sizes 
produced in multivariate breakdowns of small samples. 
After careful consideration of these factors and an exploratory 
use of discriminant analysis, the position adopted here is that 
(bivariate) contingency analysis is more informative than misapplied 
multivariate techniques or modified multivariate analyses. 
The results of a series of such bivariate analyses are presented 
in Figure 5.1 which summarises the most salient relationships between 
'vulnerability', 'impact' and 'recovery' as indicated by the measures 
listed above. It is the result of systematic two-way 
cross-tabulations amongst these variables. The analysis began by 
looking first at the relationships between each of the 'vulnerability' 
variables and the 'self-reported recovery' variable (the dependent 
variable); then at the relationships between 'impact' variables and 
'self-reported recovery'. The third step was an examination of the 
relationship between each of the variables measuring 'material 
recovery' and the 'self-reported recovery' variable. Similarly, the 
'material recovery' variables were treated as dependent variables and 
the relationships between each of these and each of the 'impact' 
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variables and 'vulnerability' variables were examined. Finally, the 
relationship between 'impact' and 'vulnerability' was assessed by 
treating each of the 'impact' variables as a dependent variable and 
examining their relationship with each of the 'vulnerability' 
variables. Only relationships which are statistically significant at 
least at p = 0.05 level are recorded and the figures in the diagram 
are the value of Cramer's V, a measure of association which serves to 
indicate the relative strength of each relationship. Cramer's V is 
used here in preference to lambda which, although capable of 
interpretation in terms of a proportionate reduction in error, would 
be depressed because of the pattern of modal categories of the 
dependent variable in most cross-tabulations. Those variables with a 
statistically significant relationship to any of the dependent 
variables of interest can be traced by reading the diagram leftwards 
from the position of the dependent variable. For example, 
'self-reported recovery' is significantly associated with 'recovery 
speed', 'post-flood condition of home', 'time spent in temporary 
accommodation', 'the experience of emotional strain', 'period of time 
away from work' and 'peak height of flood water'. 
For the purpose of this analysis, the responses for each variable 
have been collapsed and receded into one of two categories dividing 
respondents according to whether they fall into the major categories 
of particular interest, for example, 'over 45 years' or not; 
'white-collar occupation' or not; 'received more than $1,000 for house 
restoration' or not; 'away from their normal occupation for more than 
three weeks' or not. The cut-off points for this pattern of 
categorisation were decided on the basis of prior analysis of the 
distributions on independent and dependent variables. The 
relationships between these final categories and the original coding 
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categories is documented in Appendix E. The object was to reduce the 
incidence of small cell sizes to ensure the validity of the chi-square 
test and to provide a feasible basis for the comparison of the 
relative risk of non-recovery for various groups. 
Figure 5.1 does not represent a causal model. It presents a 
pattern of statistically significant contingent relationships among 
those variables specified above as indicators of vulnerability, impact 
and recovery; variables which are theoretically of interest. Arrows 
in the diagram serve to identify which variable was logically treated 
as a dependent variable, although some variables can clearly be 
conceptualised as temporal and effective antecedents to others. 
Generally, 'vulnerability' precedes 'impact' which precedes 'material 
recovery'. However,'the chronological relationship between 'material 
recovery' and 'self-reported recovery' is less easily conceptualised 
and, in this same sense, the validity of the measures of 'political 
vulnerability' is questionable. These complexities are taken into 
account in discussion of relationships apparent in the diagram. 
Recovery, House Restoration and Emotional Strain 
Attending initially to the strongest measured relationship 
depicted in Figure 5.1 and focussing on self-reported recovery, it can 
be seen that recovery is most clearly associated with poor post-flood 
condition of the home and the experience of emotional strain. A 
weaker relationship exists between post-flood condition of the home 
and emotional strain with post-flood condition of the home and 
restoration speed being more strongly associated. This pattern of 
association suggests the possibility of two dimensions of recovery - a 
personal dimension, indicated by the association between emotional 
strain and self-reported recovery and a material dimension, indicated 
by the association between post-flood condition of the home and 
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self-reported recovery. That these may constitute separate dimensions 
is also suggested by the weaker level of association between emotional 
strain and post-flood condition of the home. 
Personal Recovery 
To explore, for a moment, the personal dimension, it can be noted 
that emotional strain is also significantly though not strongly 
associated with the following variables: longer lengths of time in 
temporary accommodation, receipt of more than $100 for personal 
hardship and distress, experiencing flood-related personal or health 
problems, longer periods off work and more severe damage to the home. 
In turn, some of these factors can be seen to be inter-related. Those 
who received notable amounts of financial assistance (house 
restoration grants, grants for personal hardship and distress, and/or 
emergency relief from the Brisbane Lord Mayor's Fund or the Ipswich 
City Council Fund) were also more likely to have experienced severe 
damage. So too were these people more likely to have spent longer 
periods in temporary accommodation and damage was quite strongly 
related to the peak height of flood waters. In brief, emotional 
strain would seem to be directly tied to the extent of impact or 
disruption to routine activities associated with the flood, while 
self-reported recovery is associated with less environmental and 
personal disruption, less chance of emotional strain and greater 
likelihood of having the flood-affected home in the same or an 
improved condition after the flood. 
Pointing to the connection between the experience of emotional 
strain and self-reported non-recovery should not be taken to imply 
that the emotional strain experienced by many flood-affected people 
necessarily hindered material recovery. The relationship between the 
post-flood condition of the home and emotional strain is relatively 
weak and flood-affected people themselves most often reported that 
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emotional strain did not affect their ability to do the things 
necessary to repair or replace their possessions. Certainly those in 
the non-recovered group were more likely than others to report that 
emotional strain did affect their ability to 'cope' with the tasks in 
hand, however, most, in spite of the associated emotional strain, did 
what was necessary to clean and repair their homes or organise others 
to do so. Although some, at the time of the follow-up study, were 
still in the process of repairing homes, the majority (even in the 
non-recovered group) either had been or expected to be able to restore 
their homes to a standard at least comparable to pre-flood condition. 
This and other data on private (individual household) effort in 
rehabilitation make it difficult to argue that emotional strain 
hindered recovery as" some commentators claimed. It seems rather more 
likely that long delays in material recovery, in spite of much 
individual effort spent in restoration or the organisation of repair 
work, may have, on the contrary, contributed to emotional strain. At 
the same time independence between two dimensions of recovery - the 
personal and the material - is suggested by the fact that emotional 
strain is more strongly associated with self-reported non-recovery 
than it is with either of the material recovery variables (post-flood 
condition of the home and speed of restoration). 
Material Recovery 
Turning now to the dimension of material recovery, a relatively 
weak link between recovery speed and self-reported recovery and a 
stronger relationship between post-flood housing condition and 
self-reported recovery suggests that the length of time taken to 
restore the home is a less critical factor in recovery than the actual 
achievement of restoration. The fact that having more financial 
assistance is associated with slower restoration speed possibly 
accounts for the fact that longer restoration periods were not 
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strongly associated with self-reported non-recovery since financial 
assistance could be a factor in the eventual achievement of a 
satisfactory housing condition. The lack of an (apparent) association 
between post-flood housing condition and variables measuring financial 
assistance suggests an equitable distribution and full compensation 
through financial assistance and/or a capability on the part of 
flood-affected people to 'take up the slack' with individual effort, 
using and managing effectively the range of resources available to 
them, including their own financial resources, the labour of household 
members and the assistance of other private helpers. 
The absence of a significant association between the 
two variables, severity of damage and peak height and post-flood 
housing condition, also suggests that, one way or another, most people 
were able or expected to find the resources they required to restore 
their homes. An examination of the extent of individual effort, the 
combination of individual effort with trade work and the uses of 
financial assistance for restoration reveals a variety of patterns of 
utilisation of resources for restoration. 
Occupation and Recovery 
From the analysis summarised in Figure 5.1, neither the 
occupational group (white collar/blue collar) of the primary wage 
earner nor of his/her spouse (where relevant) was significantly 
related to recovery. Yet, a comparison of differences in the 
occupational composition of the group doing some repairs themselves, 
with the group who had all repairs carried out by tradeworkers, 
indicates that there were, in the first group, higher proportions of 
male income earners who were managers and skilled workers and of women 
who were housewives. Since, as Table 5.2 illustrates, the proportions 
of households where men were skilled workers (a blue-collar group) and 
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women were housewives were also noticeably higher in the recovered 
group compared to the non-recovered group, this raises questions about 
the nature of the relationship between occupational positions and 
resources (including skills) and the processes of recovery. 
Addressing such questions. Table 5.3 presents patterns of 
difference among occupational groupings with regard to household and 
tradework contributions to material recovery, financial assistance and 
self-reported recovery. Proportions rather than percentages are 
presented since the numbers in some cells are small and to 
conceptualise them as percentages would therefore be misleading. The 
clearest pattern evident is the higher proportions of 'blue-collar' 
workers (skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled occupational groups) who 
were involved in major repair work on their homes. Their household 
contributions to repair (particularly that of skilled workers) 
contrast most sharply with that of clerical and sales workers who, 
although having a similar recovery rate to the 'blue-collar' groups, 
were far less likely to have supplemented the work of employed 
tradeworkers with their own labour. 
Managers appear as an interesting group of household workers who 
were heavily involved in repair work but less likely than other groups 
to be directly involved in major repair work. This could in part be a 
reflection of a lower frequency of severe flooding (above main floor 
level) amongst this group - an interpretation which is supported 
somewhat by the relatively lower proportion of this group receiving 
more than $1,000 as a grant for house restoration and fewer, compared 
to other groups, who employed tradeworkers for major repair work. 
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TABLE 5.1 
DIFFERENCES IN OCCUPATIONAL COMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLDS 
DOING SOME REPAIRS THEMSELVES AND HOUSEHOLDS HAVING ALL REPAIRS 
CARRIED OUT BY TRADEWORKERS* 
Some Repairs 
Done by 
Household 
Members 
n = 77 
% 
All Repairs 
Done by 
Tradeworkers 
n = 139 
% 
(Male) managers 
(Male) skilled workers 
(Female) Houseworkers 
18.2 
32.4 
79.2 
7.9 
21.6 
66.9 
^Differences for other occupational groupings were not significant at 
p = 0.05 or less. 
TABLE 5.2 
OCCUPATIONAL GROUPINGS AND RECOVERY RATES 
Recovered 
n = 198 
% 
Non-recovered 
n = 64 
% 
(Male) Clerical and Sales 
Workers 
(Male) Skilled Workers 
(Male) Miscellaneous Workers/ 
Pensioners 
18.7 
30.3 
16.2 
8.2 
21.3 
27.9 
(Female) Houseworkers 79.3"* 67.3** 
*"These figures are a percentage of those households where a second 
household manager was present and occupation was recorded. 
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Examination of the category of miscellaneous occupations which 
includes pensioners (of all categories) and retired non-pensioners, 
suggests another distinct pattern. A relatively high proportion of 
this group experienced severe flooding but a low proportion received 
financial assistance for house restoration whilst at the same time a 
fairly high proportion employed tradeworkers for major repair work 
(see Table 5.3). This suggests that among these people the 
contribution of personal, financial resources along with or instead of 
their labour was an aspect of recovery. 
Gender, Occupation and Recovery 
The possibility, suggested by the data in Table 5.3, that 
occupational or labour market^position partly shapes the recovery 
process is further strengthened when one investigates whether 
housewives made a contribution to the recovery process as domestic 
labourers. Table 5.4 compares the proportions of married women who 
were housewives in groups which differ with regard to the household 
contribution to home repairs. The difference in the proportions of 
housewives in the group who carried out some repairs themselves 
compared with the group who did no repairs themselves is significant 
at p = 0.05 level. The overall pattern in the table (the higher 
proportions of housewives in those categories of people who carried 
out some repairs themselves) suggests that housewives made a specific, 
direct and/or supportive contribution both to what have been called 
here 'minor' and 'major' repairs. Minor repairs include such work as 
redecorating the interior and exterior of the home - painting, mending 
or making of drapes, repairing and refurbishing floor coverings and 
wall tiles. 'Major' repairs involve repairing and/or replacing 
joinery, floor coverings, electrical or pliimbing work and structural 
repairs. It is possible that the main direct contribution of 
housewives was in the area of minor repairs and that their 
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TABLE 5.4 
PROPORTIONS OF HOUSEHOLDS WITH HOUSEWIVES 
Total 
Follow-up 
Sample 
% 
Some 
Repairs 
Done by 
Household 
Members 
% 
Major 
Repairs 
Done by 
Household 
Members 
No 
Repairs 
Done by 
Household 
Members 
Proportions with 
Housewives 76.0 84.0 82.5 73.0 
contribution in the area of major repairs involved supportive domestic 
labour enabling their husbands to engage in household labour using 
their relevant job skills to carry out major repair work -
conventionally men's^work. This particular division of labour is, 
however, difficult to demonstrate from the available data, although 
the prevalence of households where men were blue-collar workers and 
women were housewives (not employed) among those involved in major 
repair work is suggestive of such a division of labour. 
The importance of the contribution made by married women in 
particular to the processes of recovery is further suggested by 
comparing the proportions of housewives (not employed) in the 
households specified in Table 5.4 with the labour force participation 
rates of married women in Queensland and Australia for February 1974. 
The figures in Table 5.5 show that labour force participation rates 
for married women in Queensland and Australia were higher than those 
for flood-affected women in Brisbane and Ipswich (refer Table 5.4) 
and, as a corollary, that the domestic labour force among 
flood-affected households was larger. According to ABS data, most 
(98 per cent) married women not in the labour force in Queensland in 
February 1974 'kept house' (ABS, 1975). Overall, then, these data 
lend weight to the view that women made an important and particular 
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TABLE 5.5 
LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES OF MARRIED WOMEN, 
FEBRUARY 1974, QUEENSLAND AND AUSTRALIA 
Queensland* 
% 
Australia''* 
% 
Participation Rate 
Not in Labour Force 
31.6 
68.4 
40.4 
59.6 
Source: *The Labour Force, Queensland, Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, August 1975, p.4. 
**The Labour Force, Australia, Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 1978, Cat. No. 6204.0, p.36. 
contribution to material recovery, either by repairing their homes, 
assisting their husbands in the repair of their homes, cleaning up, 
general household management and/or the maintenance of 
household/family relationships, thus enabling other family members (if 
not the housewife) to resume their normal occupations within quite 
short periods of time after the flooding, something which the 
contingency analysis depicted in Figure 5.1, suggest may have 
contributed in some way to an overall feeling of personal recovery. 
The association between the labour market position of married 
women (paid workers or housewives) and self-reported recovery was also 
examined. Table 5.6 indicates that there was a noticeable difference 
in the recovery rates of women in paid employment and women in the 
housewife only groups (69 per cent compared with 81 per cent) but a 
chi-square test of independence indicates that the relationship 
between labour force status and recovery is not statistically 
significant at p = 0.05. 
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TABLE 5.6 
LABOUR FORCE STATUS AND RECOVERY 
Recovered Non-recovered 
Paid Working Women 
II 36 16 52 
% of row 9.2 31.0 
Housewife 
n 146 35 181 
% of row 80.7 19.3 
182 51 233 
This pattern, although suggesting the importance of domestic 
labour as a resource for material recovery, also supports the view 
that different resources were used in different ways to achieve 
recovery because, although housewives clearly made a definite 
contribution to material recovery, the absence of a full-time 
'housewife' in the family or household did not markedly affect the 
achievement of an overall feeling of recovery. 
This investigation of the relevance of occupational position to 
recovery has demonstrated that although recovery, either material or 
personal, is evidently not directly associated with occupational 
position, when the processes of recovery are examined in more detail, 
the patterns appear different for different occupational groups. 
Thus, the relevance of occupational skills and occupational position 
in patterning recovery is suggested. The data presented suggest that 
the unpaid manual labour of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled men 
and the unpaid domestic labour of women are of particular importance. 
The analysis has suggested that although occupation apparently makes 
no difference to self-reported recovery rates, labour market position 
and gender (to the extent that it influences the labour market 
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position of women), structure the processes of recovery. That is to 
say, differences are apparent among those in different positions in 
the labour market with regard to access to, and utilisation of, 
different resources used to restore (and in some cases improve) the 
condition of the home, which is evidently a key factor in overall 
recovery. A similar pattern of revealed differences in experiences of 
recovery has been docxamented by Bolin (1986) who compared the recovery 
experiences of black and white families in a US city, and discovered 
that, for each group, different factors best predicted economic and 
emotional recovery. 
Age and Recovery 
There is also some evidence that the processes of recovery among 
households of older people (whose age affects their labour market 
position) differed from the experience in other households (see 
Table 5.7). However, the labour market position of the elderly would 
not seem to account fully for this difference. 
Table 5.7 presents information which parallels that presented in 
Table 5.3 with respect to occupation. One of its most salient aspects 
is the comparatively higher level of involvement of primary income 
earners over 45 years of age in major repair work. Although this may 
be in part related to occupation (since 36 per cent of the 46-60 year 
age group in the follow-up sample were skilled workers), an 
independent effect of age on involvement in repair work is still 
suggested. This is because skilled workers in the 46-60 year group 
were nearly three times more likely than those in the 30-45 year group 
to have been involved in major repair work and two-thirds of all 
primary income earners who did major repair work themselves were over 
45 years of age. As mentioned above, this higher level of involvement 
may reflect a strategy to compensate for the lower likelihood of 
receiving house restoration grants (see columns 7 and 8 in Table 5.7). 
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The overall pattern for the over-60 years age group is also of 
interest. A comparatively low proportion were involved in only minor 
repair work (0.06), with a comparatively high proportion (0.22) 
involved in major repairs. Moreover, similar proportions (to other 
age groups) employed tradeworkers and lower proportions received house 
restoration grants. It would appear that this group in the older age 
bracket, was likely to tackle expensive repairs themselves, with 
people preferring to invest their own time and labour and not always 
their money - a pattern which probably reflects the common concern of 
those on fixed and usually low incomes to have enough money 'put 
aside' for their everyday and regular needs. However, for the 
over-60 years age group, it appears that this investment of personal 
resources in major repairs did not reduce the chances of having one's 
home in worse condition some fourteen months after the flood than it 
had been pre-flood This contrasts with the situation for those 
60 years and under. For these age groups, participation in major 
repair work did reduce the chances of not having the home restored to 
at least its pre-flood condition. Table 5.8 illustrates this pattern. 
Again proportions are presented because of the small numbers involved. 
Further analysis also reveals that, amongst those whose homes 
needed repairs, those elderly who were less likely to have improved 
the condition of their home were also more likely than the 30-45 year 
age group to report that they had recovered, even when they regarded 
the post-flood condition of their home as worse than its pre-flood 
condition. Along with a preparedness to expend considerable personal 
effort and time on their recovery, these elderly appear to have 
accepted their inability to restore their homes to their pre-flood 
condition; they have accepted their vulnerability which entails 
acceptance that vulnerability and impact are essentially private 
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matters. The data presented above suggest that this acceptance has 
occurred in a context where vulnerability is in part a function of the 
economic position of the elderly in Australian society (predominantly 
having low, fixed incomes and some assets). 
Conclusion 
This chapter began with questions about the nature of recovery 
and its relationship to vulnerability (conceptualised as having 
three dimensions) and impact (measured in terms of damage to the 
home, emotional strain and personal disruption of flood-affected 
people). In summary, analysis has suggested two dimensions of 
recovery - a personal dimension and a material one - with the actual 
achievement of material recovery appearing as a more important 
influence on self-reported recovery than the speed of its 
achievement. It has also indicated that some aspects of environmental 
vulnerability, particularly the peak height of flood waters, affected 
recovery by increasing damage and time spent in temporary 
accommodation, ultimately reducing the speed of home restoration. 
Aspects of social-economic vulnerability which were shown initially 
not to be strongly related to the outcome of recovery processes, have 
been subsequently shown to shape different patterns for achieving 
recovery. Labour market position, gender and age evidently structured 
patterns of utilisation of available resources and hence they 
structured patterns of recovery. However, because these factors are 
not clearly associated with different rates of the actual achievement 
of recovery, their relevance was not apparent - 'victims' could be 
seen, and indeed were seen, in the dominant public account, as having 
had a common experience caused by the extremes of the natural 
environment. Had these differences become apparent, social action 
based upon labour market, gender and age divisions may well have 
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emerged and challenged the way in which the environment was 
incorporated into the social system. Such a challenge would have 
constituted a challenge to the (capitalist) system through which the 
natural environment was incorporated, with the benefits and risks of 
using the natural environment being unevenly distributed. As such it 
could have constituted class action. Such a challenge did not, 
however, emerge, because the relevance of these divisions, based upon 
labour market position, gender and age, was not apparent. 
The reduction of political vulnerability through the 
redistribution of resources by the state, in the form of financial 
assistance for personal hardship and house restoration, was also 
shown, once again, to have been a particularly important intervention 
strategy enabling recovery and hence contributing to the containment 
of opposition and the absence of protest. This strategy of 
redistributing resources was a directly relevant and appropriate 
method of ensuring that those with too few personal, social or 
economic resources were able to manage the effects of their 
vulnerability. However, it can also be seen as a way of obscuring the 
very differences in access to resources which are its raison d'etre. 
Such differences in access to resources in any capitalist economy are 
derived, at least in part, from differences in class position. 
However, if they are not apparent, the structural arrangements through 
which they have been produced will not be apparent. Class divisions, 
labour market divisions, gender divisions, age divisions or the 
interactions of these and other factors may enable or limit access to 
resources. But, unless these arrangements are recognised as the bases 
of social differences, they will be unlikely bases of social conflict 
leading to political action against the system organised around them. 
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Potential conflict over the causes of the catastrophe in the 
Moreton Region, and over the uneven distribution of disruptive 
effects, was counteracted not only by the provision of state organised 
financial assistance, but also by the investment of household labour 
in restoring privately owned residential property. Both of these 
factors were verified by this analysis of recovery as important 
post-impact intervention strategies. Yet, neither strategy altered 
the underlying pattern of vulnerability; a pattern which, we have 
seen, can be understood by reference to the particular social-economic 
and political organisation of the environment in this modern 
capitalist society. These strategies, instead, reproduced 
two fundamental (perhaps paradoxical) aspects of vulnerability in the 
Moreton Region - (i) a dependency upon the state for bureaucratic 
management of vulnerability, mainly through bureaucratic management of 
the environment and organisation of relief; and (ii) the privatisation 
of the environment through private home ownership, a mode of 
environmental incorporation which entailed an acceptance by 
householders that the effects of vulnerability were essentially 
private concerns. Former patterns were reproduced through 
intervention (both public or formal and private). The (capitalist) 
system through which they were constituted was stabilised, as the 
status quo. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION: THE SOCIAL ORGANISATION OF VULNERABILITY, 
IMPACT AND RECOVERY 
What was the nature of vulnerability to flooding in the Moreton 
Region in 1974? What were its dimensions? How did it differ for 
different groups in the flood-plain? How were particular patterns of 
vulnerability sustained? What was the relationship between 
vulnerability and recovery? 
The enquiry began with these questions and to them it now 
returns. The aim of this final chapter is to review the patterns and 
outcomes of the enquiry (its genealogy if you will) and to return once 
more to these principal themes established at the outset. The 
relevance and workability of the study will also be demonstrated by 
relating the insights gained to the practical field of hazard 
management and by indicating new directions and relevant fields for 
related enquiry. 
Summary: The Nature of the Enquiry 
The thesis developed through a conceptual framework based on a 
class analysis of human agency and natural disaster. Such a 
conceptual framework translated the opening questions stated above 
into others, formulated from a class perspective. These questions 
were, in turn, modified in recognition of the relevance of a 
Foucaultian framework focusing upon the emergence of strategies of 
power through discourse, action and effects. Thus, the presentation 
of evidence in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 has been organised around questions 
about what people knew and talked about and what people did in both 
the public and private spheres. 
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The enquiry, though based largely upon the analysis of numerical 
data, is properly regarded as an exercise in grounded theory. It has 
involved a 'tripping back and forth' between data and theory (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1976), although these processes are not always apparent 
in this statement of the enquiry. This thesis does not represent 
adequately the doubling back which occurred at each stage in the 
process of theorising because of the necessity in the end to present a 
clear account focussing on the outcomes of enquiry. However, the 
simultaneity of the processes of selection and re-categorisation of 
data and their analysis, and the intermeshing of these processes will 
have been evident in the previous chapters. In the same way, 
theoretical sampling decisions, decisions about where to turn next in 
developing an explanation of what was really going on, have been 
articulated in the organisation of chapters and their sections. The 
conceptual framework was developed through frequent literature 
searches, carried out within a framework of grounded theorising. A 
phenomenological perspective has been maintained in the search for 
sociological concepts because it has, at all times, been guided by the 
need to 'make sense' of the data by fitting the sociological concept 
to the data and to everyday accounts and not the reverse. Concepts 
have been included in the analytical framework only after their 
relevance has been verified by reference to analytical notes made 
throughout the research and by reference again to the available data. 
This strategy provides one of the bases for linking substantive to 
formal theory. 
The use, from time to time, of tests of statistical significance 
and statistical measures of strength of variable association in the 
analysis of numerical data may also lay this analysis open to the 
charge of theoretical insensitivity for it has been argued by the 
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advocates of grounded theory and indeed by most phenomenologists that 
such tests can often distract the theorist from substantively 
significant associations. The position taken here is that statistical 
measures and tests of significance are always useful devices in the 
description of numerical data and do not necessarily imply a 
positivist methodology. They have been used in conjunction with other 
analytical tools so as to minimise that risk of missing substantively 
significant relationships because they do serve, when used with 
caution, as standardised procedures for comparison with data on other 
social settings and/or from other substantive areas, thus providing 
another albeit limited basis for the development of formal grounded 
theory. The limited use of these statistical procedures has added to, 
not replaced, other descriptions, and variable analysis has not been 
substituted for grounded explanation aimed at understanding the social 
processes which constitute the links which have been revealed in 
variable analysis. 
The task now is to consolidate the elements of a substantive 
theory which have been produced and to demonstrate their value. What 
follows summarises the findings presented in earlier chapters, 
evaluates their significance and points to new directions for the 
further development of grounded theory. 
The Social Organisation of Vulnerability, Impact and Recovery 
In this analysis, vulnerability was conceptualised as a personal, 
privatised experience constituted through economic, social and 
political organisation and was considered in terms of three major 
interactive dimensions - the social-environmental, the social-economic 
and the political. It became evident that management of the natural 
environment was highly bureaucratised and removed from the public 
political arena. Measures taken by the state to mitigate and protect 
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the region from extreme conditions of the natural environment 
maintained a hazardous relationship by emphasising the protective 
capacity of large-scale technological mitigation schemes and assuming 
the availability of emergency financial relief for repair and 
rehabilitation. As a consequence of the bureaucratic management of 
the environment, low levels of perception and knowledge of the hazard 
existed among flood-plain residents. With low levels of perception 
and an absence of knowledge of the hazard, there was also an absence 
of political action, for not even a common environmental interest was 
recognised, prior to the flood. That is to say, prior to the flood, 
most flood-plain residents had not recognised that they shared the 
risk of damage to their homes and injury to themselves as a result of 
severe flooding. Therefore, they had, neither personally nor 
collectively, taken political action aimed at reducing their 
vulnerability. 
Whilst the lack of awareness, knowledge and experience of the 
hazardousness of the environment was common to most flood-plain 
residents, there were differences in the social and economic 
characteristics of these people. Variations in education, occupation 
(indicating variations in income levels), and age, for instance, 
suggested some variation in access to resources available in the 
formal economy and hence some variation in the nature and level of 
dependence upon household labour and resources (the informal economy) 
in the event of impact. These patterns of difference, indicated early 
from census data, appeared also in the flood survey data. Occupation, 
age and another factor, gender, were revealed, through analysis, as 
factors structuring the experience of impact and recovery. The 
ideological and practical significance of widespread private home 
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ownership was also recognised, for it was an important common 
characteristic of those at risk, cutting across other differences, and 
an important element in the private acceptance of risk. Though there 
were differences among flood-affected people in access to relevant 
resources and resultant differences in patterns of recovery, 
householders overwhelmingly accepted the need for a heavy private 
investment of resources, either their labour or personal finances, to 
ensure the repair of their own homes and ultimately their personal 
recovery. 
With regard to the political dimension of vulnerability, it has 
been noted that the implementation and structure of disaster relief, 
forthcoming from the federal, state and local governments, depended to 
a very large extent upon the initiatives of incumbent politicians -
particularly at the federal level (with a Labor government in power at 
the time) and state level (with a National-Liberal Party Coalition 
government) where some inter-party rivalry complicated the 
implementation of relief measures. The relief measures introduced 
stabilised rather than reduced vulnerability, because they emphasised 
repair and rehabilitation after impact rather than specialised 
preventive and/or adaptive measures. An emphasis upon the possibility 
for repair and rehabilitation after impact is consistent with 
risk-taking rather than prevention. In the Moreton Region, public 
(and official) confidence in the potential availability of government 
and private funds for post-impact repair and rehabilitation allowed 
private risk-taking by householders in the flood-plain to occur. When 
the flooding occurred, it was demonstrated that public financial 
relief was available for the restoration of private assets and for 
immediate personal rehabilitation, and that governments would continue 
to invest in large-scale mitigation schemes. This demonstration 
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enabled householders to continue to accept the risk they had been 
largely unaware of prior to the floods (and which they understood 
would be reduced by further, large-scale mitigation schemes). 
The management of the effects of vulnerability in the emergency 
was viewed as a political process and was seen as an outcome of 
strategies of power operating between the formal/public level and the 
level of the household. It has been argued that the uneven pattern of 
distribution of knowledge of the hazard was the basis for the 
development of a public (and dominant) account of the emergency and 
state control over the response to the flooding. This public account 
offered an interpretation of the emergency as a situation in which the 
community was suffering from stress caused by uncontrollable and 
haphazard forces in the natural environment. Flood-affected people 
were seen as the victims of these forces. A widespread inability to 
interpret warnings due to lack of prior knowledge resulted in 
ineffective responsive behaviour and a widespread acceptance of this 
publicly-constructed definition of the situation. In the process of 
management of the effects of vulnerability, two main groupings 
emerged, the victims (of the natural environment) - the unorganised, 
helpless flood-plain occupants - and helpers - the facilitators and 
some-time agents of the state, who had access to bureaucratically 
distributed resources. These disaster groupings, formed in response 
to environmental conditions, cut across and obscured other social 
groupings. Limited case studies of the Police Department, mass media 
and welfare agencies indicated how the public response to the threat 
was constituted as combat against and eventual victory over external 
forces. These case studies also illustrated the complex processes by 
which much private helping activity came to be seen, in the dominant, 
public account, as public helper action. In reality, however, the 
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situation was not like this. An overview of public and private 
responses has illustrated that householders in the flood-plain sought 
and gained most help (other than financial) from friends and 
relatives, and at all stages of recovery, their own labour was an 
indispensable resource. What also became apparent from the study of 
public and private responses to the flooding, was the way in which 
they were mutually constituted via a dependency of householders (based 
on an unequal distribution of knowledge prior to the floods of 1974) 
upon knowledge which was publicly distributed at the time of the 
flooding, for interpretation of what was going on. Public and private 
responses were also mutually constituted by householders' dependency 
upon state administered sources of financial assistance. The inherent 
potential for opposition by flood-affected people to the system of 
social organisation which entailed their vulnerability was thus not 
realised. 
Though the public and private responses to the flooding were 
mutually constituted, a study of the processes of recovery revealed 
that flood-affected householders defined recovery only partly in the 
terms in which it was publicly recognised; in terms of the resumption 
of business and commerce, transport and other essential services and 
the return to work. The process of recovery for householders appeared 
to have two dimensions - housing or material restoration and personal 
or emotional recovery - the two, of course being inter-related and 
structured, only in part, by the public definition of recovery. Both 
material and personal recovery required considerable personal effort 
and household labour, particularly on the part of women as housewives 
and those in retirement (both groups did not participate as workers in 
the formal economy) and of those blue-collar workers whose job skills 
were relevant to the repair and rebuilding of flood-damaged homes (and 
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whose participation as workers in the informal, household economy was 
something they did in addition to their participation in the formal 
economy - a double commitment to labour). Material recovery (and 
through it, personal recovery) also depended, in most cases, upon 
financial aid from the state. Thus, household recovery was evidently 
constituted through labour market position, gender relations in 
households, age relations in the system of social organisation and a 
dependence upon state administered financial aid. 
This understanding of the Moreton Region floods of 1974 has 
developed through an enquiry into the activities and operations of the 
state, the distribution and organisation of environmental and disaster 
knowledge, the organisation and distribution of labour market skills, 
and gender and age relations in the recovery process. It was 
primarily through these structures and not directly via the class 
structure, that the distribution of environmental benefits and losses 
and the maintenance (or stabilisation) of patterns of vulnerability 
occurred. Class groupings did not emerge as disaster groupings, 
because although the catastrophe arose out of particular ways in which 
the natural environment was incorporated into the social formation 
(one which, as a capitalist system, functions primarily in the 
interests of capital), the hazard was never recognised or interpreted 
as one derived from particular social, economic or political 
arrangements. That is, it was not perceived as a social, economic or 
political issue. It was interpreted as an environmental hazard, 
unexpected and not preventable by hviman (technological) means. Some 
would have held that it was 'an act of God'. In this context, 
disaster groupings formed not around class positions, which were 
obscured, but as a response to perceived external, environmental 
forces of attack. The dominant, hegemonic account of the catastrophe 
which obscured class differences amongst victims was acceptable to 
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them because it 'made sense' to a group who, in spite of their social 
and economic differences were predominantly private home-owners/buyers 
who shared, by and large, an ignorance of the hazard and its 
dimensions. They would, more than likely, have found unacceptable any 
other account which recognised the extent to which the catastrophe was 
an outcome of particular political, social and economic practices 
(including the pattern of land tenure). Such an account might have 
presented a challenge, at some stage, to their right to own small 
parcels of private property in the flood zone, or at least threatened 
the value of the economic and social investment they had made in their 
'own home'. Thus, private home ownership, both as an ideology and as 
a practice, was an important structural arrangement through which 
vulnerability, impact and recovery were constituted. Paradoxically, 
the private acceptance of responsibility for recovery from the effects 
of vulnerability by home-owners was complemented by a dependency upon 
the state for bureaucratic management of the hazardous use of the 
environment and the bureaucratic organisation of financial relief. It 
was via this strange complex of dependency and privatisation of 
responsibility that reactive, interventive strategies for the 
management of the effects of vulnerability, rather than preventive 
strategies aimed at reducing vulnerability, were accepted and 
reproduced. 
This analysis does not imply that the structures mentioned were 
the only structures through which hazard, impact and recovery were 
constituted. What it does indicate, however, is that the 
understanding of a society in disaster is usefully predicated upon an 
understanding of that society itself rather than, as many early 
studies would have it, upon the characteristics and dimensions of the 
extreme environmental conditions which will have catastrophic effects 
in that society. 
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The Significance of the Analysis: Towards Substantive Theory 
What then are the social and theoretical implications of this 
analysis? Of what relevance are the insights gained and what workable 
'solutions' or actions are implied? 
The analysis has produced, through various levels of abstraction, 
an integrated description of the social setting at the time of the 
floods of January 1974 in the Moreton region of South-east Queensland. 
Six main elements of an emerging substantive theory can be discerned. 
• Hazards in the natural environment are socially, economically and 
politically produced. That is, environmental conditions become 
hazardous because of particular social, economic and political 
arrangements. Thus vulnerability to natural hazards has, as well 
as an environmental dimension, at least two other dimensions -
the social-economic and the political. 
• Vulnerability to natural hazards and the impact of natural 
hazards are processes which are constituted and managed via the 
same social structures; the same social arrangements which 
condition patterns of vulnerability are utilised and hence 
reproduced in managing the effects of that vulnerability. In the 
Moreton Region, as this study has shown, bureaucratic management 
of the environment, bureaucratic control over environmental 
knowledge along with private home ownership were important 
structural arrangements which both constituted the vulnerability 
of flood-plain residents and enabled its management in the 
aftermath of the floods (and thus the recovery of those 
affected). The dualism of such structures means that changes in 
the way in which a natural environment is incorporated into a 
system of social organisation are unlikely to occur as a response 
to impact, because making such changes would entail a challenge 
to the very structures which enable recovery. 
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• A genuine restructuring of patterns of vulnerability implies a 
restructuring of the system of social organisation and not merely 
of the natural environment. Such a restructuring would entail 
fundamental changes to the pattern of social organisation, 
particularly in social-economic arrangements and in the 
structural bases of inequality through which the effects of 
hazard are distributed and controlled. 
• Making such fundamental changes does not necessarily imply 
destruction (or overthrow) of the system of social organisation 
but does imply ideological shifts leading to: (1) a preparedness 
to reformulate basic values (such as the profit motive and 
private property in capitalist societies) and the processes of 
evaluation and decision which are based upon them (for example, 
cost-benefit analyses and urban management models); (2) a 
preparedness to restructure conventional modes of social 
organisation, for example, methods of bureaucratic management, 
and, in particular, bureaucratic and/or professional ways of 
organising and controlling expertise; and (3) the specific 
protection of the rights and circumstances of groups made most 
vulnerable within the system of social organisation, that is, 
those at greatest overall risk. 
Conclusion 
These propositions imply, in turn, some possibilities for action 
in the social setting and suggest useful directions for further 
comparative analysis: 
Flood-plain planning and management procedures could encompass a 
search for and explication of the negative or constraining elements 
(the risks) which are entailed within the positive elements (the 
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benefits) of proposed, or existing, schemes. This does not mean 
simply identifying the risks which can be weighed up and possibly 
balanced out, overall, against the benefits. It means searching for 
risks which cannot be avoided so long as the benefits are enjoyed. 
Furthermore, it means investigating the particular ways in which the 
distributions of risks and benefits are related; developing a keen 
understanding of who benefits and who takes or bears the risks. Such 
an approach would provide a basis for the development of progressive 
arrangements capable of responding not simply to the 'needs' of a 
system of social and economic organisation, that is, to dominant 
economic and political interests, but also to needs which are best met 
via changes in the pattern of social and economic organisation which 
incorporates the natural environment. This assumes, of course, a 
preparedness and/or a demand to reformulate planning procedures. It 
also implies, to some degree, a shift from an interventive or reactive 
management model to a preventive management model. That is, some 
challenge is needed to the power-knowledge of experts, embedded as it 
is, in the system of social organisation. Encouraging or enabling the 
participation of hazard-affected people in policy formulation could 
increase the likelihood of policies being responsive to their needs 
and it could create opportunities and structures, at the practical 
level, for citizen education and the acceptance of management policy 
by directly affected citizens. 
On another front, the scope of flood-plain mapping could include 
social impact studies which map not only the environmental dimension 
of risk, but also the vulnerability of the population in terms of 
social-economic and political factors which past research has shown to 
be relevant. This would provide a more realistic and humane basis for 
the assessment of strategies for reducing the vulnerability of 
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specific groups. However, to be an effective basis for flood-plain 
management policies, such vulnerability-mapping would need to be 
carried out regularly, taking account of changes in the 
social-economic characteristics of households (and individuals) in the 
flood-plain, as well as changes in social-economic and political 
structures, new initiatives in environmental use and management, and 
the implications of environmental changes which have occurred. 
More broadly, this analysis has indicated, firstly, the value of 
more detailed investigations of the relationship between the 
distribution of negative and positive effects of the social use of the 
natural environment and of investigations of strategies for the 
containment of potential conflict arising from particular human uses 
of the natural environment. In this analysis, vulnerability has been 
conceptualised mainly in terms of negative effects and their 
distribution. A detailed analysis of the positive effects (and who 
benefits) has not been undertaken within the scope of the present 
work, and the question of the relationship between the distribution of 
positive effects and the distribution of negative effects of 
social-environmental relations has not been dealt with directly. 
However, the significance of understanding the interactions of 
negative and positive effects has been clearly indicated. 
A second line for further enquiry would be the investigation, by 
comparison, of the conditions under which fundamental changes in the 
social-environmental structure are likely to be demanded and to occur 
after impact, as happened for example, with the organisation of 
victims demanding housing after the September 1985 earthquakes in 
Mexico City. There, victims formed domestic shelter groups, their 
demands were co-ordinated, and they became politically organised. 
This resulted in the presentation of a list of demands for housing and 
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for the formulation of a new and acceptable housing policy for the 
destroyed space (Massalo, 1986; Rabell and Mier y Teran, 1986; 
Azuela de la Cueva, 1986; Ziccardi, 1986). 
Thirdly, the conditions under which ideological shifts, which 
lead to changes in planning and management procedures and ultimately 
to changes in the social-environmental structure, are likely to occur 
is an area where comparative study could lead to further insights. 
Further studies of the content of mass media communications during 
disasters and more general discourse analysis to discern the emergence 
of language categories employed in the interpretation of events are 
clearly warranted. Although, in the tradition of disaster research, 
the functional efficiency of the mass media has often been of 
interest, the language of communication and its effects within 
specific sociocultural settings have not received the attention they 
warrant. However, this study has indicated how critical the nature of 
discourse on disaster can be in the structuring or conditioning of 
events. 
Fourthly, the position of specific groups such as women and the 
aged, in disaster demands further enquiry through comparative study. 
This study has served to indicate, for example, the relevance of 
gender and age divisions in the process of recovery and Bolin's (1986) 
study of negro families in Texas indicated that in addition to 
socio-economic factors, which are of major importance in recovery from 
disaster, sociocultural factors also appear to play a part in 
differential patterns of recovery. Black and white families appeared, 
from Bolin's study, to be sensitive to different aspects of economic 
aid, social support and emotional support from family and kin in their 
recovery patterns. These studies not only indicate the importance of 
further investigation along these lines, but also the inadequacy of 
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environmental management models, which assess the balance of costs and 
benefits of using an environment, in an overall calculation of 
aggregate benefits and costs. 
Substantively, these lines of enquiry connect this study to many 
other areas of sociological research apart from disaster research and 
natural hazards research within which the initial enquiry was 
situated. Welfare and the distribution of resources, social planning, 
technology and the environment, urban sociology, the sociology of 
women and feminist research, studies of the informal economy and 
studies of bureaucracy and democracy are among the most obvious 
related areas. 
The study is also clearly related to more formal theoretical 
concerns such as those about the division of labour and control over 
resources (including knowledge); hegemonic control, the state and the 
constitution of power; conflict, containment and change, indeed, about 
the constitution of societies - basic social processes which underlie 
the issues and problems of a wide range of substantive areas. 
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APPENDIX A 
1. UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND - FLOOD STUDY 
FIRST HOUSEHOLD SCHEDULE 
Respondent No, 
Address 
1. Which members of your household were at home when it looked as 
though you were going to be flooded? (Specify) 
2. How far into your property did the water come at its peak? 
Entered grounds FOR FIRST TWO 
Under house (i.e. where no RESPONSES ASK ONLY 
rooms under house) QUESTIONS MARKED * 
Entered downstairs rooms 
Over main upper level 
Don't know 
N.A. 
(Describe depth as R. indicates) 
How long did the water remain at this level? (Specify) 
*3. When did you first think you might be flooded? (Probe) 
Day: Friday Time: Morning 
Saturday Afternoon 
Sunday During the night 
Monday 
Tuesday 
What height was the water in relation to your property then? 
Had entered grounds 
Was under house 
Was to the main floor level 
Over main floor level 
Had not yet entered R's property 
(Describe depth in inches/feet in relation to R's property) 
*4. What made you think that you might be flooded? Did you have 
someone warn you? (P) Did you hear radio or television reports 
that indicated there would be flooding in your area? (P) Was it 
something you read in the newspapers? (P) Or was it something 
else? (Specify) 
Someone warned (Specify) 
Radio reports (Specify - Radio station if possible) 
Television reports (Television channel if possible) 
Newspaper reports (Newspaper if possible) 
Other (Specify) 
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*5. Did you, at any stage, receive any official warning that your 
area was going to be flooded? Probe if YES: What height was 
the water then? 
Had not yet entered R's property 
Had entered grounds 
Was under house 
Was to the main floor level 
Over main floor level. 
*6. Supposing you were responsible for warning the residents of a 
certain area that their area was going to be flooded, how would 
you go about it? Probe: What sort of information would be 
important? How would you go about getting the information to 
people? (Record response) 
*7. Could you tell me briefly what kind of thoughts came to your 
mind once you realized that your area was going to be flooded? 
(Record comments) 
*8. Did you move from your home during the flood? 
NO ASK 9 
YES GO TO 12 
*9. Did you make any preparations in case you had to move from your 
home, or take any precautions to protect any of your things? 
(Record comments) 
NO YES 
*10. Were you asked to leave at any time? 
YES NO 
If YES: Why did you stay? (Record reasons) 
*11. Did you take any of your furniture or other possessions out of 
the house? 
YES NO 
If YES: What did you take? (Record) 
Did you have any problems with storage? 
GO TO 31 
*12. How did you get out? (Specify) 
*13. What level was the water then? (Specify depth or in relation to 
R's property. Use categories in Qs 3 and 5) 
*14. Where exactly did you go? 
Relief centre (Specify) 
House (Specify whose house and location of house) 
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*15. Did you have any special reasons for going there? (Record 
reason) 
IF R. WAS DIRECTED TO TEMPORARY ACCOMMODATION: Could you 
explain how this happened? (Record explanation) 
Probe: ALL RESPONDENTS 
And did all the members of your household go to the same 
place? 
Did anyone stay behind after other members of the 
household had been evacuated? 
YES NO 
IF YES: Who stayed? (Specify) 
Why did he/she/they stay? (Record reasons) 
How long after did he/she/they stay? (Specify) 
*16. Did you stay at the one place all the time until you were able 
to return home or did you go somewhere else from there? 
IF R. WENT SOMEWHERE ELSE: 
Would you mind giving me the details of where you 
stayed and roughly how long you stayed there? 
Place Length of Stay 
CHECK: So that it was about (add second colunrn above) 
weeks before you returned to your home? 
*17. Can you suggest any improvements which could have been made in 
the provision of emergency accommodation? (Record) 
*18. Was your house left completely unattended at any stage? 
YES If YES: For how long? (Specify) 
GO TO 20 
NO ASK 19 
*19. Who looked after your house during the family's absence? 
(Specify) 
*20. There was much talk at the time of the floods and soon after 
about people's property being looted. Did you yourselves 
experience any of this? 
YES NO 
If YES: 
What sort of things were stolen from your property? 
Going back to the time before you moved from your home ... 
*21. Did you make any preparations before leaving? 
YES ASK 22 (Record reason) 
NO 
GO TO 24 
*22. What sort of things did you think of saving? (Specify) 
*23. How did you go about trying to save these things? (Specify) 
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*24. Did you take any of your furniture or possessions out of the 
house? 
NO GO TO 26 
YES 
If YES: What did you take? (Specify) 
Where did you take it? (Specify) 
Did you have any problems with storage? (Specify) 
*25. Did you receive any assistance when you were fixing things to 
move out? 
YES NO 
*26. Did any member of your household return home after having 
evacuated, before you could do anything about cleaning up? 
YES NO 
If YES: (record reason) 
*27. Are you living in your home again yet? 
YES ASK 29 
NO GO TO 29 
28. When did you move back? Day/date (Specify) 
GO TO 30 
29. Are you going to move back? 
YES NO 
If YES: When do you think you will move back? 
(Record) 
If NO: Why not? (Record reason) 
*30. Did you have any urgent needs or problems while you were away 
from home? 
YES NO 
If YES: What sort of problems were they? (Specify) 
Were these needs met/problems solved? 
YES NO 
If YES: Who helped you in this respect? 
QUESTION 31 FOLLOWS 
31. Were you satisfied with the way in which the evacuation was 
carried out in your area? 
YES NO 
If NO: Why not? (Specify reasons) 
*32, Was there any particular organization or group of people 
involved in helping to evacuate residents in your area? 
(Specify) 
*33. Can you suggest any improvements in the evacuation process which 
could have helped you? (Record) 
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*34. Was there an emergency relief centre set up in your area at the 
time of the flooding? 
IF YES: Where was that? 
IF R. ANSWERS: What services did it offer? (Specify) 
Who was responsible for operating it? (Specify) 
*35. Did you have any contact with any of the emergency relief 
centres? 
YES NO 
If YES: Which one? (Specify) 
What was this for? 
Were you satisfied with the service you received there? 
YES NO 
If NO: Why weren't you satisfied? (Record reasons) 
*36. Can you suggest any improvements in the emergency relief centres 
which could have helped you? (Record any suggestions) 
*37. Could you describe briefly the damage your house/property 
suffered as a result of the flood? RECORD STRUCTURAL DAMAGE 
ONLY 
*38. Did the damage turn out to be more or less than you had first 
expected? 
More 
Less 
About the same 
Couldn't say 
N.A. 
*39. How long after the water had first come into the property were 
you able to start cleaning up? 
Time: 
Date: 
*40. When you could start cleaning up your house/property, did you 
receive any help? 
NO GO TO 44 
YES ASK 41 
*41. Who were the people who helped you? (Specify if necessary) 
Friends 
Neighbours 
Relatives or other family members not in the household 
(Specify which relatives) 
Organizations (Specify) 
Strangers - people R. did not know. 
*42. In general, who would you say was most helpful to you? 
(Record) 
*43. Have you ever been helped in other circumstances by these same 
people? 
YES NO 
If YES: Specify the people and the type of assistance given in 
the past: 
149
*44. Do you know of any organizations which were giving assistance to 
people in this area during the time when they were cleaning up 
their properties, though you may not have obtained any 
assistance from them yourselves? (Record) 
*45. Do you feel you had enough expert advice on how best to go about 
cleaning up your property and other things? 
YES 
NO 
No need for such advice 
*46. Was there any other type of assistance you could have done with 
that we have not already mentioned? 
*47. Let's talk now about some of the more formal organizations that 
were involved in various activities during the flood. 
We can discuss them in turn. 
Name of 
Organ-
ization 
Would you 
say they did 
an effective 
job? 
Did you receive Have you any 
any personal suggestions for 
assistance from them improving 
this organization? their perform-
ance? 
Civil 
Defence 
Police 
Army 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
(Record if any) 
(Record if any) 
(Record if any) 
*48. Could you describe briefly your feelings during the clean-up? 
(Record) 
*49. Looking back to cleaning-up, did you 
(a) Save things you later found had to be discarded? 
YES NO GO TO (b) 
If YES: What sort of things? 
Why did you save them? 
(b) Did you throw away things which you now feel could have been 
saved? 
YES NO 
If YES: What sort of things? 
Why did you throw them away? 
*50. What were your major losses? (Specify) 
*51. What work was/is necessary on your house or property to 
(i) Enable you to live in your home? (Specify) 
(ii) Fully repair your home? (Specify) 
*52. Has your home been fully repaired yet? 
YES NO 
If YES: When were the repairs completed? (Specify) 
If NO: When do you think the repairs will be completed? 
(Specify) 
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*53. Who carried out/will carry out repairs on your home? 
Person: Type of Repair: 
(Specify) 
Self or other 
household member 
Family/relatives 
outside household 
Neighbours 
Tradesmen 
Others (specify) 
54. Have you paid or will you pay for the work to be done, (P) 
has it been done voluntarily, (P) or is it paid for by insurance 
or reconstruction funds? 
Type of work: Amount: Paid by: 
55. Have you had any difficulties about getting tradesmen to work on 
repairing your home, or getting expert advice on what you can do 
yourself? 
YES NO 
If YES: (Specify) 
56. Can you think of any improvements in services relating to home 
repairs which could have helped you or could still help you? 
(Record suggestions) 
57. Did you apply for any sort of financial assistance? 
YES ASK 58 
NO (Record reason) GO TO 64 
58. I have here now a list of possible sources of financial 
assistance for flood victims. Would you mind filling out the 
table by answering the questions at the top of each column for 
each of the funds? HAND QUESTIONNAIRE TO R. 
Name of 
Fund 
Have you 
Applied 
to this 
Lord 
Mayor's 
Fund 
State 
Government 
Relief 
Fund 
Yes No 
(Circle) 
Yes No 
(Circle) 
Yes No 
(Circle) 
Date of 
Application 
Have you 
received 
Financial 
Assistance 
from this 
Fund? 
Yes No 
(Circle) 
Yes No 
(Circle) 
Yes No 
(Circle) 
Amount 
received 
if any 
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59. FOR RESPONDENTS WHO HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED SOME FINANCIAL 
ASSISTANCE: 
Do you feel that the money you have received is sufficient to 
cover your losses? 
YES NO 
GO TO 62 
60. FOR RESPONDENTS WHO HAVE NOT ALREADY RECEIVED ANY FINANCIAL 
ASSISTANCE: 
Do you think you will get any financial assistance? 
NO GO TO 62 
YES 
If YES: How much do you think you might get? (Record estimate) 
61. Do you think this will be enough to cover your losses? 
YES NO 
(Record any comments) 
62. Would you say you were satisfied with the way in which financial 
assistance has been given? 
YES NO 
(Record any comments) 
63. Can you make any suggestions for improving the way in which 
financial assistance has been or is being given? (Record 
suggestions) 
*64. Do you have an insurance policy that covers you against 
flooding? 
YES ASK 65 
NO GO TO 66 
*65. To what extent are you covered against flood damages? 
(Specify) 
GO TO 68 
*66. Were you aware that you were not covered against flood damage? 
YES NO 
(Record any comments) 
*67. Did you ever make an attempt to obtain flood insurance? 
YES NO 
If YES: What happened on that occasion? 
*68. In general, what responsibilities do you think governments have 
in situations such as the recent floods? (Specify) 
*69. Can you think of anything that the Federal Government has done 
by way of flood relief? 
YES NO 
If YES: (Record) 
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*70. Are you satisfied with the action that the Federal Government 
has taken? 
IF R. REQUIRES EXPLANATION OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ACTION, OUTLINE 
AND THEN RECORD ANSWER 
Satisfied Dissatisfied 
(Record any comments): 
*71. What about the State Government, can you think of anything it 
has done by way of flood relief? 
YES NO 
If YES: (Record) 
*72. And are you satisfied with the action that the State Government 
has taken? 
IF R. REQUIRES EXPLANATION OF STATE GOVERNMENT ACTION, OUTLINE 
AND THEN RECORD ANSWER 
Satisfied Dissatisfied 
(Record any comments): 
*73. And now the Brisbane City Council, do you know what it has done 
for flood relief? 
YES NO 
If YES: (Record) 
*74. Are you satisfied with what the City Council has done? 
IF R. REQUIRES EXPLANATION OF CITY COUNCIL ACTION, OUTLINE AND 
THEN RECORD ANSWER 
Satisfied Dissatisfied 
(Record any comments): 
*75. Have you had to take time off work directly or indirectly as a 
result of the flood? 
YES ASK 76 
NO GO TO 79 
*76. How long did you have off work? (Specify) 
*77. Was it part of your holiday or recreation leave or was it 
special leave not affecting your holiday? 
Holiday/recreation leave 
Leave other than holiday/recreation leave. 
*78. Did you suffer any loss of wages or income of any sort directly 
or indirectly because of the floods? 
YES NO 
If YES: Why was that? (Record) 
*79. Have you ever been affected by flood before? 
YES ASK 80 
NO GO TO 83 
*80. Was it here or somewhere else? 
Here 
Somewhere else 
Here and somewhere else. 
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*81. How many times has this happened to you? 
Once before 
2-5 times before 
More than 5 times. 
*82. Were the other occasions the same as this, worse than this, or 
not as bad? 
Same 
Worse 
Not as bad. 
*83. Had you ever thought about the possibility of your home being 
flooded? 
YES NO 
(Note any comments): 
*84. When you moved to this house, did you make any check on the 
possibility of flooding in this area? 
Made no check 
Check made 
If CHECK MADE: (Results in brief): 
*85. Did you know that flooding was likely to be a problem when you 
decided to move there? 
YES NO 
*86. Do you remember hearing people discuss floods in this area since 
you have been living here? 
Probe: Who was this? 
How long ago? 
*87. Do you know of anybody who had investigated the flood situation 
prior to the January flood? 
Probe: Who 
When? 
*88. Do you think there will be another flood while you are living 
here? (Record comments) 
YES NO 
*89. Before the flood, had you ever thought about the kinds of 
precautions that might be taken against flood damage to your 
property? 
Hadn't thought GO TO 92 
Had thought ASK 90 
*90. What kinds of precautions had you thought about, for the 
protection of your property? (Specify) 
*91. Did you ever actually do anything about taking these 
precautions? 
YES NO 
If NO: (Record reason if any) 
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*92. Have you thought now since the flood of taking precautions to 
protect your property in the future? 
YES ASK 93 
NO GO TO 94 
*93. What kinds of precautions had you thought you might take? 
(Specify) 
*94. If you were to live one hundred years, how many floods would you 
expect to happen here in your lifetime? (Record answer) 
Probe: Why do you say that? (Record) 
*95. Do you think there are any signs or particular ways of knowing 
that a flood will happen? 
YES NO 
(Record explanation) 
*96. If you were worried about the possibility of the River/Creek 
flooding do you know anyone that you might call at any time for 
information? (Record answer) 
*97. I would like to read to you several statements and ask your 
opinion as to whether you agree with each statement or disagree 
with it. 
A. Chances are that there will not be another flood for a 
long time. 
Agree Disagree 
B. Planning only makes a person unhappy since your plans 
hardly ever work out anyhow. 
Agree Disagree 
C. The only sure thing that you can say about floods is that 
if you wait long enough, you will always get a bigger one. 
Agree Disagree 
D. When a man is born, the success he's going to have is 
already in the cards, so he might as well accept it and 
not fight against it. 
Agree Disagree 
E. Floods, like trouble, come in threes. 
Agree Disagree 
F. Nowadays, with the world conditions the way they are, the 
wise person lives for to-day and lets tomorrow take care 
of itself. 
Agree Disagree 
G. A flood that will come to the 20 feet mark on the Port 
Office Gauge would occur on the average, only at rather 
long intervals of time, but it would occur in any year. 
Agree Disagree 
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'''109. How important would the possibility of a future flood be on that 
decision? 
Not at all important 
Somewhat important 
Very important. 
*110. People say "It's an ill wind that blows no good". Would you say 
that any good has come out of the flood? 
YES NO 
If YES: (Specify) 
*111. Did you get to know any people living around here you did not 
know before the flood? 
YES NO 
*112. Are there any people you feel you have come to know better? 
YES NO 
*113. Do you feel there have been any changes in the contact you have 
had with the people around this area since before the flood? 
NO GO TO 115 
YES ASK 114 
*114. Has this been the same all the time since the flood? 
(Record any comments) 
Hasn't changed 
Has changed. 
*115. It has been suggested by people on television and in the 
newspapers that many people have had to face emotional stresses 
during and after the flood. Would you agree or disagree with 
this? 
Agree Disagree GO TO 116 
Why is that? (Record comments) 
*116. Looking back, can you identify any particular personal or family 
problems you faced during or after the flood? 
YES NO 
If YES: When was this? 
Would you mind telling me the nature of these problems? 
(Specify) 
*117. There has been some discussion about the part that social 
workers have played during and after the flood. Did you 
yourself see a social worker? 
YES ASK 118 
NO GO TO 121 
*118. What sort of assistance, if any, did he/she give you? 
(Specify) 
*119. Was he or she able to help you with any personal or family 
problem? 
YES NO 
If YES: In what way? 
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*120. Do you feel it was helpful to you to have the opportunity to 
talk about your problem? 
YES NO 
Was the social worker able to redirect you or refer you to any 
other social agency? 
YES GO TO 122 
NO GO TO 122 
*121. Apart from social workers, have you had the opportunity to talk 
over any personal or family problems which may have arisen 
during the flood with anyone? 
YES NO 
If YES: With whom? 
When was that? 
Did you find this helpful? 
YES NO 
If NO: Did you feel at any stage that you would have liked to 
have talked any particular personal or family problem over with 
someone? 
YES NO 
If YES: Who did you think you would have liked to talk to? 
(Specify) 
When did you feel this way? (Specify) 
This is the end of the main part of the questionnaire, but there are 
some more questions we would like to ask you which would help us in 
our analysis. 
*122. First of all, do you own your house, are you buying it at 
present, are you leasing it, or do you rent it on a short-term 
basis? 
Rent (short-term) 
Lease (longer-term) 
Buying 
Own home 
*123. How long have you been living in this area? 
Less than 1 year 
1-3 years 
3-5 years 
5-10 years 
More than 10 years. 
*124. Where did you live before you came to this area? (Specify) 
*125. Have you always lived in cities or large towns, or have you 
spent some time living in the country? 
Always lived in cities/towns 
Some time in the country. 
IF R. HAS SPENT SOME TIME IN THE COUNTRY: How long did you live 
in the country? (Specify) 
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'''126. Would you mind telling me who lives here, their ages, 
occupations - or what they do - and their relationship to the 
head of the household, for example, "son", "daughter", 
"husband", "father". 
Occupant 
Relationship 
To Head of 
Household 
Age Occupation Sex 
Thank you very much for your time. But before I leave, is there 
any aspect of the flood situation which you feel we have not 
dealt with and you would like to comment on? 
INTERVIEWER COMMENTS; 
R. prepared to be interviewed at later date Yes 
No 
Item No, 
DAMAGE SUPPLEMENT 
Col. No, Check 
Code 
Would you mind filling out the table below so that we have an accurate 
record of the extent of damage to your home and property? 
Not 
Damaged Damaged 
Could be 
Repaired 
(Record 
Cost) 
Unable 
to be 
Replaced 
Beyond Repair 
Replaced 
with 
New Item 
Replaced 
with 
S/H Item 
Internal 
Walls 
External 
Walls 
Internal 
Doors 
External 
Doors 
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Built-in 
Cupboards 
Ceilings 
Roof 
Could be ^^y°"^ ^^P^i^ 
jpaire( 
Record 
Cost) 
Re d ,, .-, T^  -, , ^ , (Tie^rn rl Unable Replaced Replaced 
to be with with 
Replaced New Item S/H Item 
Floors 
Windows 
Footings, 
Wall Struts, 
Beams 
Stumps 
Stairs 
Internal 
Paintwork 
External 
Paintwork 
Furniture 
Curtains 
Floor 
Covering 
Fridge 
Stove 
Washing 
Machine 
Other 
Electrical 
Appliances 
Personal 
Effects 
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TRANSCRIPT^ OF LETTER OF INTRODUCTION 
HM:EC:cls 14th March, 1975 
To whom it may Concern 
This is to identify Mr who is working on a 
follow-up study of the effects of the floods in Queensland in January 
1974, under the supervision of Mrs Patricia Short and Mrs Heather 
Mugglestone of the Department of Social Work, University of Queensland 
(telephone 70-3741). 
I should appreciate any assistance you could give to help him 
with this project. 
Yours faithfully. 
Professor E.R. Chamberlain 
Department of Social Work 
Note; 
The letter of introduction used by researchers was printed on 
the University of Queensland letterhead. 
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3. FLOOD STUDY FOLLOW-UP 1975 
INSTRUCTIONS TO INTERVIEWERS 
Where to go 
Interviews are to be conducted at a random sample of households 
where interviews were conducted in 1974. Therefore, you are 
provided with lists of addresses at which you are to interview. 
Photocopied area maps are also provided. 
Who to interview 
You must interview the household member who answered the 1974 
questionnaire. Therefore you must ask for that person. In the 
case where no one in the household can recall having answered 
the 1974 questionnaire, you should conduct an interview with any 
adult member of the household who is agreeable and inform us 
that this has occurred so that a check can be made from our 
records to decide whether or not the interview is acceptable. 
Call backs 
If the person you wish to interview is not available to be 
interviewed the first time you call, please make up two return 
calls at different times of the day. If an interview cannot be 
obtained after two return calls have been made, please let us 
know. You will be given another address. 
The Call Sheet 
Please fill in the call sheet carefully. It will be used for 
lodging pay claims and as a summary of interviews conducted and 
reasons for interviews not being conducted. 
Reports and Returns 
It is very important that this survey be done quickly, well, and 
efficiently. To help in achieving these things we would like 
you to telephone me or Heather Mugglestone on Wednesday of each 
week to report on your progress and any difficulties you might 
be having, and also to return completed schedules by each Monday 
morning of the following week. 
If you are unable to come to the University, please phone 
and make alternative arrangements for the return of 
completed schedules. 
You are, of course, free to phone at any time if you are 
having difficulties. 
Some Notes about the Schedule 
We have endeavoured to pre-code questions where possible to 
minimise problems with processing at later stages. Please use 
the categories provided but if it is necessary to elaborate in 
order to make the respondent's answer clear, please do so. It 
is intended that the pre-coding be helpful not restrictive in 
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recording responses. Remember the comments which will be made 
at the briefing session about the use of categories in 
particular questions. 
Please try to get the respondent's name and record it 
fully. Be thoroughly familiar with the schedule 
before you go out to use it. 
The damage sheet may be filled out by the respondent 
at the completion of the interview. The question 
about taxable income may be left with the respondent 
with a stamped, addressed envelope for return by mail. 
Thank you. 
Patricia Short 
Phone: 70-3741 (work) 
30-4102 (home) 
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4. UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WORK 
FLOOD STUDY FOLLOW-UP HOUSEHOLD SCHEDULE 
DATE: 
ADDRESS; 
RESPONDENT'S NAME: 
RESPONDENT'S NUMBER: 
Interviewer Introduction 
Good Morning 
Afternoon 
Evening 
I am 
I am helping with a follow-up survey which is being done by the 
Department of Social Work at the University of Queensland to 
trace the social and psychological effects of the flood last 
year. 
I understand that at some time last year, someone in this 
household was a respondent in our first survey. I should like to 
interview that person again if possible ... Was it yourself who 
answered our questionnaire or was it another member of the 
household? 
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1. Would you say that by now you have "recovered" from the 
experience of the flood last year? 
YES NO 
If YES: Was there any particular stage or time during the past 
year when you would say that you felt you had recovered? 
YES NO/Couldn't say 
If YES: What was it that made you feel you had "recovered"? 
(Record) 
If NO: Is there any particular reason that you do not feel you 
have "recovered from the flood"? (Record) 
2. Would you say that your home is now in the same condition as it 
was before the flood last year, in better condition, or not as 
good as it was? 
Same condition 
Better condition 
Not as good 
Don't know/couldn't say. 
IF SAME OR BETTER: How soon after the flood was this achieved? 
Within 1 month 
More than 1 month, less than 2 months 
More than 2 months, less than 3 months 
More than 3 months, less than 6 months 
More than 6 months, less than 9 months 
More than 9 months, less than 1 year 
D.N.A. 
IF NOT AS GOOD: Do you think it will ever be restored to its 
previous condition? 
YES NO 
If YES: When do you think this will be achieved? 
By end April 1975 
By end June 1975 
By end September 1975 
By end of 1975 
By end of 1976 
Some time after 1976 
Don't know/couldn't say. 
If NO: Why do you say that? (Record) 
3. In general, would you say people have experienced emotional 
strain associated with the flood? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know/couldn't say. 
If YES or DON'T KNOW: Have you yourself or any of the members of 
your family experienced emotional strain associated with the 
effects of recovery from the flood? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know/couldn't say. 
If YES: Would you say it was one of the worst periods in your 
life? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know/couldn't say 
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If YES: Was it the worst period in your life, or have there been 
other times which were just as bad or worse than this? 
Worst period 
Other times as bad 
Other times worse 
Don't know/couldn't say. 
4. Would you say there was anything about the flood experience which 
made it different from other periods of emotional stress which 
you might have experienced? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know/couldn't say 
If YES: (Record differences) 
5. When you were repairing your home would you say that there was 
any stage when emotional strain was severe enough to affect your 
ability to do the things which were necessary for you to repair 
or replace your possessions? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know/couldn't say 
If YES: (Record) 
6. Looking back, can you identify any particular personal or family 
problems which have arisen in the year since the flood which you 
feel are either directly or indirectly a result of the flood 
experience? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know/couldn't say 
If YES: What were these problems? (Record) 
7. We know that many people had to take time off from their normal 
occupations during the flood and in some cases for some time 
afterwards. If any members of your family were affected in this 
way, could you tell me how long it was before each of them 
resumed normal work or school activities? 
H. of household Spouse Other Other 
With: 
More 
In 1 week 
than 1 
less than 
More than 3 
less than 
More than 5 
less than 
More than 2 
week. 
3 
weeks. 
5 
weeks. 
2 months 
months 
Have you noticed any particular community problems which have 
occurred in this area and which people feel are a result of the 
flood experience last year? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know/couldn't say 
If YES: What are these problems? (Record) 
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9. How important do you feel each of the following characteristics 
is in being able to recover from situations such as you 
experienced as a result of the flood last year? 
Taking each one in turn, could you tell me if you think it is 
very important, somewhat important, not at all important? 
Very Somewhat Not Very Not at all Uncer-
important Important Important Important tain 
Number of 
people in 
family 
Family 
income 
Type of 
occupations 
of family 
members 
Level of 
education 
of family 
members 
"Having 
contacts" 
Age 
Membership 
of clubs and 
societies 
10. Would you say there were any other things which are important in 
recovering? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know/couldn't say 
If YES: What are they? (Record) 
And how important would you say they were? 
Very Somewhat Not very Not at all 
Important Important Important Important Uncertain 
11. If you feel that any of these things is important, in what ways 
do you think it is important? 
Number of people 
in family 
Family income 
Types of occupations 
of family members 
Level of education 
of family members 
167
"Having contacts" 
Age 
Membership of clubs 
or societies 
Other (Record) 
The next group of questions refers to a number of activities which 
people who were helping flood-affected people in this area might have 
been engaged in. Again, it will be simpler if we take each activity 
in turn. 
*12. During the flood, were you aware of any people who were warning 
households likely to be flooded of the possibility of flooding in 
this area? 
YES NO 
If YES: Have you heard since the flood if people were doing 
this? 
YES NO 
If YES: Did you personally receive any warning of this sort? 
YES NO 
Can you tell us what sort of people were doing this? (Record) 
Don't know 
Do you think they were the best sort of people to be doing this? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know/couldn't say 
If NO: Why do you say that? (Record) 
What sort of people do you think could best carry out this 
warning activity? (Record) 
*13. Do you think it is a good thing to have people in an area warning 
residents of what is likely to happen? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know/couldn't say. 
If NO: Why do you say that? (Record) 
''•'This group of questions was repeated with reference to: 
Rescue activities 
Accommodation service 
Provision of food 
Provision of clothing, furniture 
Clean-up assistance 
Assistance in matters relating to health, sanitation 
Counselling service. 
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During the flood various neighbourhood relief centres opened and gave 
assistance for a time. 
28. Were there any of these relief centres in your locality? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know 
If YES: Where were they? (Record) 
How long did they stay open? 
Don't know 
Less than 1 month 
More than 1 month, up to 2 months 
More than 2 months, up to 3 months 
More than 3 months, up to 6 months 
More than 6 months, up to 1 year 
More than 1 year but not still in operation 
Still in operation 
Would you say the centre(s) had stayed open too long, not long 
enough, or was the time just right? 
Too long 
Not long enough 
Just right 
Don't know/couldn't say 
Some of these flood relief centres seemed to draw people living 
in that locality together for quite a long time. Would you say 
that this happened in your area? 
Don't know 
Yes 
No 
Did anything grow out of the centres in the weeks and months 
after the floods, like interest groups or associations? 
Don't know 
No 
Yes - non-specific 
Yes - interest group/action group 
Yes - association (including community association) 
Yes - other 
Yes - more than one type of group (Specify) 
If YES: Could you tell us about them and what they are trying to 
do? (Record) 
Were these interest groups mainly on behalf of the flood-affected 
people or for the community in general? 
Don't know/uncertain 
Flood-affected people 
General community 
29. Do you know of any groups which were formed in this area as a 
result of the flood last year who were concerned with giving 
personal help on a long-term basis to people who were affected by 
the flood? 
Don't know 
No 
Yes - but cannot specify 
Yes (Specify if possible) 
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If YES: Are you a member of any such groups? 
Yes (Specify group) 
No 
If YES: Specifically, what does this group do? (Record) 
If NO: Have you been approached by any such groups? 
Yes 
No 
31. In the first few months or so after the flood, would you say that 
people in this neighbourhood talked with each other about the 
flood a great deal, fairly often, not very often, or not much at 
all? 
A great deal 
Fairly often 
Not very often 
Not much at all 
Don't know 
32. After that time would you say they talked about the flood a great 
deal, fairly often, not very often, not much at all? 
A great deal 
Fairly often 
Not very often 
Not much at all 
Don't know 
33. In the first few months or so after the flood, would you say that 
the people in this neighbourhood talked about the possibility of 
a future flood a great deal, fairly often, not very often or not 
much at all? 
A great deal 
Fairly often 
Not very often 
Not much at all 
Don't know 
34. After that time,' would you say they talked about the possibility 
of a future flood a great deal, fairly often, not very often, or 
not much at all? 
A great deal 
Fairly often 
Not very often 
Not much at all 
Don't know 
35. Would you say you took an interest in community affairs or what 
goes on in this area? 
YES NO 
If YES: Would you say you were "active" in community affairs and 
community projects in this area? 
YES NO 
If YES: What sort of things do you become involved in? (Record) 
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36. If you have children going to school, do they go to school in 
this area or do they travel some distance to school? 
No school age children 
School age children 
(Record in table below) 
(Specify son/ 
daughter and 
age 
Same 
suburb 
Nearby suburb 
(within 
5 miles) 
Other suburb 
(5-10 miles) 
More 
than 
10 miles 
37. And the members of your family who work, do they work in this 
area or do they travel some distance? 
No family members go out to work 
Family members go out to work (Record below in table) 
Same Nearby suburb Other suburb More 
suburb (within (5-10 miles) than 
5 miles) 10 miles 
Head of house-
hold 
Spouse 
Other (Specify) 
38. Do you or any other member of your family belong to any 
organizations related to your occupations: e.g. a trade union, 
professional organization or any social clubs associated with 
your work? 
YES NO 
If YES: Would you mind telling me what these are? (Record below 
please) 
Head of household 
Spouse 
Other (Specify) 
Would you say that you/they are an active member? 
Head of household (1) Active 
Not active 
(2) Active 
Not active 
Spouse (1) Active 
Not active 
(2) Active 
Not active 
Other (1) Active 
Not active 
(2) Active 
Not active 
What would you say were the main benefits of membership in this 
(these) organization(s)? 
Organizations Benefits 
Head of household 
Spouse 
Other 
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Was membership in this (these) organization(s) in any way 
beneficial to you during the flood and afterwards during the 
period of rehabilitation? 
Organizations Benefits 
Head of household 
Spouse 
Other 
39. Do you or any other member of your family belong to any community 
groups, church organizations, clubs or societies not associated 
with your work? 
NO YES 
If YES: Would you mind telling me what these are? (Please 
record below) 
Head of household 
Spouse 
Other (Specify) 
Would you say you/they are active members? 
Head of household (1) Active 
Not active 
Spouse (1) Active 
Not active 
Other (1) Active 
Not active 
What would you say were the main benefits of membership in this 
(these) organization(s)? 
Organizations Benefits 
Head of household 
Spouse 
Other 
40. If you got support from an organization or organizations to which 
you belong, which ones would you rate most highly? (Please 
record in order mentioned) 
41. Are there any organizations to which you belong which 
disappointed you by a lack of support? (Record) 
42. Do you know if any of the following organizations have opened new 
branches or groups in your locality? 
Yes No Don't know 
Civil Defence (SES) 
Red Cross 
Lions 
Religious organization 
(Please specify) 
172
43. Do you think this is a good location at which to live? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know/uncertain 
44. Would you say that the location is as desirable now as it was 
before the flood? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know/uncertain 
45. If you had your choice, would you move from this place, stay here 
or are you uncertain? 
Move 
Stay 
Uncertain 
Other 
46. At present, what are your moving plans? 
Do not plan to move 
Slight possibility 
Fair possibility 
Good possibility 
Definitely will move 
47. Do you know of anything that will reduce flooding in this area? 
No 
Levees 
Land-use control 
Wivenhoe 
Other 
Combinations 
48. Would you say that you now have more knowledge of the nature of 
the flood threat in this area than you had at the time of the 
flood last year? 
Yes 
No 
Uncertain 
If YES: What kind of knowledge have you gained in the meantime? 
(Please specify) 
Do you think that this knowledge will be of help to you in the 
future? 
Yes 
No 
Uncertain 
If YES: In what way? 
49. Do you know of anyone or any place you could contact for 
information if you were worried that a flood might occur again in 
this area? 
YES NO 
If YES: Who or where? (Please record) 
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50. During the year since the flood, have you received any 
information, e.g. by way of pamphlets 
(a) about the nature of the flood threat in this area? 
YES NO 
If YES: (Please record details) 
(b) about what should or can be done in the event of another 
serious flood in this area? 
YES NO 
If YES: (Record details) 
(c) about who you might contact if you were concerned that a 
serious flood might occur? 
YES NO 
If YES: (Record details) 
51. Do you know of any groups which might have formed in this area as 
a result of the flood last year which are concerned with putting 
pressure on the Council or Governments to provide flood 
mitigation works in this area? 
No/don't know 
Yes, but cannot specify 
Yes (Specify if possible) 
If YES: Are you a member of any such groups? 
YES NO 
If YES: Which group/s? 
If NO: Have you had any contact with such groups? 
YES NO 
52. During the past year have you made any permanent alterations to 
your house or property so as to reduce damage in the event of 
another flood? 
No alterations 
House raised 
Water proof/resistant building materials 
used to repair damaged sections 
Unsuitable building materials replaced 
with water resistant furniture 
Some or all furniture/furnishings replaced 
with easily moveable items 
Modifications to drainage 
Other 
(Combinations of 2-7 above) 
53. Do you plan to make any (further) permanent alterations to your 
house or property so as to reduce damage in the event of another 
flood? 
YES NO 
If YES: What is it that you plan to do? 
Uncertain 
Raise house 
Replace unsuitable building materials 
Replace items of furniture/furnishings 
with water resistant items 
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Replace items of furniture/furnishings 
with easily moveable items 
Modify drainage 
Other 
(Combinations of 2-7 above) 
54. Are there any permanent alterations which you would like to make 
to your home but are unable to for some reason? 
YES NO 
If YES: What is it that you would like to do? 
Uncertain 
Raise house 
Replace unsuitable building materials 
Replace items of furniture/furnishings 
with water resistant items 
Replace items of furniture/furnishings 
with easily moveable items 
Modify drainage 
Other 
(Combinations of 2-7 above) 
55. During the year, have you taken any precautions apart from making 
permanent alterations or modifications, to protect your house or 
property in the event of another flood? 
No precautions taken 
Precautions taken (Specify) 
56. Are there any (other) precautions which you plan to take in order 
to protect your property in the event of another flood? 
No precautions planned 
Precautions planned (Specify) 
57. Are there any other precautions which you would like to take in 
order to protect your property but are unable to for some reason? 
No precautions 
Precautions would like to take (Specify) 
58. Have you and your family changed your way of life in any way as a 
result of the flood? 
No 
Yes 
Couldn't say 
If YES: What sort of changes have you made? (Specify) 
Why is it that you have made these changes? (Specify) 
59. Do you have any type of insurance cover on your home and 
property? 
YES NO 
If YES: What exactly does your insurance policy cover? (Record) 
If NO: Do you have any particular reason for not insuring your 
home and property? (Record) 
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During our last survey, we asked questions about the amounts of money 
people received from various sources. Because some people had not 
received final amounts of money when we interviewed them, we need to 
ask those same questions again. 
60 :om So would you mind telling me how much your family received frc 
the Government under the personal hardship and distress category? 
No assistance received 
No comment/will not say 
Up to $100 
More than $100 to $300 
More than $300 to $600 
More than $600 to $1,000 
More than $1,000 to $2,500 
More than $2,500 to $5,000 
More than $5,000 to $10,000 
More than $10,000 
61. How much did your family receive from the Government for the 
restoration of your flooded home? 
No assistance received 
No comment/will not say 
Up to $100 
More than $100 to $300 
More than $300 to $600 
More than $600 to $1,000 
More than $1,000 to $2,500 
More than $2,500 to $5,000 
More than $5,000 to $10,000 
More than $10,000 
62. Did you receive any other assistance from Governments, e.g. under 
the Land Exchange Scheme? 
No other assistance received 
No comment 
Assistance received 
63a. How much did your family receive from the Lord Mayor's Fund 
(Brisbane)? 
OR (if applicable) 
63b. How much did your family receive from the Ipswich City Council 
Relief Fund (Ipswich)? 
No assistance received 
No comment/will not say 
Up to $100 
More than $100 to $300 
More than $300 to $600 
More than $600 to $1,000 
More than $1,000 to $2,500 
More than $2,500 to $5,000 
More than $5,000 to $10,000 
More than $10,000 
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64. How much did various members of your family receive from 
voluntary organizations that were established to provide relief, 
e.g. employers, employees; churches, clubs, societies or other 
flood relief appeals? 
No assistance received 
No comment/will not say 
Up to $100 
More than $100 to $300 
More than $300 to $600 
More than $600 to $1,000 
More than $1,000 to $2,500 
More than $2,500 to $5,000 
More than $5,000 to $10,000 
More than $10,000 
By the way, would you mind telling me approximately how much your 
family earns, i.e. the combined income of the head of the 
household and spouse (if working)? 
Don't know 
Will not say 
Less than $100 gross per week 
More than $100 to $150 gross per week 
More than $150 to $200 gross per week 
More than $200 to $300 gross per week 
More than $300 to $400 gross per week 
More than $400 to $500 gross per week 
More than $500 gross per week 
65. After a natural disaster. Emergency Funds are often established 
to assist people in financial distress. Do you think that in 
these circumstances, people prefer to obtain assistance from a 
special fund or from standard assistance programs? 
Don't know 
Special fund 
Standard assistance programs 
It doesn't matter 
Why do you think this is so? (Not coded) 
Apart from natural disasters, there are a variety of reasons for 
people finding themselves in financial difficulties: for example -
sickness; tmemployment; personal hardship. 
Do you think that the Government should assist them all 
financially ON THE SAME BASIS or DIFFERENTLY? 
Don't know 
Same basis 
Differently 
If DIFFERENTLY: In what way? Why do you think so? 
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66. Would you mind telling us the level of education which each 
member of your family has attained? 
Head of Spouse Other 
Household 
Not yet attending 
school or pre-school 
Pre-school only 
Completed pre-school 
attending primary 
school 
Completed primary 
school only 
Still attending high 
school grades 8-10 
Completed high school 
to grade 10 level 
Still attending high 
school grades 11-12 
Completed high school 
grade 12 level 
Attending university 
Attending other 
tertiary institution 
Completed university 
degree 
Completed studies at 
tertiary institution 
Other 
67. How long have you and the other members of your family lived in 
Australia? 
Never More 10-20 5-9 2-4 Under 
lived than 20 years years years 2 years 
elsewhere years 
Head of 
household 
Spouse 
Other 
Other 
Other 
Other 
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THANK YOU VERY MUCH. This is the end of the schedule but I wonder if 
you would mind helping us out by filling in these sheets? Could you 
fill in at least the first one while I am here? We would appreciate 
it if you could answer the following question. However, if the 
information is not available, or if you do not wish to provide the 
information, leave the question blank. It would be of considerable 
benefit to our study however, if you could answer this question: 
What was the taxable income of your family for either or both of the 
following years? 
1972-73 1973-74 
Husband 
Wife 
Other 
Other 
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APPENDIX B 
TEXTS OF BRISBANE VALLEY FLOOD WARNINGS FROM 10.30 P.M. 
24 JANUARY, 1974 TO 5.00 A.M., 29 JANUARY, 1974, EXTRACTED 
FROM THE REPORT BY DIRECTOR OF METEOROLOGY (1974) 
Warning No. 1 Initial Flood Warning Brisbane Valley issued by the 
Bureau of Meteorology, Brisbane at 10.30 p.m. 
24.1.1974: 
Heavy rainfalls in the Upper Stanley River have been 
recorded in the 12 hours to 9.00 p.m. in association 
with the movement of Cyclone Wanda which at 9.00 p.m. 
was located 25 miles N.E. of Gympie and moving S.W. 
at 12 m.p.h. Minor flooding currently occurring 
around Peachester will increase overnight. Further 
heavy rainfalls are expected during the next 
12 hours. 
Warning No. 2 
Warning No. 3 
Warning No. 4 
Renewal of Flood Warning Brisbane Valley issued by 
the Bureau of Meteorology, Brisbane at 5.00 a.m. 
Friday 25.1.1974: 
Heavy flood rains have been recorded over the Upper 
Stanley River catchment overnight. Continued heavy 
falls are expected this morning as Cyclone Wanda 
moves S.W. River levels in the upper reaches at 
Peachester were rising fast late last night and 
flooding is expected downstream this morning. 
Renewal of Flood Warning Brisbane Valley issued by 
the Bureau of Meteorology, Brisbane at 11.00 a.m. 
Friday 25.1.1974: 
Heavy rains averaging 230 mm were recorded in the 
24 hours to 9.00 a.m. in the Stanley River. Moderate 
to major flooding is occurring in the Stanley River. 
Very heavy to flood rains are expected over all 
tributaries of the Brisbane River in the next 
24 hours. Flooding and traffic disabilities are 
expected throughout the Brisbane Valley and 
tributaries by tomorrow. 
Renewal of Flood Warning Brisbane Valley issued by 
the Bureau of Meteorology, Brisbane at 5.00 p.m. 
Friday 25.1.1974: 
Heavy rains have continued in the 6 hours to 3.00 
p.m. but rains are expected to ease slowly overnight 
in the Brisbane River and tributaries. Flooding is 
now easing in the Stanley River, however the Upper 
Brisbane, Lockyer and Bremer River tributaries are 
rising and continued rises are expected tonight. 
Some flooding and traffic disabilities are expected 
and the Murrumba bridge on the Brisbane Valley 
Highway is expected to remain closed for the next 
24 hours. 
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Warning No. 5 
Warning No. 6 
Warning No. 7 
Warning No. 8 
Renewal of Flood Warning Brisbane Valley issued by 
the Bureau of Meteorology, Brisbane at 5.00 a.m. 
Saturday 26.1.1974: 
Heavy rainfalls up to 127 mm at Moore in the 18 hours 
to 3.00 a.m. have been recorded in the Brisbane 
Valley and tributaries and further heavy falls are 
expected in the next 12 hours. River levels are 
rising in the Bremer River, Lockyer Creek and Upper 
Brisbane. Moderate to major flooding is expected 
today in these streams. In the Brisbane River Middle 
Reaches minor flood levels are expected to increase 
in the next 12 hours. Moderate flooding is expected 
to increase at Ipswich today. In the Brisbane 
Metropolitan area, the effects of Upper Brisbane 
river runoff. Metropolitan creek runoff and an 
apparent Moreton Bay Tide height of approximately 
1 metre above predicted heights, is expected to cause 
moderate flooding of low lying areas on the high tide 
at about midday in the city area. 
Renewal of Flood Warning Brisbane Valley issued by 
the Bureau of Meteorology, Brisbane at 7.00 a.m. 
Saturday 26.1.1974: 
Heavy rainfalls up to 127 mm at Moore were recorded 
in the 18 hours to 3.00 a.m. in the Upper Brisbane 
River, Lockyer Creek, and Bremer River. Moderate to 
major flooding is expected today in these streams and 
increasing minor flooding in the Brisbane River 
Middle Reaches. Moderate flooding is expected to 
increase at Ipswich today. A height of 14 feet is 
expected at the Brisbane Port Office gauge on the 
high tide at 12 noon today. This is similar to the 
flood peak of 1931. Moderate flooding will be 
experienced. 
Renewal of Flood Warning Brisbane Valley issued by 
the Bureau of Meteorology, Brisbane at 11.00 a.m. 
Saturday 26.1.1974: 
Heavy rainfalls averaging 80 mm to 120 mm were 
recorded over the Brisbane River tributaries in the 
24 hours to 9.00 a.m. Major flood levels are rising 
in the Upper Brisbane River, Lockyer Creek and the 
Bremer River areas with widespread traffic 
disabilities. Moderate flooding is expected in the 
next 24 hours in the middle reaches of the Brisbane 
River. Major flooding is expected in the Ipswich 
area overnight. Minor flooding only is now expected 
in the Brisbane River, on the high tide at midday 
today. 
Renewal of Flood Warning Brisbane Valley issued by 
the Bureau of Meteorology, Brisbane at 5.30 p.m. 
Saturday 26.1.1974: 
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Major flooding is occurring in the Bremer River, 
Lockyer Creek and Upper Brisbane River and further 
rises are expected in these rivers. Moderate 
flooding is increasing in the Brisbane River Middle 
Reaches. A height of 16 metres (52' 6") is expected 
at Ipswich between Midnight and 6.00 a.m. Sunday, 
with major flooding. At the Brisbane Port Office a 
height of 4 metres (13') is expected on the high tide 
at about midnight tonight and a height of 4.6 metres 
(15') on high tide at midday Sunday with moderate 
flooding. At Darra a height of 8.2 metres (28') is 
expected late morning). 
Warning No. 9 Renewal of Flood Warning Brisbane Valley issued by 
the Bureau of Meteorology, Brisbane at 1.00 a.m. 
Sunday 27.1.1974: 
Major flooding is increasing tonight in the Bremer 
River, Warrill Creek and Lockyer Creek. Major flood 
levels are falling in the Upper Brisbane River but 
further rises are likely. Moderate flooding is 
increasing in the Brisbane River Middle Reaches. 
Major flooding is increasing at Ipswich and a peak of 
18.3 metres (60 ft) is expected at about 6.00 a.m. 
Sunday. A height of 4.6 metres (15 ft) at the Port 
Office is expected on the high tide around midday 
today which is approximately 1 metre (3 ft) higher 
than the level at midday Saturday. Moderate flooding 
is expected along the Brisbane River in the city. 
Warning No. 10 Renewal of Flood Warning Brisbane Valley issued by 
the Bureau of Meteorology, Brisbane at 5.00 a.m. 
Sunday 27.1.1974: 
Major flood levels continue to rise in the Upper 
Brisbane River and Lockyer Creek. A peak of 
7.32 metres (24 ft) was reached at Rosewood at about 
9.00 p.m. Saturday but at 5.00 a.m. today at 
Harrisville on Warrill Creek major levels are still 
rising. At 5.00 a.m. today the Ipswich height was 
19.05 metres (62' 6") rising slowly and near its peak 
with major flooding. A height of 11.6 metres (38 ft) 
is expected at Darra wharf at midday today. At the 
Port Office a height of 17 feet is expected at high 
tide at about midday today with major flooding. This 
is 1.5 metres (5 ft) higher than the height observed 
at midday Saturday. At Tennyson Power Station the 
height at midday today is expected to be 3.35 metres 
(11 ft) higher than at the height at midday Saturday 
and at Darra Wharf the height at midday is expected 
to be 4.57 metres (15 ft) higher than at midday 
Saturday. 
Warning No. 11 Renewal of Flood Warning Brisbane Valley issued by 
the Bureau of Meteorology, Brisbane at 1.30 p.m. 
Sunday 27.1.1974: 
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Major flooding continues in the catchments of the 
Bremer, Lockyer Creek, Upper Brisbane River and 
Brisbane River Middle Reaches. Brisbane River levels 
are expected to continue to rise today and a height 
of 19.5 feet is expected at the Port Office by 
midnight tonight, and a height of 21 feet is expected 
at the Port Office by mid-morning tomorrow, Monday 
with major flooding increasing. Tonight's height at 
the Port Office by midnight is expected to be 2 feet 
6 inches above the height at high tide at about 
midday today. At Ipswich the height at 12 noon was 
19.58 metres (64' 3") and rising very slowly. Major 
flooding is expected to continue in the Ipswich area 
overnight. 
Warning No. 12 
Warning No. 13 
Warning No. 14 
Renewal of Flood Warning Brisbane Valley issued by 
the Bureau of Meteorology, Brisbane at 6.00 p.m. 
Sunday 27.1.1974: 
Further rains are expected throughout the Brisbane 
River catchment again tonight although not as heavy 
as the past 24 hours. Major flood levels continue to 
rise throughout the Brisbane River and major flooding 
is widespread. The Brisbane River is expected to 
continue rising tonight and reach a height of 20 feet 
at the Port Office by midnight tonight with further 
rises continuing tomorrow. The height at Ipswich is 
19.61 metres and falling slowly and major flooding is 
expected to continue in the Ipswich area overnight. 
Renewal of Flood Warning Brisbane Valley issued by 
the Bureau of Meteorology, Brisbane at 9.00 p.m. 
Sunday 27.1.1974: 
Further rain is expected throughout the Brisbane 
River catchment again tonight although not as heavy 
as the past 24 hours. Major flooding is occurring 
throughout the Brisbane Valley and will continue 
tomorrow although major flood levels are falling 
slowly at Ipswich. The Brisbane River at Moggill was 
20 metres (65' 7") and rising at 8.00 p.m. and 
downstream at the Brisbane Port Office the height is 
expected to exceed 6.10 metres (20 ft) overnight and 
reach 6.7 metres (22 ft) by 12.00 noon tomorrow being 
1.52 metres (5 ft) higher than the peak height 
recorded today at 12.45 p.m. 
Renewal of Flood Warning Brisbane Valley issued by 
the Bureau of Meteorology, Brisbane at 5.00 a.m. 
Monday 28.1.1974: 
Little rain has been recorded over the Brisbane River 
catchment overnight and only light rain is expected 
today. The Brisbane River major flood peak is 
expected at Mt Crosby this morning and relief from 
major flooding in Ipswich will not commence until the 
peak moves into the lower reaches below Moggill this 
afternoon. A peak of 17.68 metres (58 ft) is 
expected at Goodna by 3.00 p.m. this afternoon whilst 
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further downstream at the Brisbane Port Office the 
height is expected to reach 6.4 metres (21 ft) by 
12.00 noon followed by a peak of 6.7 metres (22 ft) 
during the early morning of Tuesday 29th January. 
Widespread major flooding of low lying areas adjacent 
to the river is expected to continue. 
Warning No. 15 Renewal of Flood Warning Brisbane Valley issued by 
the Bureau of Meteorology, Brisbane at 2.00 p.m. 
Monday 28.1.1974: 
Major flood levels are now receding throughout the 
Bremer River catchment and the Brisbane River above 
Mt Crosby. At 10.00 a.m. today the height at 
Mt Crosby was 65' 0" (19.91 metres) and stationary. 
At 12 noon the height at Ipswich was 64' 6" 
(21.08 metres) and at its peak. At the Brisbane Port 
Office a height of 21 ft (6.4 metres) was reached at 
1.30 p.m. A Port Office height not exceeding 22 ft 
is expected on the high tide between 1.00 a.m. and 
2.00 a.m. Tuesday 29th January. This is one foot 
higher than the height observed at 1.30 p.m. today at 
the Port Office at the lower end of Edward Street, 
City. River levels will remain fairly stationary 
between 2.00 a.m. and 4.00 p.m. on Tuesday. 
Warning No. 16 Renewal of Flood Warning Brisbane Valley issued by the 
Bureau of Meteorology, Brisbane at 5.00 a.m. Tuesday 
29.1.1974: 
The main peak of 21' 8" occurred at 2.15 a.m. at the 
Brisbane Port Office and flood levels will recede 
slowly reaching successively lower peaks on the high 
tides. All major flood levels are now falling. At 
4.30 a.m. the Brisbane River at Mt Crosby was 54' 10" 
(16.71 metres). At 5.00 a.m. the Brisbane River at 
Ipswich was 60' 10" (18.54 metres) and at 3.00 a.m. 
at Moggill the height was 66' 9" (20.35 metres). On 
the next high tide at 2.00 p.m. this afternoon the 
Brisbane River at the Port Office will be 
approximately 20' (6.1 metres). This will be 1' 0" 
below the previous peak at 1.00 p.m. on yesterday's 
high tide. 
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APPENDIX C 
NEWSHEETS NUMBERS 1 TO 6 
Newsheet 1 Sunday Mail, 27 January, 1974 
Newsheet 2: Courier-Mail, 29 January, 1974 
Newsheet 3; Courier-Mail, 28 January, 1974 
Newsheet 4: Courier-Mail, 29 January, 1974 
Newsheet 5 Courier-Mail, 29 January, 1974 
Newsheet 6 Courier-Mail, 30 January, 1974. 
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'J" ~s Briibane'sgl'eat A,Ultrlllla Day f1<:ods be~Cln to r.ced. lost night! 
t _ U the ~mbone W.atherBureau Issued" .",rOI" warnings. ,. ',. q
! Thl Tropical Cyclone . The Bureau. sold f1o:ods w~re expected to be ',as bad as those wh,ch','1 
~ Warning Centre In Bri,- devastated the city on Fnday night. . ' ' . r]
t bone luued thj~ Priority , , ',. i . ;'~> 
t
' Gal. wa',ning ~ 10 p.m. The floods, from the welte,st Brisbone day, for 8,7 Y, ears, were trapped in already 1 
la,t I)lght: ,wollen Brisbane streams by Q tidal surge which added '1.5 metres to forecast heights. 
I h"A trough 1Yhl"gjocerou In 24 hour., 314 mUIl-, . Th~ Bureau .sld more t' In yeot.""'y'. noodlns i&rOO Creelt brolte Its' 
I., t f' co-cat. nort. 0 rla..... melrNJ 01 tarn hnd faU-en, rJJJn with b~avy rall, 'the t-1~lit·-"t fiver tmer.., bank!. . 
~'bane, together with (I '. . . ' .... ,fnty e..,lcuatlon 1n BrL!l... . • 
;' 1026mb. high nlar New Tb. Oood, lell at "'a.t were erpeo~d llurlni ~h. "Me wo., mounted with On. or the flooda fJr.~ 
, Z.alarld, i••xpeet.d ta lhr.... , dead and lour" night.. ' , ,. poUce civlld.fen"e AU- victim. WM a baby boy. ~ mOinlain 30 10 AO knot ml"ll1, end a dam"re 1.' 'tharld"" ,th. Army .na who ":" swept Irom hia, ~ , . bill tb.t Hi.1e author-" tie'"".n! p.m. and 10 tAlr Force combllllni to lather, hMds At Oxley, .~ east to norrh-east )Y!~d, ILles estimate will run tfJ po. m . J !l2.~ mlIllrnetreli rmuce ntc,re tha.n. ~OO Creek neat InalB. early
 ~ (55-75 km·hrl with' mllllen. of doll..... ',"""e rncorded at ~h.Bu- flood-bound r.,ldmte, ye;t.erday.
 
... 5tro~.r £qU'Olls bttween r«l&u. _. _ .
 
,; Cape Moreton and COC>1on-' Mt'r a ,la'. momJn,' , ., •. It " ... Brl.b",,.'1 D'JtI- He WM ShaD.e David,;

V gatta far ot IOQ,t tho next, &nd .rtern""n Inl1, heovy ,Wmd ruste 01 mar. ' kirk.
 ~~:~~ron~... of HYM ,i~ 12 haurs." ';, " rlln Ilatn bJt the cl~. than 50 kllom.trrI an H !l n dr. ~ a or mI.!! 
- • . \' ,'. Irom .bout e p~ " ' , houf were recQrde~, erart worked the flooded The b.by'. mothar and 
ta.ther were re~ued alter~~~~~~~rd:~~~tt,'~llrrh~~ . tbe1r car WM wuhed 
grDund and .5!!l1eoty.: . Into Oxley Cro.k. 
RAAP" Iroquois htU: , 'Th. ""rond flood" death:· 
oopien "fie-tor mi'tC"'j mL."i­ OCCUITt"d M rti-3c-....'·-r·6 were 
elons In the matropolllftn ev~c".,tlni & middl.... 
Ilrfl!\. : . ffo·o~.r'i,~a.~".f N~~Th.y winched J'OOple markflt eRraV$n park..from ~e-wP6 nPl,t B\m... 
damb~ lU'd rool-top-, at II. WI./l Mr Robert 
Inala and Bhtt:k.~ton~. Adl',nUl. ~~I who 'cotlapt.ed 
(~it~' wirlt::,) r::~~~~ ,rr~~ a ~~:r~ at~~~ently 
t h ft 8c1enc:e MlnLsL-f'r ;: .' . '; 
(ntr. Marthonl to IJtJo- 1 he cost' .: 
,'. ~f.';.~ ,re~ort 011 Ihe " '''., " ,j 
I,ate ~lerd"y, lhe full " Reseue.. dlorovered ~I 
lmpp,cl 01 tb.' devas- the body 01 a 'r1ddl.- '.~ 
!.aUan bec~me 8l'pruent aged man floalong· in'1 
lUi -,;tre..,m.!l tha.t had been floo~wl\terti In the prem- ,~ 
running in flood for,nlC'n 1i~~ ci a mator ¢ealer in~: 
than 36 hours bt~Em to Bowen Brjdge, R?a.d,< 
raIL Wlnd,or, ,', . '.", 
·Hou.." "'era tlPP"d olf The man hed nol,been 1 
their stump,. Iteel "·all. k1a"l1lted 1..1 nllht. 
.	 of factorle'\ were' t.orn ;. i ~ 
open and luxury crort . rollc. ,lasl Dlrhl 1I"rw 
were .mllJhed to match- ......chlnc lor & oohoolglrt. 
wood in BrP"Rkr"l!t Cll"'tk.• mls!'iln( In the Moorook .. ~! 
'M:o-c;t major Bri~ba.n,f'" af!a. .'~1 
~ roM!' ~ere ,attn closfod Drec~"'.ed In cordu.!'OY ': 
• lB.'t night. . pants ",Uh ah!rt· aleeves 
The np&!r bill lor rolled. up, the Premier 
'pothol& dam",. wlll N (M r. Bjeike-Petersoo) 
P!lormoUB.	 . hi~tef}~a a~~ro..t h~g: 
Th. flood. and torren- i rove. Wind.50r. ·and Newmarket. ' .' .; ~~ ~~G';~~~~Yem~rn­
, He u.ld nr;!Iba~~ dam.:';':
Tht'l twa airports were &&,e "'ouht rlln ~nto mil•. 
e 10,0; e d. tnJn serylce!!i 
v,ere ~lMhed, council bUll; . M~~ J!ver~~:~-w:~~ 1liervtce-8 we-re disrupted. trellt the flood roln as IUT ~ 
e-mergency 8U~Il~lO,n,...· 
Black-out 
'M r: ~' BJeik~-~et.eraen· 
i....1d; "The'" h.... been8u burb! were blacked 'hemenctouB . d~Va.5t8.ttOri. 
cut a.'S power l1ne-~ wen 'W~ .'iaw flood debrL'S on' 
lei led by gale force th!'. ron!! of 'Some homes." 
v,1nd5., lllld hundreds of 
.It l.< nnl>ellevable that 
home.! lost 'phone 8-l'r- ~the ",atera could have ~'ic~, " , 1I'''''. OS hlgh,.", ' 
. L a tar ye.terd.y he}to~~~c<l ~~t:~;d~ 0:; an.aerialnl a d C! 10· 
roadl. !'pE!.ction oi flood damage 1 
In tile metropolitan are •. ion;9i~t it::~a&~ker~~~ Many plu..'\ure- boats 
tile other at Gaile3., wert!: "ere t.orn irom their ]~lt in a. shllnlhlt!:!I. moor1ng~ hy the wfLll or 
wat~r whlrh rushed downFour prople were ml~­ BreakfR"t Creek about 3:tng Bfter thejr car!l,\'Bns a.m.had bten 05We-pt away
from ·¥.... rogaroo caravan 'jBrJ..sbane busine.s~rn8.o, ipRrk at QRiJp~. Mr. GeDfg@ Pickers,' 65•.
 
CONCERNED PREMIER IMr. Bielke-Petersen) after his oerial In­ PoIlee rear they may
 and his wife, Lorna.. 
h.va been' trapP"d in wa l e h • d .., theJr 13spection' of flood ravaged Brisbane leaves the Army Kkrwo heli­ th('ir C!UH.\'anl'i.· m ft t r t 1u x u r y dte6eI';
 
copter in which he made the imp~ction. Earlier, Mr. Bjetke-Peter-
 One hundred vans wer.. l~l~~~dh 'ag~~tceBre:'~~ , 
. ~ ·sen ,hod:, tour~d hard-hit suburb• .." . ' 
"",opt, ,way, who" ~1r.l- rLSt Cr.,.k BrI<\Ie.: 
I:~tlb~ 
Newsheet L: Sunday-Mail, 27 January, 1974. 
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~RISBANE'S overworked emergency service' were faltering last 
night a,' State Government authoritie, warned that the 
beleaguered city'. flood crisis co uld last for several more days. 
The Brisbane River has been ris ing continually in the upper reaches 
since the flood emergency began three days ago and it is expected to rise to 
more than six metres (21ft, 6in.) at the Port Office about noon today, 
Thls com par e a r~Cl plan t.a cope wilh tlonJng at M:wage aya- Tll~ \\'ere &CirJL to I>LGp 
with .. maxlmum ot the 4.ltuaUon. • teL~r~ji\~~ rH~r~~llon ~~JO ap.%'a ~L~<itrrsd I'..~~ 
n1ne metres (29ft.) He uld he ';liould order to e v a CUll. ~ re:,ldent.!l belni' towed to B HP. 
in the 1893 !lood, ~(}n"~~rO~~~\hltrd~tt~l; k~rpi;.I~!~I~lI.il~~~~: iJ~at!ou~~~ror..,~~~~~~~ 
The Brbbllne Weather II::lty poUc~~~~~.~ .c~d t.er 5eeped Into the bul1~M bl!.nJc. ot L.'1e r1l"er I:.t Gol­~l~~du n~~~ ~~tyr~~ ~~;~ent.· ~~~1ll~~':1 It!:ll~l~ rgla~~: m~~lIer In the day thlt 
top at the 639 mm DOLl! late la..,t nJ.!ht plode C e n ten a r y Hlghway(Z~.31lrn..) that had Callen the tull strength of he Ott'clals at the MorrLs bJ1dJe v.~a buckied when ~~: u~tUii ~in~;~st::: ~ge ~:~y bbfgc~::o~'~~ t.·g~n~IB1r~~~U1~~r~ekxe: :mall~:~ln~gJ~s1°H w~ 
day. ,uttering tr-om bal[ulJ were .called' In to !lhitt. ~ 1IoOd.. 
p~~ Bt:~d an~c~~lJ:r~ ~~~tl.J~ endle~ rescue ~~~c~~l~1~~ ~~P~~bh~: tla~g~ ~ b: J;~~'iet;;tr~ll~ 
a.choo13 wUl not 9pen un­ "The Coree hu been pochlorlde - before fur- carried EI.\\'&.y the bridge ;::t"'-~'~ · .... ~~.....~~?~;etm U1PebruiU'Y"-&week~ :ltretche~toH.II ~tmost:' ther.exlllo~lorul occurred. The 1l.2,OOO---tonli·elJt6*r:!~:'f: - ,I;~;'.'.;:"';:':'; !b,J~' ·,~mdf'·: - 1J.~~D1vualt 'JiU le-; 1d:·~iJW;;;::r:ri~'i.n thLs i~uil~si.~X'Pl?Sl()WWere ~g~;rf~~~~~'a~j1~~~ 
. ;. -: _ ment .. r7uaJ;lnit~I1I ~~~:e ~in ~~~~u~ ic~:~~~I~~~:~l~~:~ i.~~ta~go~,~~ ~~~~Jl~ 
ROAD TO NOWIIERE waH the Centenary ~18hwa¥ Hrldge"at.J"~dalea ;yeBt~rda)'. The DEATH TOLL, ~~:~~b.P~t bu..c.k. ro~t5h:~~J~~~erv~ our lI::ontll.Ct with waler t:­ ~~~~~oo metrc.s dOll,11 M 
brIdge wa.s tl1relitened bf !lood.s an~ a. bl~ iravel barge w~lc.h. CI'1\..!h:d ~ia..1n.e.~. tl~e Up~ The Hood. have The Btatt Government ~e:ed~~~r~h~U:I~;rnao!t;r . 
5tream section ye~terC1ay morning It Wa.::i closed to motoflstll atHt pede.'ltr1Anr. eXctp~ NOW IS 4 Cll"lppled 't..Nl e1l7. leM-vinr"\ lI.uthorltull .MV' bew. fi(}(X1wal.t!r !lwep~ through Port closed 
rescue worll:euand police, A' 01lY .Epgln~er'~ Department: ~~~e!'(ll~n sald ~our py\otl.l ~o~~:~e~ l~lbuJ~ldeb~ ~~e Ur:i\~ne~lI~\e~ ;Ia%t° c k 1e & cbemlcoJ. The port h&..l ~t:l 
had been aa.maced. A central ld-rder or the.ibrldge· is belle\llllD::6J.fL ha.'r:a. ~C1'U~ .:under .". TlIIOk-.flo'" "~.t.h ton . Ilted j a.nd ~lMlnUll IeJ"" )nay llOOn be ~5~cted Btl!lbane'15. t~lephone ~lQ,L;ed by the f1~d Ind ' , -r fJ'I" • ' .,.' ~ I ••s r~.11 1"0 (-ul'r. Witt. tu ,kea d.14ruptad.· Ie ve tel y bccaU6f! th& I kervlces have Peen Qver­ port. authorltlf:s aald t!1 ... t 
\ presbUr~ ot th, tJ.. arifi and tlOO4WJAl1., r~.~ i .' ~;... flrwI .....f • ,..,u", 110111, At 11 o'clock: lut. nlgM ~fu' Ima.ximum aatety taxed durinl ~ll crLs1s aMps III the river mr.y bf:'. .....;., . ~,: .. [ "lilt. I,uk .t D.ylloro. the 8011th~Ea::il P'rll::e~'L1 aervlce pcrtoo.e han been and thousanrLA or 5ub­ trapped there Ccr wedcs 
• ' , •• "....\ > • ,nd VJclorJt. Brl~ ,,"'ere ru.ch~Q. acrlbenl are withOUt tele- beclI.use of mas.slve !dltlni
'J b f . d" ! ;,~";:' - • t· :,4~ , re~~endi:th~he be@ 1m~ab~ of h lUted pl~on~.1!£;t.~u;~~~t~~nt at~::~~~:re:~:or1tlc~ 
lSI 
b "IdTroQPs U I 
_.","O"-.~ .... ­
. 
.\s~ndb~g .was'II 
~a~;.~k~·:'e~~lIi~lr.rl~~e':..:~~~lI ~a~Lcrt: 
protect two', impprlan~ cUy' properUe8 
from t100dlnll7 '.' . 
One: WIllI 'J{1l4 aoinl" ~p AmonI' the acores ot 
around th, 'CeQ };. te1e- 're.sc.Ue5 yesterday wu 
~~eSt~tan 1~:.f.11)a~ ~n~;)~ d~~~~pal~~~ 
~ ~f~a!l~~lvl..i:l; ),~,. =~~:~:~~~~~~k 
" 
.. 0 . 0 r· ' y nam I e 
.	 . ~ 
'E!-;~k' ",';t~Il.Iea.. n c:n trel!t., ~mc HOSPItal. 
:. .,.,here &jc vaulll'i con~' Civil deCence and po­~ IflJlllOI'll! of,. doll8,l'6 1nr .• lice la.sl ntgbt mustered. 
t. ElfIte6, '", '.: ~ 12 speed bOIlL!lto rescue'· Pollee 68.1<1 boLb ~~ .. f t5. =~Lranded In Lh~
 
. :rl5t=t~&:..~r:I~,·11'le.u~ PalI::"~\rJ~h~:
ti ~.J lIlvel.l, ,'. .:; t. 8Out..h a1de _ot Blunder 
~. 'f ii::o~~rn~'~ ~'''i,~~~' ~nco~~
 ~ ~:~ ~~)u;.~th:·.,·roO~~~~~c~te
 ~(1 OWee aboll~ noon: At IndooroopUly 100 
~lm~:' f~L}~elilbt • ~l:1eLntr:~~I~~ 8~~)'ei~~
 
~ f\edoeral Tnnspon Dt~ . old.s ahtltered at Nudite

·artment oCClclll.l.s 5llld Junior Colleae.
 
I'~ nlahL U1AL Drbb).ne. The t:::p1e were rdu~ 
~~Jd::~ay~ clOltd t,.ililtollrol~tr('~~li .... l~:c-~i
. t!{H13t-.1 '111'0 c01{nod by 
.b~n~ ~I~~~~~~~:J hb~ w~~~ u~et~ :l~~;. d:If' by 
JloodwllfT' and furtller c...ndle lIilJ Iv;l nlthL.
 
~~l~~: ~~I~~~c:n~~ r~t~1t~ Ulll coUeie Id
 
atlho gravel 
.,;~; Ji~::ilittl; 'litfi'#iiMBl!fIJlW ;.AIDI 
!~"'h' :Uf"~I~t1';~~~~~~~:t':iJ6.¥·~-~;·~~:~~{';·;,,,)!:,:-,y:~,: 
-,.!;. "::~~:'~<-1 ;J""~_"::'t ~\if~ 
....::;"i:~>:-'~'t'f"~~ ~h;:~:4! 
..•,- -.- -. -- ~., - . - • -' 
TWIBTEII IlAll.INGS 'how the tore. at the IlI1p,c~ ~"rgo.I.II"~ th. 
\ Centenary Bridge at 'Jlndalee yesterday. Four charl'ea 01 dynamite were pJa.ced In thlJ 
. barge In a.n attemp~ to .slnk it. T~e vessel litayed aBoat untlI la.st nlji:ht, When It- piued 
.>.., ."". . under the.brloga and aan.ll; I1own:ltrearu.•. 
HardshIp
other d.ellths occur~ un re a ex a l	 IS kelSman liaJcl tour ex- ben b(en unable to e.s!J 
COl Sl.lL:r-:1ay.	 ~~r~~C'Yr~60~lt~~~j:' . 'M.r. u.ld {:~nlil:e5 had been cl05ed ~!I.~ the. tun of:.r.du"'b,Ej Whllrod the	 ext-ent ~~~, OCs~PtlWJ;&~ar:~~ ~~e~:~u~~fr"e~ ~il~Hu~~~q~~u\~a.~! ~Yt;l~'bw;~e~:nfi~el: ~~~ tb~t d~~;:~~:LI~~~~n~
 
g-;"hekr:"n~~taJ-:' ili1ey ~~WhfChi~~~~Cf:~~ ~~~I~rom~~dnt~~~ ~:~l~~.~~ha~b~lrui~ ~~~~ ~t.B~ball~t:~
 
ed third C th Jt their 110m~6 would Dced .ubscnbenl. About 4000 pa~~~ Jh~je ~~~ c and~-Imed Cciurl!:e~ ~ : h~alna:d cJoth1Di and. Tgt~ ~egtar~m~~ uJ.fe1~ w:::::: h~i~ ~eJefi~
 
"¥eronia. '. TM Pollee Oomml1l~ Many peOple duJ1ni ~\Ihone.ti unleM the call about 1000 people at
 
Mr Robtn Adll..l::ll..' r.s, sloner- (Mr. WhJtrod) the next tew.day" .....ere w~ "l:rg-ent. . their 15 maIn w~lC;He
 ~btJe aC ~ln~ea~a~:~~~ . l~l:t ~~~te~od:(in~;~~ fg~~ to rau ~me hard- &e~I~;I r:~~ t~~d t~~ ~~~~~~a~.n the 6uburbs
 
Cram Newmarket Cllra.V&n 'had compelled author... Bj Ikh'pPlreml~!'d"lhlr. moorings In the Brisbane An a~ed people'lI horne
 
park... . lUu to adopt. .. loni'· ~ e~ e ersen) ........ e River. at New P.Hrn llo11-5 e\"ac­
'. " • > ' • ~tlth~I~~~;lt~d: ~W~h: to~~e 8 (~~_~~) 21;~~ n~~. because ot nS!I1i'
-t t flood. devastatlan.. Uncr Patrb broke herN. 0 II-mi· O' al;re :~~ua~'.()~d~~t .~~I~Ear~ta;d~JI~!!?;~~=.::4r !~rLni. with Fed:tral Qov- I ,.... 
. , ...._'. ". ~~e~~l~~~nct1i~m~i":' 
'." Itld emergency.. ,~ 
' 1 -d Th. PDlle, MIn~tor 1~ ~~f::~11 ~~fl ~~
·Federa aI tho Sl.to exec.d,d $2. 
. , mt1llon. 
Swamped 
The pHiht ot lhe cllyfor.: victims ~~WotWj~S~o;.,roes;~:;~~frll~"~ 
'l'enn)'lItllI. wallo- .!I-llllt downCANaERR"'~. _ Unlimited hd.ral fund. 
a'
 
When tloodwater
 
.are to b~ pro'f'lded fo, f1ood-drlck.n aroCl' awamped lu mll.ln ba~e· 
Brl'bcrne ohd Quun.land. m~nt. A BOtH hem EJeclrlc
 
The Ac~lni TreMurer ..., -------.,. Aut h 0 r J t Y .pokesmlW.

said thal stall WLS alw(Mr. H2.yden) yMterdny 
~1l.j{vt.")~1,l"~~I~~~~lY-.:e~g;~tp.J~I~tJl a~e ·.{)l~iri,~ Lord 
main power supplier Jar
 
end GovernmenL could
 
what lU'blii.nce the Fed· 
the :i.OULh-ll::li.X't Queena­
la.nd iTId.Mayor'sJl~:e ~aid.' th~t the a~vM He llllll1 lOme lIlatt 
nlllmbll.ra Were rhcued by
 
puwnaJ hardahlp itll1\.4
 
all- .. d.olll.J"~fo.t·doJla:
 
• r n men t would make Appeal ~r~i~g~;.~~~t~~r~~~~d\'f~
 
~~~t ~~~l~~LG Govern· AN appelll lor
 ~~~u~~t:m.fl~e tol.~~k~l;Jl;~~ 
uld the DlIlllllbll. atlr.lion
 
~acc.d on FedlHt.1 a,uUM vlcUms 'bu been
 
No limIt 9Iould b.	 Brhbllne rio 0 d w~ lljtll~iL.~rr;t¥le'!l.1l borb. 
· ~~ S.lUTda.y, lhe opened.. have been bltl.cked OUl by
 
P rim e Mllll.lor lMr.
 ~Jree~~rlcIlY aupply 11\11­wi~tl~~~r~r~rn~~~1o'l~~ (!Jd~erm~rd :r.gl~: Power lo bOnle ot lhe 
luburba hLlr. been CUl oU~ueeml.nd·' :lood 'prab~ Jonelll Innounced l"'~L 
tor lIat... ty rt.a ...on.. AtleTt;. Hayden .wId lhat ~l~~,~ thplr~JI~~ aftft;~ le8.'lt Jour 6Ub-Jtll.Llon... In
 
the QueetuI&nd' Qonrn- Cor lhos~ vicUmll not
 the metr-opolUan ,;artll.
 
ment hll.d. Lhe oril1n~ ellglble tor B~t4 or
 
It;. I t I~ nand Lhe ex.- t'ederal t.111.
 ar;'t~ach~~k la~t nji~t 
the Preml~r ord~l'ed all 
· :lre~tl~an~ Idmln15Ler orJ~~ ,.,ir~ea~ ,UO~ ex.ternal UR'htlni Jiwltch­

The' Federal Gov~mM donation from Brb­ ed ott a~ StllU flovernM
 
menl would keep 1n close ba.ne Wht.rvea and
 ment buildings ln BrIs­

totLch with Bt.a~ auth()r~ Wool Dumping Ply.
 bane.
 
lUe.!l. Ltd,
 Brbbane'a iU :'iUpplJea
have been reduced toStranded dO~~dl,~...n g:~l~ sa~ thouaands ot homes,
mlll1ly In 1l00d llreu. 
., Mr. HI.i-'den WlUl Uran- JiU~dtoMiYOr't Flood 
, g;dfl~:~bh~e~\1f~~: D~~~i£iirPeal. Gall threat 
ThLrty ;'I.Oldl~ra were~h;~ ~~e~~~~~~ Brlabkn., -WOO. I~nt to lhe Nu•• lead
 
H.....Id h. WO\lld Ir·
 , ........'ol'kl 11I..!Il nlf,l"ht When III rO(tllMu !rorn Queel1l~ nllOrt ....·dcr. ~llnat4'l1cdr·&nie for 50elal IhcmlLy lo cut the Whole city"~P&t 14nelll Lllhtanc(l to ti)t~o~IV~ g:f~n~iLl~r~:dBlattl Ol:l~Clrume[lUi lC lh' I~~~~~, i~'~d~Oli~~:reIJel.
 
tor rellet..
 
a.lIa1.llance '\lIPU nC'Ce,u.ry Mr, Morrlaon , Lld he fhroUihou( the nighl. 
expected to i1ve a ~uU re~ The ""',,tel' lapped8ocJal' ,,"'elCUll C1CClcer.l port at his visit to the wlLhln 3 metrroa {lOtU oC
Cl>Uld I>e: Hnt ~rotJ1 olber
 
Btll.-cA to UJlI.lt..	 (M~~~~) ~~~r ~~ ~fdfeer~e~r~h~ ~e~~~ The Peden! Govarn~ J1neera Reilment .itarted
m.enL 111"1& read1 to oller Mr. MOlThon worJc. ou the le ...ee.&11 iUMlta.nce neuau17 
to Bt3.ta &uthorlL1u. "rlUe.'. ~.&. J. One iaa .company.
 
Mr. Whltlam aent the
 apokeaman saId there 
Selenc. Mtnlster and were tears of i.u; leak.s III 
&CtIni DeCence Mlnlater Water plea lome auburbh when the
 
(Mr. MorrOOn) to Brl.·
 tlood".. ter rect"de,1Brlbbo.nl! City Council Borne are..." ot lhe citybane on Saturd.y 1.0 In·	 ,,",Drk. cDmllllllefl chalr­ wer. lI.l.3o WI~hO\ll rell~lpe;:lt Quod dalUlI.j(F. ma.n (Al~hmll.n l"ync:hJ culated ..... ~t.er. Mllltunc· th~~~~Z:rd li.\~~e~e~·~~~	 t~lt~~~· ~~~1~lj~t~8~:~ 
Pol(lra~l1) tnll 1·110 I:3htl. 
()p~l/iltIL\an L,(I;l.(\tr IMr.	 ~l~:\:llll~':l:~1 rl'~l~~r:f~ ii\~~~. i
 
atted~d Ole ~iOllnl Cr06M ,
rheuaL~~Jn gtflle~~l~~;f by purnplnlil: III'lIon. 
need Cor a.ervlce acthlty, Eoa-lneert suld the a(l­

Mr. Morr1..5on has Ilk:ed Won C!luld be oul oC '-cllon
 
thD ....med Sorell. to }llee~	 tar two p:a)'8 or Olore, : 
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IPSWICH last night was 'reelin 9 under the impact of the worst 
-flood to strike the city since the 1893 disaster. 
Authorities hove lost count of the number of people who have evacuated
 
their homes, but believe the total is more than 1000.
 
At least 300 houses in six suburbs have been abandoned; and
 
have been badly inundated or destroyed by the relentless muddy,
 
<­ torrents. ' 
One coal mine, Moreton Extended, was covered by the floods 
and "exploded." 
Overall property dam­
age is expected to exceed 
$3 million. 
The swollen Bremer 
F,iver yesterday reached 
a heigh t of 19.6 metres 
(64ft. 5ln.) at -1.30 p.m. 
By dark, the river had 
shown no sign of falling. 
'Out on feet' 
The r e were uncon­
firmed reports of another 
hug e body of water 
swe€ping down towards 
the city. 
A senior police officer 
commented: "People are just about out on their 
feet. 
"They've been working 
non-stop for more than 
24 hours. They can·t take 
much more." 
Four of the district·s 
major coal mines went 
under ,vater. 
They are Moreton Ex­
tended, owned by Ry­
lance Colleries, West­
falen (Kathage Bras.), 
Haighmore (Tivoli Col­
leries) and Aberdare No. 
B (Aberdare Colleries). 
Other mines are known 
to have serious wat€r 
damage. 
Chi e f Inspector of 
Mines (Mr. W. Roach) 
said the MoretDn Exten­
ded explosion was a pres­
sure blast. 
Water seeped into the 
mine through a weak 
spot in the overburden. 
Gradually, the ~Iow in­
creased lintii t·he entire 
mine was flooded and air 
and gas pressure then 
"blew." 
Crater 
Mr. Roach said a small 
office buildmg and a car 
dis a p pea red intD the 
huge crater. 
He said he believed 
it might b€ six weeks 
before the mines were 
pumped out and back in 
production. 
Coal Board chairman (Mr. A. CrOWley) said the 
Ipswich mines had the 
contract to supply the 
Swanbank Power Station 
Which needed 52,000 ton' 
nes (51,000 tons) a week. 
He said the sta tion had 
reserves for a few weeks. 
But it might be neces­
sary to use the men from 
the flooded mines tD aug­
ment the production of 
those mines still oper­
ating. 
It would be a few days 
before the position could 
be assessed. 
'Aerial taxi' 
Helicopters from thll 
isolated Amberley
R.A.A.F base began res­
cue and evacuation mis­
sions at first light yester­
dav 
they plucked people
from the tops of houses, 
off the roofs of cars and 
trucks. out of flooded 
paddocks and even off 
fences. 
A RAAF sDokesman 
said: "We've got quite a 
few strangers staVing
with us on the base 
tonight. 
"I don·t think anybody 
bothered to count how 
many peopl€ were res­
cued. 
'Th.. helicopters sim· 
p!v acted like an aerial 
tax.i sen'ice '" they 
v:nu]d be Q'jven a pick un. 
and when that was fin­
ished, another one. 
The spokesman said 
that only two helicopters 
were available when the 
rescues began. 
A third craft came into 
use later in the after­
noon. 
Yesterdav; the base -'­
which is "home" for the 
RAAF's latest' and most 
pO\l'erful air armada, the 
Fills - was inoperable. 
All landing surfaces 
were covered - by feet of 
water as two local creeks. 
the Purga and Worrell, 
broke. their banks, merg­
ed into a 5.7 km <3,­
mil e) s t rea m and 
swamped the whole dis­
trict. 
Bv dark, some "is­
lands" were starting to 
appear on the strip. but 
the base could be ou t of 
action for another 48 
hours while the ac.~umll­
lated rubbish from the 
flood is cleared off. 
Worst hit 
Ipswich district police 
chief fInsp€ctor J. V. 
M c Car thy) said the 
worst hit suburbs had 
been Basin Pock~t, Eras­
sail. Wood End, West 
Ips\\ich, Booval. Bun­
damba. and Bergin's Hill. 
Scores of homes were 
submerged. 
Inspector McCarthy 
said many hundreds of 
people had been cleared 
out of these areas. 
He said' the city had 
responded .magnifkently 
to Dleas for help. 
,As far as he knev.'. not 
one p€rson was v.rithout 
shelter. 
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FUEL EXPLOSION A THREAT NOW
 
f-' 
00 
00 
BRIDGE to nowhere. (Top picture). This was 
the Centenary Bridge at Jindoiee yesterday, 
as Brisbane River floodwaters rose to near­
record height, and below, a modern house 
was another flood victim, 
THE flood-besieged suburb of Jindalee, starved of food and all but isolated, now faces a 
new threat -- a petrol explosion. 
Flooctinh \\'8..<; rppor~('d accr,,;." to supnUes at Ox- M\lre t.han 100 rr.ful:.f'r.s 
to lla\'~ dhplac('rl 1111n- lry (\no.' oqfe~ :... \n~,ttrn irTllH th£' \Viltr'n Hr\nd 
ctrect:s of gallr:ns (If petrol s~lburbs. ~:: :' Hnd T\r!~g F3trdH area of 
[rom ::;toragf: t?nks at a Indroor<lopilly w(ltched 
Curragundi Street service Before tho flnocl" the frf)!l1 the !'anetllalT of 
station. heFY machinu,' had th'2 Nl1d~ce ,JQBlnr' Col­been llsed on roadiH\rks l('~(' BS i':alcr pngulfcd all 
RCSGue workers ~ald connected \dth residen­ bllt the rooitops Ol til~ 
petro! s\,;jrlin~ arollnd tial dcvelopments in the fei\." lWll1(',<:; :-1 ill Yi.sible at 
\\'ith the \':ate;~ '\"2.5 \'a­ area. da\rn ye~t('rr!8.Y" 
pons~ng Rnd posed a. 
serious explo:Slon thrrat. Ti1~ bead of Ule schoolSolid link (Brother l!(1!lgood i toldPeople who helped fer­ th~ llC'lneless "You are r~- in ':s~ential supplies to Early reports \\·ere that 
,Ye!cmne a." long as the
the suburb spoke of some thp bush traCK, helie-,ed emergency lasts".to be almost a kilometer 
ing" of petroL (six-tenths of a mile) Brothor Hopgood 'aid 
long, W?...3 fit onh for Jator that ttie school 
streets of Jindalee "reek­
Meanwhile residents fOlll"-\vheel drl\'e yeillcles. would nDt open untiland pol ice yesterday but offered a ~0]jd land next \VQdne,da,',commander;red hea\'v link with the outsine
machinery in an effort to
 
break through the flood Wh!le the com tructlon
 
barrier threatening the '~:2.S 18.king place, Civil
 
S,tl burb. Defence wnrkcrs wE're
 
The re.<:;idrnts began ~~~-~Xll~y fg~~t 3f~~o s~g;bullrtozirl~ an emerget1cy
 
road from the '!;\'f'stern
 suhurb,
 
sir'[ e 0 [ the :zuh:lrb
 Othp.r equipmcnt. par­
tluoJgh bushland to a ticularl~" g;l.') r.slindrrs fordry section of the Cen­ cooking, was bejn~ t<~k('n ten~r'y Highway_ in hy penple from adjoin­

ThIs would give them ing suburbs.
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• EXCLUSIVE AIR PICT,ljRES T 
City almost 
.,~' ,',' ' _~-l' ';at standstill 
... ..,.' tt¥1,r-;HE Brl~bane River's ~as5lve floodwave ~" ..:e,·:.",·d iearly today began Its surge through the 
i;~~;", . ~! ;city's aleady·ravaged areas and authorities 
.. ~ ". S~,~' ~ ... :"" "" warned that the disaster level would not ~')~~"il: •. ~'~:::l, 1 fall until late this afternoon ' ' 
'''lfIl..,cL ~ ":~F~'! ji". ..' , • • . ~; 
', "t.r.:','~'~,,',',').,.:'. Rescue craft, last mght were operating by searchhght
.' , {III......... to mOVe scores
 
, 
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~ 
•
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SPECIAL AIR PICTURES show Ule extent(It the!lood devastaUo.n in -"Brisbane. Tbis 
.t..ew. ta.ken from a~ aircraft over Toowong. 
looks over the flood-swept suburhs or 
'\~chenJloweJ: .and Mllton to William Jolly 
~, llrl~ge .n~ fbe Clt¥be2.?,n~,.,. 
of people trapped in flooded suburbs as 
the river heiljht reached 6.7 metres (22ft.) - 4.2 metres 
,(14fl.)' above normal 
.,' 
Tit. rucul operatlonl follow.d anoth.r day of 
h.ight.nil'\5J crilil in many .ubu~bl. 01 polici and volun.. 
I.....va,ua,led 600 mor. flood v,d,ma from Ih.lr hom... 
. . . 
TlJ~ worstfJoods this century claimed more live~ 
brInging th~ State death toll to eight dead and two 
missillg. . .. . ,,(~, I ~ The rag dg Brilbane Rlnr continued8 ftDod }o rip the hec:.rt Out of the necu-cripple-d city, 
l ....oring velu:f. from th,i, mooring. and Dlh,'rwi into more than a d.D.un suburb.deaths ~aU&lni dl,ruptlon to .I.entla) ICfYJcO'. 
t-' 
CXJ 
\.D 
worry 
sports 
stars 
er~~(' ~~~lJ;e~o~: ' 
lleves her husband and 
children have hM to btl 
evacuate4 from their 
home. 
Au.strallll.l1 t.eam man-
CHRISTCHURCD. 
_ Au~tralian Com­
monwealth G:l.m~1I 
athlete Margard 
Ramsay hag asked to: 
be released lrom the 
team to return to her 
1'amily in flood­
bound Ipswich. 
Floods1 dead, 1
 
missing
 
•In Army
 
tragedy
 
, 
AJ:< :\R~Y, corpo~al IS dead, a cap­
tam 18 mbslng beheved drown~d and 
three, men are In the Roy~1 Bnsbane 
HospItal badly.burned alter a flood 
tragedy near Kenmore yesterday.
Th. moo ~'" m,m· 
~;'t~~; o,;:~~,,·n::, 'i,;.mp~Hbl"U'' 
,~ rnuried. dt Staltard, who Life aavlnz Club 
• ~ . 5everalareas'wer,-'". &r.cul workerlrepo~~·j ~:~~e~06fo:~6~~' a. ~fi"'~anUl~t~~~alii 
Without electricity, Wilier, ed' In.ataneu Whclll ~he IOn of'Moigill, hurned; .lone," tu! saId.
 
.a.nd i:1lA. . 0 n I 0 0 k e r I were bam- Mr ~ Oleo Suttle or Mog':' "He Wa.:!l IStlU alwe, ht
In State ~~ry~!l~ c1~tut~~ ~~Ol1~e1M~o,: (~~ ~~~e~Mr ~eu~~)-;: ~tJ~~JnJ ~~~d 
fi-ght p~pl. h"..."..tiM flni ~t nuJor ro&da Hodge3) ordered. pollee to M L.A 'IlJb . Mt Coot: hIm kee-plng his head ou~ 
&emy LARCI vehicle that htL hlllh 
~:~I~ :';::.l!ill~utt: :l~~-
te;h~:w ~~~lYde~ll~~~I~
 
&nO the InJu"d to the 
Royal BrJ.5.blLJle Hospital 
;~:'t.o'~?c'::~'J,,\:::'~t ' 
nJ.ht. 
~~Illed N~~Mll' B~:;
 
j, ~ounga.n. marrled., or
 
BunnybanlLMI~lng l.s Oll.pta.ln L (j. ~ :er~;rr. IIlMrled. ol AI· . .Mr., Lidtit. 
v;~~o ~~r: 4Je kfs~ be~:rotLlf~~ K~r~ mJ~i 
h'jilt Qlolu,ulu4', 110041 II'! .. n db. d I y danla.g.tni . &nd out tlck:etlS 1.0 the tba>·· of .. Ore.enLreea ot the wat.er .n4 ~wao1 ',I~. ~tt dz: 41i1~. " ~~ O~t:~cr~rnmui.era ; tr~~~nn~~. tm!l8t :VJ~~;ir BrlJOl(neld; fo.D~, '~~;d'::.(l'J~WC; to _ In~~:reku4 yetiterda 
Thll. body of .. MkIl 'tlJ~-' fk.CCt& ·,grlm tJo!k. ,th1& " . The. Weather Burnu· . ),Ir Lkk1w hu minor "r thought 11 I got tUm. t.hA :OClOdlI had re&dl:! 
fQund nol.Unlil' tWn Ar-' ~orn.lnj"bgettln!:uwork ":JJ:r::'4 ~ B~fblj bUl"clon an IJtIl. ~ • back: to the LARe he'd the up,sts.1n! liv1ni QUJ.r­
,~~~~;~~tf..,:" \!~~ ~1l:~4 :~:,',' fiood lj,s1i1lt 0/ B.7~etr: , ' ' : __':··.~~~b: ;l~~tin~ilth~~. ~er:r °lr~fl~CrO:k.hod~l~ . 
, tan; 1e&~r(l.ay IMm1tl,. ";';' ~rcl1, . ',- '"" .'," ... ~. "-:--,!" If;LLia.r 14 houn unt.l1. ;..~~~ $urveylnli;'. ·<-fr<nn tl;. E.1lnck JiDDn· aJ: ~ troylni Of c1J..lnfI.BlnI{ tu;r~ . _. 
I', , > SOm. m.aj01' city de- a ut. ~ p,m. today. th ter he WlLS en board niLure wd. Utun~ He ­
Another tItan I budy· tt r t III II:' n t at-o~ haye· The let'sl \lilll be about He aa.¥:i la-at nJs:ht • < "'\11 of us in the tront estimated t.he dMna&e to
 i:~l:e~~~n1n s~~d:i·' d I.hel~ ~ ~e =~~IIM1~n belo.... be about 55000.
elnplo}'ee:a ~1~R;"o wo~e~Vj~aU~: ~~tl~1I U1~ni • w::r {~~ IlAY hom ' pei~:d i{rl~t~ ~!~~ ~~~~':~~ e- =Qlli1}~'O~ 
axea at WiodJ.ot OJl, Bat- Food shortage }'esterday for the flr$t noon. lurveyln( Lhe area 
urd.a.y. There 'JIen rellT.l lut 
. Police had PoOt named n1ltht tha.t the floods U~;~~1UJ~n:Ilsht.dl~d ' ~~~ uuu a lood ahort­
fr-om a h~_ t a.1til.Ck dur~ HU e qUllnLJtlCII 01' food 
lng e\'ACU ion ot a New- were '''''t ye.5t.erday when 
mar!u: • LL\aU pa.rlL. "'Ilten; e\i.amped ware~ 
_ Sh a.v!.d. Patter.. hOll.5-e.s in the BrLsbanefJ: ~~.,..t~o.rpY~~~th":'~ and IpnrJcb U~lU. 
arn:;r;-A Qxle. Cnek: Wat.t:r feet deep "owed n~s.r InaJ.a." 'UHOUiIh ps.rt:s of tbe 1n­
, " ., lj . net clty cau.'ilng huge 
. mi~\!i:f~fU~=; ~~~.,t¢ ~~R~~d ~~;y 
on Prl~ay afternoon. ,. Street-Albert Street areo.. 
La->t Th:m-dAJ' • ml.n ~ 8oldter.a and fIremen 
'l.:il.5 found nOl!Uni in a. ,worked tor houf.! tlu~~ da;:,,~ ~~~5&. men are ~~ l~a~e; fte1~p~~~~mex~ 
~Ih~~~' 2ci~~%11~e~ S~:erli\l,~e/~ n:~~~~~· 
'~;~)"keI=, ~a~ ~:~~.Lened to roin eqUIP-. 
eheml.'lt la belle\'ed to- Pollce CTa.ck:ed down on 
ho.\'e dro~:ned on Sunda.y the erowd.s of 8pectatol1l 
;:.~~ lI.~~aeJ;fJl:r'a:~: th~':n ilt~or~1a;p~ila~ 
hIli :t,IpaW~~~ ~~,. '~f~~~ R1',...~rt'1\~. . 
, . '- '6 . '< . ~'. 
,I 
Alit VIEW 01 Ute lIooded commercial ,section 01' the cJty near Eagle Stre.et. Wole.r had svread beyond the Wool 
Exchange lnto Cha.rlotte and Elizabeth Streets, and threatened the Edlilon Telephone Exchange, the Hght­
. colored hulldlng at lett. almost 0pp051te St. SL-ephen'~ Cathedral. 
Mor. flood plclure. Pag•• :2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15 Gnd 16. 
{- ..~ :t-. 
," -- J' 
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Newsheet 5: Courier-Mail, 29 January, 1974. 
~lden~ce ine ~ve-d~Y· ~d ~~W,J:rl~~Ck-UP 
The peJ[ s gand d He lSaJd' "We :pIcked 
at Mogg1U ~i ~~:d~Y up a man, hl.s bed.t1dden 
yt.!>terday, glln:Hather, 86, and hla ~~fl1 ~de ~\r{r14bano f~11~1~1r=~aa~ ~o~~~ 
y & ue . :3 p,m. and baby fro~ Weelul5000 t Road and the MoggJ1l
OU dde Of, Bellbowrle.~ 
qtate Government .~, 'The LARO ptl£lied 
tho-rlues a.!tlmllLed I~t under se~nll dead hljl:h
nli:lH that about 1)000 teruslon wlrell on Lne ~P~fty Ire homeleil! 1n ~ W~'bt~C~jnute I wu In 
The worn-t-h1t aUb~rb6 lile LARa and the next 
)-'esterday :!Dcluded Jjn- I wu thrown about: 1& 
dale-¢: 8berwood In- ya...ds out of !t," Mr. ~l~~.ilIlY. Yeronga llnd Llck~ saJd. 
5O~~e~lICll~dMI~e~i~~' Electrified 
~bur~ had Peen .!!ect- el:~~~led~:loJeeoCp~f~ ~~ 
Some of the :peoole moatllng an~ screaming
rno}'ed by boat during I.l1d there were 6heet.s ot 
t~~n~~Y t,ad ~~rrJun~: ~O~~p~?on~ sound 01 
~:~~~~~a.~~~~~~~ !r~:?~f ~P£:..RCt w~~; 
lnll them. burned and I ,saw the 
ce~~~ o~~t.erInre~; ~rr~a.:h~~u~l~e~reand 
city l!l.'it night to- house tried to 1nllue my M~ 
and teed the 1100d, vlC- West, but couldn't and 
tlm.a. .swam b-ack: toward,., the 
crafL . 
"I could hear peopleExhausted InsIde groanJnli. evcry­
ope received the llhock:,&aid: ,~~~y o~t::l~e~ Mr, LlckJss ,said he In-
CUll work~n arl!l exhaUllt­
ed. They'Ve been worklni' ~l~~e~~~l~~ t~~~d~ and 
with only short breaka "It's hard to rec<lllect 
for lour daylS and n1g:hts.. what It WIlS like", he said 
"The ttood peak is ex­ "It wal!l p.audemonlulll, 
~cted t.o last throughout. eol1fuslon. 
"I ~member someoneO(d'~l~~l~~r~;l~~s1::- trom the other LA-Re, 
the flood vIctims." 
Th e Brisbane Olty ~~~~s :I~Il£~U;SereaV::l~ 
Council appealed to resi­ /i.O-meone In the wat.t:r, so 
dents to restrict theIr use I dived in asaJn aHer 
of electrlc1ty ~rt wa.ter. blm." 
HI
 
ai~~~;°tonll!r;vg~i ~t lihe may have LO run 
In the -fxlOO metres relay
l,O(llly belore IShe can 
leave. 
She eJ.so la tlndlnll tt 
dUflcljlt to get a dlred 
flJ&"ht to Brlsbanll' 'pe~ 
C2.U.5e or the nooo:. . 
Mr, Younlt add Jut 
nliht: "The Quee'nEJand
memben ot the tnm at"' 
very rom:erued ,J:Iout tbt 
!I00dIS.'l 
Cricketers' 
llL~ ,t1eCl~U~ipt~ee.~d 
AWit...Uilll blll.&mB.D. Q~ gg~~uBr~~~~~oon 
1.ll pos,slble. He Ls plartng
in the Third \.est aga.!nst ~,z~~a.:~ A~elfln~ 
out the condJtlon of b1I 
flooded two-awre")' hoo56 
of the L.>\RC 'rea.lly cog­~~kltw~fu;:t~~o~ l.:r~ le~~eldi1tC~~k:C:i:~ ~;:o-t b~~~ U made anxlolL5 loni-d1a­
the O~I~UtJllit'g: th1!.t ~:..,~:d ~6~oc ~lro~~~~tni~ ~~ 
me, yet the corporal waa yesterday to check on tha 
.wearing them too." 1'lood filtuLitlon.
'C t II For at least twG,. theOp er ca ne~t;,~a:adAh.n .1ane.& 
The two LARC5 re- went to the cre,!M after 
turned to Mo:gg1U Road. learning that hilS late4 
at Bellb;owne, where· model car had been wub-
Mr, LlcklSS called the ed (I.'9.'lI.y by tlood,~at.en. 
AmlY tor hellcoplu.s to ll~ Car:lna. . 
en,cuate the Injured. The 'car WIl.!1 badly rl;;~~~~h:ei~tD~t r~; 5~g~ge~a1~ ~~r &~ 
major and Mr, Sultle, would be- covered by in.. 
Flares were. t1red to help ~rance, . 
the second' and lhird Spln bowler Malcolm ~:~~co~~e~ c~~~edlnpa~~ ~iP:}~11~~:d h~;~ h~_. 
a.Io11gll.(de the road. .1lndal~ wu"ubmer~4. 
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SItlSllAN E RIVER In full flood yesterday, looking upstrea'm from Dutton'¥Jrk. 
_ ,._..e foreground is the Queensland University. St. Lucia. The area at left 15 the 4Uh.\Jrb 
:&: ~, .._'"'' West. In the dl,tance are Long PockeL the Oxley Creek mouth and thes\jlliirbs 
ot Chelmer, GracevJ1le and Sherwood. 
•River IS two
 
miles wide
 
By a Stoff Reporter who flew ""er Brisbane yesterday
e 
! FLOOD-SAVAGED., Brisbane wal an incredibl. •..a> ,&lV'sed . 
. light fro~ the ail yelitorday. - ~ - '. _'al~:~k~=f::~ ~rE 
'~.' .' ,.,~ .,"" ,'" ',,,. ••. '.A··..,':" ... "l':' ..'v.te bOxea-Ultto Box::JPO" 
1.. ",'1'11,6'; Brh!lbl!.m'''· Ervu' 'aN:t:u' ,tOOlU: north ·~to caI4l'&na, ·tl&tL-",,;'.;;;_;l::h'd.':.~.»(nriri~· ~.;::...~-­
! WaH mdrll tlUn -J km.: ..$U ut It ·,allU a.er..-Icdhle ba.,.... ,,-hat -. ·bob~'-· Man the£"could not ~ 
;. {,two mUeSl wlde).lplead~ \o\-u, ~le swy sndll;e.. ~ ..Iani' orr top Of,th. water _dt:l1verea la.at Saturday 
Ins: back rr~ et. LlJc1~. ,D.o.-anA': of hoW.,~ ~~~l:d for MO!"~R13~Y.>~4U a1.l0 damam ....nd: 
. thtutl.ilh.the lXeltlltO J\n .. ~~~\~:{ea ~~d~~:;Z 
lubdrm. . , 
As the l1tl,e:rnoon flood 
pr'lJ,k rf'iH:hed the Inner 
city area. the onlY llil1tlC 
.TanI.-er IS ~ 
danlag"ed: The tonn.62,000 
! ~:~e~K~:::i~O!~~~e~g~:~ 
line. b h,ok. it •. mool~ 
lng, an ~L1nday night, 0. 
.pok~lm.gn for Evant 
Deakin laid yenudcy. 
The .'OjJokt>,<.JlL.I.n con­
tJrmed that the ::.!lijl l;u.d 
bee n hokd in tllree 
I Pl~~h hole melUllred 
ar,o~lt l8 metres bY.6 
l)l('lrc:l (6 Ct. by A ft). 
Jl~lob;~~~:;/:t~~r~~~O fii~ 
lihlp when dl1ttlng out of 
c.omrol do~n the .:. ....ol1en 
rh'f't on ~!ond'lr nJ~bL . 
The bole..! are abo\'e 
water Ic\'t"1 aDd are noL 
call!im~ 1:Illll.:-ulJ.te con­
l:ern, 
I
The .shIp will remaIn 
a.tlts prl'''.:nt po,itlon 
nE:1I.r the E'duU Deakin 
!hlp-",rd:l ulItll port alj­
thorillt! can make al~ 
tern<l.ll\ e arral\l-:"elllent~. 
f·;· P.O.m:~~
 
spoiled " 
n. Pent Offi" It., not 
IMln .blt to ..,im.', rlt . 
h.ow m'tch ",.1( hn It... 
,pall." In Ih. fl..cf... 
The South Br\l:;bane 
~g~;p~f~l~ n:J":rr~~ 
mc.'it of the mall Utere 
~-ahO'\l,ied:> ... thdl'," rool~ ~u.r. ... ld.' t.1i.I, .river,. much'of Jt~ula 'be ~n" ­
A i~~O~It;!~ ~g~'l~t~~rn~~ =~ ~~m;~~t1or1ayt~: ';: l1e!~va,rab".'· -" .: 1 
~'ere- 5ubmeri~d Or alm- port to req~n to Illaw The Poat oWe. booed 1 
ply Inb~IIJ¥" a.s Iln~-ct... them to berth but .1ItJnl to U~ Wcolloonpbbl.!
d 1a a. p p e .. r a d Ullo thl of the rlYH trom hea.vy POlll OWce to d~ll\'tr 
ml.rk:y ",·ata. run-oft eould ~ont1nu. to mB.lI to aTeu of Bouth 
Hun d red a .pr oLhera bill theIr entrUict.. Braba.n. today. 1 
.(ood tn w.", varying tn 1--'depth ('Olll • lew uHum • 
to D1..l11y teet.
 
At Bt. Luda. the riveT ..
 
JtIlmedlately u~lrI~am
 
CUt blrallthl acro!>.S Lana
 
Pockr--.t ~ol! coune. '
 
pU~~l;}lltQ~~h tltiri1~~~~~ .
 
~l~ r~e~~'~~i1 ~~d BQt~f'nel~
 
b:n.:(;t g ..... \e borne 'm-

UJ~u.tlOU of the magnJ~
 
lU(le at the un.',>cen dam·
 
ag:e to lll1:51Ile:-.S prellllbe5.
 
In EB.bl Brbbanc, the
 
C h u r c h ot Ellilllnd
 
~1~~~l~~l\J;l~~h~lu,,~'rb~ 
UJI:l bank~up in NOrHlan 
Cr(;(::k sendIng v,:atu hila 
~~~~.~~f~~l\ll~~~:~r~I~~: 
l)lenL.S. 
Square only 
u VoS t rea m from 8t. l
 
LUCia. wa,. water
 
.l'itrcLched lor mile! alun&, .'
 
tne rlver.$ tu-..od plujn u
 
{'lr a~ the eye could lite
 
to'.. MUll l~wlci:,
 
tolL~r~:;eyll~~d'li~k~:~ .
 
JIllLbtl lal a.re.J.JI, and the
 
re ,JCc',lUal nrf'EI..'j oC JJn­

(jake. SL, Lm:lfl. Chelmer,
 
lndool·oupllly. and ad~
 
jCJlIJmg f1verslde lllJburb~.
 
AL Milton, the QlJeerc;­

land Lawn TennLs A1;..",o­
~~,~\lgn'sbe w~r~LlJ~~,r~~~ 
a n I y by the square
 
flJ.rillel1 b)' UPI)a .lIectiOM
 
of the ll:ra.ndstand.
 
; arnund LIle ~entre court.
 
; Lang Pflrk, Bnsbane'!
 
R:Hihy '<c(q.:ue hendqnar-

I t.tr:i, <Iud lhc Albion Park
 "kCt~ Co,jr:-c resembled
 
IHIlle ~1\'1!lIJIlJnl{ poob.
 
In tile Ilr.('uk!iUit Creek
 
ll.n;'l. 1t Wl16 difricult to
 
plCl-: mit, lh~ COIlI'!>C of the
 
(rCf'!", .Ju'il In a !wlrJlIlIJ
 
mR~5 or Wilter which
 
bitr"ked up throllJ.:"ll busJ­

ne"g prell1ht:s rlW"hl back
 
lO I'l'rry Park
 
D"b dl tram hOU1i~.g. 
Newsheet 6: Courier-Mail, 30 January, 1974. 
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APPENDIX D 
THE DAMAGE SCALE 
The Damage Scale was constructed using the Guttman Scaling 
Sub-programme in SPSS (Nie et al., 1970). Initially, all items from 
a detailed 'damage' supplement to the Follow-up Schedule were 
considered for inclusion. 
A final pool of five items was accepted as a useful scale. These 
items were: 
Item 308 Damage to Internal Walls 
Item 310 Damage to Internal Doors 
Item 311 Damage to External Doors 
Item 312 Damage to Built-in Cupboards 
Item 320 Damage to Internal Paint Work. 
Statistics for this scale, based on 262 cases, were: 
Coefficient of reproducibility = 0.9160 
Coefficient of scalability = 0.7556. 
Yule's Q: 
Item 308 Item 310 Item 311 Item 312 Item 320 
Item 308 1.0000 0.9756 0.8963 0.8781 0.9485 
Item 310 0.9756 1.0000 0.9769 0.9724 0.9623 
Item 311 0.8963 0.9769 1.0000 0.9541 0.9572 
Item 312 0.8781 0.9724 0.9541 1.0000 0.9760 
Item 320 0.9485 0.9623 0.9572 0.9760 1.0000 
Biserial Correlation: 
Scale-Item 0.8973 1.1228 1.0350 0.9833 1.0772 
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APPENDIX E 
RECATEGORISATION OF VARIABLES FOR CHAPTER 5 CONTINGENCY ANALYSES 
Note that only those variables appearing in Figure 5.1 are 
included in Appendix E. 
Peak Height 
Original categories: 
No answer 
Don't know 
Entered grounds only 
Water under house but no rooms 
affected 
Entered downstairs rooms: 
. No details on depth 
. Less than 1 metre 
. 1-2 metres 
. More than 2 metres but not 
into upstairs rooms 
Over main (upstairs) floor level: 
. No details on depth 
. Less than 1 metre 
. 1-2 metres 
. More than 2 metres but not 
to ceiling 
. Above ceiling height 
. House totally submerged 
New categories: 
No answer 
Don't know 
Mild to moderate 
flooding 
Severe flooding 
Knowledge of the Hazard 
(No recategorisation necessary) 
Age of Male Household Head 
Original categories: 
N.A. 
Less than 18 years 
18-29 years 
30-45 years 
46-60 years 
More than 60 years 
New categories 
N.A. 
45 years and under 
Over 45 years 
Age of Female Household Head (Includes spouses of male household 
heads) 
(as for age of Male Household Head) 
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Occupation of Male Household Head 
Original categories: 
N.A. 
Professionals 
Managers 
Clerical and Sales 
Farmers 
Skilled 
Semi-skilled 
Unskilled 
Miscellaneous (Pensioners) 
Houseworker 
New categories; 
N.A. 
White collar 
(No cases) 
Blue collar 
Home Tenure 
Original categories; 
N.A. 
Renting 
Leasing 
Buying 
Own 
New categories: 
N.A. 
Rented 
Owner occupation 
Personal Hardship and Distress Grants 
Original categories: 
N.A. 
No assistance received 
No comment 
Up to $100 
More than 
More than 
More than 
More than 
More than 
More than 
$100 to 
$300 to 
$600 to 
$1,000 to 
$2,500 to 
$300 
$600 
$1,000 
$2,500 
$5,000 
$5,000 to $10,000 
More than $10,000 
New categories 
N.A. 
$100 or less 
Little or no assistance 
received 
More than $100 
Considerable assistance 
received 
State Government House Restoration Grant 
Original categories 
N.A. 
No assistance received 
No comment 
Up to $100 
More than 
More than 
More than 
More than 
More than 
More than 
$100 to 
$300 to 
$600 to 
$1,000 to 
$2,500 to 
$5,000 to 
$300 
$600 
$1,000 
$2,500 
$5,000 
$10,000 
More than $10,000 
New categories 
N.A. 
Little or no assistance 
received 
Considerable assistance 
received 
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Lord Mayor's/Ipswich City Council Fund Grant 
Original categories: 
N.A. 
No assistance received 
No comment 
Up to $100 
More than $100 to $300 
More than $300 to $600 
More than $600 to $1,000 
More than $1,000 to $2,500 
More than $2,500 to $5,000 
More than $5,000 to $10,000 
More than $10,000 
New categories: 
N.A. 
Little or no assistance 
received 
Considerable assistance 
received 
No cases 
No cases 
Damage (Scale) 
Original categories New categories 
(See Appendix D for details.) 
Time in Temporary Accommodation 
Original categories 
N.A. 
Does not apply 
One night only 
2 to 3 nights 
More than 3 nights but less than 1 week 
1 week to (less than) 2 weeks , 
2 weeks to (less than) 1 month 
1 month to (less than) 2 months 
2 months to (less than) 3 months 
More than 3 months 
New categories 
N.A. 
A short time 
A long time 
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Experience of Flood-related Problems 
Original categories 
Yes - but did not supply problems 
Yes -
. Marital problems 
. Marital problems associated with 
financial worries 
. Financial worry and other 
personal problems 
. Financial worries alone 
. Specific physical health problem 
. Emotional problems associated 
with physical symptoms 
. Other personal or emotional 
problems, not associated with 
physical health problems and not 
related to financial worries 
. Problems with children 
. Other specific problems 
No ' 
Don't know/couldn't say 
New categories 
Yes - experienced flood-
related problems 
No - did not experience 
flood-related problems 
Emotional Strain 
Original categories New categories 
N.A. 
Yes 
No 
Don't know/couldn't say 
N.A. 
Yes 
No 
Time Off Paid Work (Primary Wage Earner) 
Original categories 
N.A. 
Not working at time of floods 
No time off 
Returned within 1 week 
More than 1 week, up to 3 weeks off 
work 
More than 3 weeks, up to 5 weeks 
off work 
More than 5 weeks, up to 2 months 
off work 
More than 2 months off work. 
New categories 
N.A. 
3 weeks or less off work 
More than 3 weeks off work 
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